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I. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING: VIEW AT THE TOP

I. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING: VIEW AT THE TOP
A. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS—A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Our understanding of the decision-making processes in Chinese foreign
policy is still very incomplete. This is an anomaly, as Lucian Pye (1978)
has pointed out, because the Chinese frequently use the mass media to
discuss sensitive bureaucratic policy matters which in other societies
would be left to confidential channels of communication. We are left with
a remarkably clear picture of the issues under discussion, but with very
little insight into the bureaucratic politics of the decision-resolution
process itself. It is the reverse of our access to and understanding of
most other polities.
There are at least two reasons for this lack of insight. First, the
political processes themselves have been unstable and subject to frequent
change. Second, our understanding is hampered by our self-imposed lack
of contact with Chinese decision-makers (on all levels) and on the reluc-
tance of Chinese officials to speak or write about their domestic processes,
which impact directly on personal political fortunes.
A variety of approaches has been used to try to explicate the domestic
politics underpinning China's foreign policies, with only limited success.
Professor John K. Fairbank and other historians have stressed the
Confucian tradition and its "Middle Kingdom" world view as the sociological
perspective structuring Chinese thinking about its world neighbors. The
distrust of the rapacious, uncultured West; China's inexperience in dealing
with other nations as equals rather than through hierarchical relations,
and an inflexible, chauvinistic bureaucracy are characteristics of the




in Chinese behavior. While this approach has enriched our understanding
of historical attitudes and geographical continuities as domestic deter-
minants, it tends to understate the social changes brought on by the
Chinese revolution and the communist reconstruction of society and social
values. The Confucian classics no longer have a literary lock on the
bureaucratic mindset; today's bureaucrats are politicians, technocrats,
and ideologues who speak, if anything, from anti-classical perspectives.
Decision-making, while colored by traditions from Old China, has to be
explained in terms of the paradigm of a modern state, which China, though
still in a mixed state of development, certainly is.
The largest school of analysis in Chinese foreign policy falls into
3
what Graham Allison calls a Model I paradigm (unitary rational actor)
.
This school essentially treats the nation-state as an individual interact-
ing with other individuals (states) on the basis of rational choices. The
approach typically analyzes one or more historical events in terms of the
interaction among the players, explaining the sequence of actions as reso-
4 5lution of national interests. Harold C. Hinton, Zbigniew Brzezinski,
and Robert C. North are leading proponents of this methodology. It is,
by and large, a very useful approach that has enhanced our understanding
of the "diplomatic game" from the perspective of the "Chinese player." It
falls short of a full understanding, however, in that Chinese foreign
policy behavior is no more "rational" to the external observer than other
nation states behavior because decision-makers are weighing domestic
political considerations that affect their priorities, freedom-of-action,
and attention-span on external problems.
Attempts to analyze the domestic determinants of foreign policy decision-
making have so far been limited to what Allison calls Model II (institutional
politics) analysis. This is a specialized elite theory that attempts to

identify political groups (institutional, special interest, and personal
factions) and explain how they interact in defense of parochial interests
to reach a final bureaucratic balance—i.e., a decision.
Several techniques have been tried on this level of analysis.
Q
William W. Whitson made a thorough study of the military backgrounds
of Chinese party and government leaders and came to the conclusion that
the most powerful factions- in the country, including the civilian sector,
were personal alliances built by men who had served in the same Field
Armies. Because the Red Field Armies (like those of the earlier warlords)
were regionally based for support, these factions remained regionally
oriented. This retarded the transition of political power to the party/
government "Center" in Peking. Whitson' s analysis provide valuable insights
but suffered from the obvious limitation of focusing on only one factor.
Presumably, Whitson would hedge some of his conclusions today, in view of
the decline in PLA political power in 1972-74, after his study was completed
Melvin Gurtov used a modified Model II approach to correlate factional
fighting and its impact on foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution,
a time when the decision-making process was particularly affected by
9domestic politics. It provides valuable insights but is time-relevant
only to an aberrant period.
Several scholars have broken important ground in the study of elites
within the domestic system. Robert Scalapino is coordinating research in
elite formation, recruitment, and power interplay in China and Japan,
but the sophistication and relevance of the analyses of elite roles in
Chinese foreign policy-making lag far behind the work done on Japan.
12
Parris H. Chang made the first comprehensive effort to trace power
shifts among contending factions over a broad period of time and across
multiple issues. Although the focus is not primarily on foreign policy
8

issues, they are interwoven as secondary factors among the other issues.
Chang's analysis of the movement of the power center among contending
groups is important for any correlations others will draw about trends in
decision-making
.
Chang's approach is carried over into contemporary Peking politics by
the Hong Kong leftist press, which generally follows the analysis developed
by Ting Wang, managing editor of Cheng Ming . Wang sees a power struggle
between the old Chou En-lai moderate faction, now headed by Teng Hsiao-ping,
and the more orthodox (but not radical) Maoists, led by Hua Kuo-feng and
13
Wang Tung-hsin. The series of rehabilitations of individuals (exceeding
100,000 by 1978) and institutions (for example, the CCP Propaganda depart-
ment and judiciary organs), however, make current analysis of power centers
difficult. Power is not stabilized in institutions and individuals, with
the result that policies tend to be provisional and sensitive to every kind
of feedback. Wang's analyses of other than cadre rehabilitation patterns
are largely based on leaks and rumors of party meetings, not always reliable
data sources. Without definitions of the power structure and formal and
informal processes to confirm his assessments, there is no clear point of
reference. Lively debate among China watchers exists over the most central
question: whether Hua and Teng are in a power struggle.
A variety of analytical methods have been employed to attempt to develop
Model II analyses. The most frequently used is polemical (or textual)
analysis.
Using polemical analysis, Donald Zagoria developed a factional politics
model (radicals, moderates, bureaucracy) in the early 1960 's, which was
further refined into various forms by RAND analysts. The works of Michael
14
Pillsburg, Thomas Gottlieb, Roger Glenn Brown, among others, seek to
identify power cliques and struggles through changes and contradictions

issues, they are interwoven as secondary factors among the other issues.
Chang's analysis of the movement of the power center among contending
groups is important for any correlations others will draw about trends in
decision-making
.
Chang's approach is carried over into contemporary Peking politics by
the Hong Kong leftist press, which generally follows the analysis developed
by Ting Wang, managing editor of Cheng Ming . Wang sees a power struggle
between the old Chou En-lai moderate faction, now headed by Teng Hsiao-ping,
and the more orthodox (but not radical) Maoists, led by Hua Kuo-feng and
13
Wang Tung-hsin. The series of rehabilitations of individuals (exceeding
100,000 by 1978) and institutions (for example, the CCP Propaganda depart-
ment and judiciary organs) , however, make current analysis of power centers
difficult. Power is not stabilized in institutions and individuals, with
the result that policies tend to be provisional and sensitive to every kind
of feedback. Wang's analyses of other than cadre rehabilitation patterns
are largely based on leaks and rumors of party meetings, not always reliable
data sources. Without definitions of the power structure and formal and
informal processes to confirm his assessments, there is no clear point of
reference. Lively debate among China watchers exists over the most central
question: whether Hua and Teng are in a power struggle.
A variety of analytical methods have been employed to attempt to develop
Model II analyses. The most frequently used is polemical (or textual)
analysis.
Using polemical analysis, Donald Zagoria developed a factional politics
model (radicals, moderates, bureaucracy) in the early 1960 's, which was
further refined into various forms by RAND analysts. The works of Michael
14
Pillsburg, Thomas Gottlieb, Roger Glenn Brown, among others, seek to
identify power cliques and struggles through changes and contradictions

crises, when the "spillage" of confidential intra-Party papers and politics
enabled outsiders to acquire tantalizing details of "push-pull" politicking
in decision-making councils. Dittmer's, Gurtov's, and Ann's analyses of
Cultural Revolution politics, and Lieberthal's description of the infight-
ing between Teng Hsiao-ping and the radicals in 1975, came close to Model
21
III in approach, if not in format and completeness.
B. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE—THE POLITBURO
Final decison-making authority on all issues, domestic and external,
22
rests in the Politburo. Only recently, however, has information clarified
how the Politburo manages its deliberations, builds support for its decisions,
and achieves implementation. These general processes have direct bearing
on foreign policy making.
The Politburo is divided into two tiers: The Standing Committee members
who act as generalists, and the rest of the Politburo, whose members assume
responsibility for one or more functional areas under the "division of
23
responsibility system."^ There are several Politburo members with active
foreign policy roles. Hua Kuo-feng, although nominally head of the party
and government, seems to have a limited role—either by his own predilection
or because of constraints imposed by Teng. Hua receives important foreign
guests and has begun to travel abroad, but so far has not been involved in
substantive negotiations on new foreign policy initiatives. He has been
abroad only twice; to Korea, and to the Balkans and Iran.
Marshal Yeh Chien-Ying, as chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National Peoples' Congress, is head of state, but due to his age (81),
performs most diplomatic functions such as receiving ambassadors' credentials
by proxy, through his 21 Standing Committee vice chairmen. Yeh was instru-
mental in swinging the PLA behind Hua in the showdown with the radicals in
11

1976. He still seems to wield enormous influence, despite dwindling
energies, but his foreign policy stands are generally unknown. His choice
of Chi Peng-fei, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, as secretary-
general of the NPC Standing Committee, suggests that he is generally
content to leave matters of diplomacy in trained hands.
Teng Hsiao-ping, though a generalist, has strong views on foreign
affairs, derived from a considerable background of foreign contacts. He
spent six years in France and Russia in the 1920' s, gaining certain cosmo-
politan tastes and attitudes found in Chou-Enlai and others who shared
such experiences, but lacking in those without such exposure to the West.
Teng was a senior delegate to the Moscow conferences in 1957 and 1960,
and in 1963 headed the CCP delegation that faced a similar CPSU team
headed by Suslov in the last attempt by both sides to settle ideological
24differences. He is outspokenly anti-Soviet. Teng traveled to France in
1975 and, since his last rehabilitation in 1977, travels frequently. He
has pushed to get other Chinese leaders abroad to see first-hand China's
relative backwardness and the need for closer outside contacts to spur
modernization
.
Teng seems to be responsible for creating the Academy of Social
Sciences out of the older Academy of Sciences in July 1977. A trusted Teng
staff aide, Hu Chiao-mu, was named president of the new Academy in March
1978. Since then the Academy has served as a "think tank" for Teng on
a wide number of issues, including foreign affairs. Its World Economy
Institute, World Religion Institute, Trade and Commerce Institute, Foreign
Literature Institute, and World History Institute, amor g other research
branches, have helped surface foreign issues for discussion at high levels
of government. One institute within the Academy was responsible for
drafting the November 1977 article "Chairman Mao's Theory of the
12

Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-
25 2fi
Leninism," the pivotal foreign policy paper of the post-Mao era.
Huan Hsian, a former Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs (1964-1968) and
Ambassador to Great Britain (1954-1962) , is a vice president of the Academy
and presumably coordinates such studies for Hu Chiao-mu and Teng. At any
rate, Teng has his own foreign policy think-tank to develop foreign policy
studies, which gives him additional expertise and clout in Politburo
sessions.
Li Hsien-nien, the fourth-ranking Politburo member, has had extensive
foreign affairs experience. Since his appointment in 1954 as Finance
Minister (succeeding Teng in the job), Li has increasingly shouldered
responsibility for China's economy, a position which has put him in the
middle of lively foreign policy debates over trade expansion and ideological
leadership in the world. Although the reemergence of Ch'en Yun as finance
and trade czar in early 1979 has transferred some of this responsibility,
Li's prestige and longevity in the Politburo have made him a key voice in
foreign affairs. He and Teng are the only leaders who speak freely on
foreign policy with foreigners. It was Li who made the important trip to
southern Africa in January 1979 to discuss Soviet expansion in the region
and hold talks with national liberation movement figures such as Robert
Mugabe. When Teng is unable to meet an important visitor in Peking, it is
usually Li who fills in and makes whatever agreements or commitments are
required. Visitor talks with Hua tend to be shorter and more pro forma
,
after business is conducted.
Ch'en Yun's role in foreign affairs is as yet unclear. Since his
admission to the Politburo and its Standing Committee in December 1978, he
has been immersed in retrenching the economy. As that job sorts itself
out, he may take on more external responsibilities. Until his fall-out with
13

Mao over the Great Leap Forward, Ch'en had routinely filled in for Chou as
27
acting premier as the need arose. Whether he will again seek such general
responsibilities of state is not known.
Wang Tung-hsin, leader of the opposition group confronting Teng over the
de-Mao if icat ion program, joined the Politburo in 1977 and has been abroad
since then only once, to Cambodia, in November 1978. There has been specu-
28
lation that Wang may be opposing Teng's efforts to end economic autarky—
a
key Maoist credo—but there is no direct evidence of this.
The remainder of the Politburo is grouped in three clusters: (1) Teng's
key backers (Wei Kuo-ching, Hsu Shih-yu, Teng Ying-chao)
, (2) technocrats and
bur^c-ucrats (Fang I, Keng Piao, Nieh Jung-chen, Yu Chiu-li, and Ch'en Mu-hua)
,
and (3) residual Maoists (Wu Te, Saifudin, Ch'en Hsi-lien and Ni Chih-fu)
.
A coalition of the first two groups under Teng has largely neutralized the
third. One is encouraged to speculate that the second group's backing of
Teng's principal programs in support of various aspects of modernization
includes his foreign policy line, since this group has been active in
establishing overseas contacts. Fang I, Ch'en Mu-hua, and Keng Piao are
28
among the most widely traveled of China's top leaders.
Apart from the conflict areas of modernization and trade, there are no
clear divisions over foreign policy issues. The leadership appears to have
been united in the decision to attack Vietnam, and there is no evidence of
dissension over normalizing ties with the U.S., or rejecting detente offers
from Moscow.
While all members of the Politburo share responsibility for final policy
decisions, there is a fairly clear-cut division of responsibility in the
preparation of position papers and in the execution of policies (usually
in the form of "central documents" issued serially by year) resulting from
discussion of those papers. Of 35 full and alternate Politburo members,
14

the 16 who hold vice premierships also hold government positions which
require frequent contact with foreigners, and so have titles with visible
governmental seniority.
Each of these 16 double-hatted Politburo members can legitimately bring
before the Politburo foreign policy issues which fall within his bureau-
cratic purview. For example, Ch'en Mu-hua, minister of external economic
relations (i.e., foreign aid), would be responsible for staffing a Tanzanian
request for major repairs to Chinese equipment on the Tan-Zam railroad
through the minister of railways and the minister of finance, before she
would present a recommendation for action. More importantly—from the
standpoint of Politburo politics—no one can properly submit agenda items
outside his own "division of responsibility." Chiang Ching in 1975
attempted to "capture" part of the foreign trade area by criticizing export
of art objects and handicrafts—her bureaucratic realm being culture—but
29
was rebuffed.
Kenneth Lieberthal, in analyzing Politburo decision-making procesees,
describes the policy paper preparation process as follows:
Each leading Politburo member evidently has a staff of
personal advisors, and one or more of these may play a role
in the drafting of a document in which the Politburo member
is involved. Once the person on the Politburo with responsi-
bility for a specific functional area takes over the drafting
process, moreover, he typically contacts people in the
appropriate executive organs and assigns them the task of
pulling together the data necessary for drafting the CD.
This in turn initiates a process of consultation, research
and investigation that might well stretch down to the basic
levels, if this is felt necessary. The consultation involves
sounding out people in the appropriate functional hierarchy
at lower levels of the bureaucracy to solicit their views on
the current situation and how best to handle the problem on
the agenda. Frequently meetings are convened at various
levels to discuss the issue. Research includes checking
appropriate documentation on previous policy, technical
documentary material relevant to finding the best solution
to the problem concerned, ... .Often investigations are com-
missioned as a part of this process, either to generate
15

better data on real conditions in the problem are concerned
or to trial test some of the proposed solutions so as to
provide the leadership with data on the likely results of
the proposals. These investigations may well produce models
for later use. Some available data strongly suggest that
particular Politburo members cultivate individual locales
where they return repeatedly to test out proposed policies
—
evidently because they know the local situation relatively
well and have faith in the local leaders' integrity, wisdom,
and loyalty. Through this process of consultation, investi-
gation, and research, an initial draft is produced. 30
Lieberthal analyzes in some detail how the division of responsibility
system was used by Teng in 1975 to keep the radicals from prematurely
learning of, and countering, his three major programs (what were later
reviled as "the three poisonous weeds") . This bureaucratic ability to
"capture" an issue area and control the data and conditions for its
presentation to the Politburo can become critical during periods of
factional strife:
The input of the various actors is structured by the assign-
ment of specific functional areas of responsibility within
the Politburo and the organization of the Party and state
bureaucracies into functional "systems" on a national basis.
This arrangement can be seen as a rational and efficient way
to link up the Politburo with the various bureaucracies that
govern China. The rules governing the flow of documents,
and thus of information, are contoured to this functional
division of responsibility. Nothing in this modus operandi
need preclude widespread sharing of information and full
cooperation among various members of the Politburo. As
documented in the text above, however, to the degree that
the Politburo itself becomes divided and ridden with fac-
tionalism, this system of channeling information can provide
a vehicle by which each side can try to deny necessary tech-
nical and political data to its opponents. Indeed, the rules
of this system allow for a situation whereby, until policy
papers concerning a given issue area are virtually complete,
only perhaps one or two Politburo leaders and the Politburo
member responsible for that "system" of work need have access
to the drafting process and the information that it generates.
This is a system that can be used, then, to work against those
who would like to block a policy in a functional area over
which they have not been given control, for they cannot legiti-
mately undertake independent investigations of the issue or
begin to work seriously on the problem until it has been
formally tabled for discussion by the entire Politburo .^
16

Given the current composition of the Politburo, one can see that the
coalition of moderates and technocrats has preempted virtually the whole
foreign policy field.
Once the position paper is before the Politburo, a process of consensus
and compromise is invoked. If the issue is too thorny for compromise and
protracted debate begins, it is customarily shelved rather than forced
32
through on a majority vote. Consensus-building is then transferred into
a wider public debate through the media (the radicals used the press fre-




An enlarged Politburo meeting or central
party work conference may be employed to "stack" such an overwhelming
majority for a given position that opposition is drowned out. The addition-
al members are usually specially invited provincial and military region
34
leaders sympathetic to the majority view. Mao developed the tactic and
Teng has favored it.
Teng has held two key central work conferences that appear related to
foreign policy shifts. His late November 1978 conference was followed by
a slight relaxation of Peking's position on Taiwan—opening the way to
normalization of ties with the U.S. the following month—and a hardening
of Peking's position on Vietnam—leading to preparations for war in
February 1979.
A second working conference in late April 1979 reorganized China's
foreign trade into a codified legal system that was adopted by the second
session of the 5th National Peoples' Congress a few weeks later in June.
Both working conferences also included major and highly controversial
domestic reform packages, which were probably the real reasons the Politburo
was bypassed. Whether they came in "piggybacked" on the domestic issues
17

or not, it is clear that Teng seeks to avoid open splits in the Politburo
over foreign policies.
Throughout his career Teng has promoted the idea of collective leader-
ship and fought bulldozing tactics in the Politburo. As Secretary-General
of the CCP in the 1950' s and the early 1960's, Teng worked hard for "unity
and stability" and showed he could live with the majority's ruling even
when he disliked it, as he proved when he implemented the rectification
program against intellectuals after the 1957 "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom"
campaign. Even then Teng was willing to step outside the Politburo when
Mao tried to block its majority will, as happened over agricultural policy
in 1960-62. That Teng has not purged his Politburo opposition (such men
as Wang Tung-hsin, General Chen H si-lien, Saifudin, and Wu Te) suggests
that he still values an outlet for opposition within the Politburo.
The result is that, instead of an increasingly autocratic one-man rule,
one sees a reenforcement of the whole "collective leadership" approach
towards decison-making. The emphasis is on an open, consultative, con-
sensual style of dec is ion-ma king with a bias towards compromise. Teng is
restructuring the political process in such a way that hardline, cross-
issue factionalism should play a decreasing role. Decisions are likely to
be more incremental and flow from consensus adjustments rather than the
old pattern of sharp policy oscillations erupting from "two-line" ideologi-
cal battles.
This same conservative approach towards the fullest possible consensus
is mirrored in Teng's use of Central Committee plenums and National People's
Congress sessions to endorse shifts in the party line, including foreign
policy changes. During the faction-riddled Maoist era, convening a CC
plenum or an NPC session to approve policies was extremely difficult in the
absence of consensus. New NPC ' s and Central Committees were convened
18

sporadically, and typically after repeated delays. The fact that Teng
uses the NPC and Central Committee frequently for prompt endorsements of
new policies shows that he is equally concerned about achieving a national
consensus, above and beyond that among the central leadership. The addi-
tional step is critical for effecting whole-hearted local implementation
of new domestic policies, but is also relevant to the "selling" of foreign
policies which might otherwise be misunderstood or unpopular. The composi-
tion of the Central Committee, and to a lesser degree the NPC, ensures
that regional and local party "opinion-makers" have a chance to discuss and
absorb policies which they might otherwise oppose had they not been consulted
The overall effect of Teng's orchestration of the Politburo and legisla-
tive organs is that decision-making in all aspects of national policy
—
including foreign policy—has become one of consensus and relative stability.
We now consider the government bureaucracy headed by the State Council,
focusing on the increasing role of institutional power in collecting,
staffing, and processing information going to the Politburo for foreign
policy decisions, and implementing those decisions after they are made.
C. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICIES—THE STATE COUNCIL
Even though the Politburo meets frequently—Lieberthal estimates about
35
once every 9-10 days — its members are too busy with the highest matters
of state and party to attend to day-to-day matters. More importantly, the
party structure is not staffed to handle the flood of government details.
The daily routine of government is supervised by the State Council,
headed by Premier Hua Kuo-feng and first Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.
The Council has 15 other vice premiers, all of whom are double-hatted as
heads of various ministries, except Keng Piao and Li Hsien-nien. There
are 16 other ministers without vice premier status, for a total of 29
ministries. (See Chart 1-1.)
19

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves as a clearing house for overseas
business of other ministries. It appears to have considerably less political
clout than its counterparts in Washington, Moscow, and London. The current
minister is Huang Hua, who entered the job in December 1976, replacing Ch'iao
Kuan-hua, who had been discredited by ties with the Gang of Four. Huang Hua
has spent the bulk of his diplomatic career overseas in Africa, the Mideast,
Europe, and the U.S. His lack of a power base in Peking is reflected by his
modest party credentials; he does not sit in the Politburo and is only one
of 201 full members of the Central Committee. The post seems to be
intentionally downgraded in the power structure; one has to look back to
Marshal Ch'en Yi (Foreign Minister 1958-1972) to find a foreign minister who
sat in the Politburo and could be considered a political boss in his own
right.
There are two possible explanations for this low-key political status.
First, all three foreign ministers since Ch'en Yi have been career diplomats,
too frequently out of the country to build up political alliances and not
directly engaged in domestic operations, where power bases are built.
Second, China's top leaders have conducted a very personalized handling of
foreign affairs, preferring to conduct key bargaining with foreign leaders
in Peking. Chinese foreign ministers have been used as spokesmen and go-
betweens, but the charter to go abroad to treat with foreign powers is only
rarely given. Foreign ministers have been more like chiefs of staff for
foreign affairs, using their ministry to collect and collate information
for the top leadership to make decisions. This role is described on the
level of negotiations in Chapter V.
Both of Huang Hua ' s predecessors, Chi Peng-fei and Ch'iao Kuan-hua,
lasted 2-3 years in the job. Should Huang's tenure extend significantly
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to win an alternate seat in the Politburo, as did his Soviet counterpart
Gromyko. If Huang is replaced in the near future, his most likely successor
is Huang Chen, currently minister of culture, who has had a long and dis-
tinguished diplomatic career, including being head of the PRC mission to
Washington, as well as a brilliant military career during the Civil War.
The other key personalities in the Foreign Ministry are discussed in
Chapter II
.
D. INTER-MINISTERIAL COOPERATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
There is no data on the periodicity of full State Council meetings.
During certain times of the year, such as year's end when the next year's
budget is being decided, the meetings for coordination are probably
frequent.
Most of the State Council's business, however, appears to be done in
work groups on the sub-ministerial level.
Within the Foreign Ministry, there are two levels of coordination to
work with other ministries: the vice ministerial level and the departmental
Twelve departments, covering geographical and functional areas, serve to
collect information, staff position papers, and perform other related
staff functions, such as setting up visits by important foreign officials
to Peking, and visits abroad by senior Chinese leaders. The departments
are in some cases subdivided into smaller bureaus, roughly comparable to
"country desks" in the U.S. State Department.
The departments and bureaus in the Foreign Ministry have counterpart
offices and bureaus in most of the other ministries (See Table A) and State
agencies (See Table B)
.
A few ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Trade, have a
structure of departments with geographical responsibilities nearly as
complex as the Foreign Ministry itself. The, departments and bureau

TABLE A





Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Ministry of Light Industry
First Ministry of Machine Building^
Fourth Ministry of Machine Building
Ministry of National Defense
Ministry of Petroleum Industry
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power
This leaves 13 other ministries without known internal sections for foreign
affairs.
called "Foreign Aid Office"
2
called "Machinery and Equipment Export Corporation"
(Source: CIA, Directory of Officials of the PRC, November 1978.)
TABLE B
STATE AGENCIES WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAUS
Bank of China
Central Meteorological Bureau
China Travel and Tourism Bureau
Civil Aviation General Administration
Foreign Experts Bureau
Foreign Language Publications and Distribution Bureau
New China News Agency
State Museums and Archeological Data Bureau
State Oceanography Bureau
State Standardization and Metrology Bureau
(Source: CIA, Directory of Officials of the PRC, November 1978,
23

probably deal directly on most matters, with the Foreign Ministry regional
departments providing the linkage between embassies overseas and Peking
bureaus needing information and coordination for such things as market
surveys, trade and scientific protocol negotiations, and trips. When one
considers, for example, that the Ministry of Commerce has commercial
counselors in only 11 embassies, and the Defense Ministry has military
attaches in fewer than two thirds of China's embassies, the Foreign Ministry's
geographic departments clearly must be busy handling the flow of requests
and information from other ministries to the embassy personnel under their
cognizance.
A second, higher level of inter-ministerial cooperation exists at the
vice minister level. The Foreign Ministry's 10 vice ministers and four
assistant ministers share general protocol functions but each is responsible
for specific geographical and/or policy areas. (See Table H-l> Chapter II.)
On military matters, coordination seems to be handled by Vice Foreign
Minister Ma Wen-po (who came to the Foreign Ministry from the PLA during the
Cultural Revolution) and Deputy PLA Chief of Staff Wu Hsiu-chuan (a career
diplomat—ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1955-1958 and Assistant MFA 1950-1955
—
until he shifted to the PLA General Staff in 1975) . There appears to be
a hazy distribution of geographical responsibilities among the PLA's deputy
chiefs of staff (See Table C)
.
On matters of military aid and guerrilla training to the Mideast,
Deputy Chiefs of Staff Wang Shang-jung and Hsiang Chung-hua appear to have
handled matters in concert with Vice Foreign Minister Ho Ying, the senior
Mideast expert.
Further similar correlations can be drawn on vice-ministerial tie-ins
among ministries through appearances at diplomatic functions in Peking for
visiting foreign dignitaries and experts. The same "crowd" tends to show
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In cases where a foreign delegation arrives in Peking seeking aid, for
example, the delegation leader is met by either a MFA department head or
vice minister, unless he is very senior, in which case the Minister himself
acts as host. The department head or vice minister will hold extended
preliminary talks, probing the delegation leader's position. The delegation
is then taken in to see either Huang Hua or Li Hsien-nien for wrap-up talks,
at which time senior officials from other ministries (PLA, Trade, etc.) may
be present. A handshake-and-tea photo session with either Li, Hua, or Teng
seals the business. It is at the vice ministerial level, though, that other
ministries appear in the talks and the Chinese position is apparently coor-
, 37dinated.
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II. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DIRECTING TRAFFIC
A. COORDINATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In addition to the overseas activities of other ministries in the State
Council, there are a large number of quasi-governmental bodies which perform
roles in the foreign affairs process. These include the Chinese People's
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) , the parent or-
ganization to a bevy of smaller state-to-state friendship associations; the
Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) , an advisory but
also participatory body semi-connected to the Foreign Ministry; the Inter-
national Department of the CCP Central Committee, which is responsible for
relations with fraternal socialist parties; the United Front Work Department,
which handles political mass campaigns within and without China's borders;
various professional, scientific, health, and sports associations, which
actively send delegations around the world; the Hsinhua central news service,
which operates offices and bureaus worldwide; the China International Tourist
Service, which is involved in a mushrooming operation that "exposes" China
and the official Chinese viewpoint to hundreds of thousands of foreigners
every year; and the foreign affairs offices set up to handle official guests
at provincial and municipal levels.
The few scholars who have raised the issue of "Who coordinates the var-
ious levels of Chinese diplomacy?" are not in agreement. From 1958, when
Chou turned over the Foreign Ministry to Chen Yi, until 1966, there was a
Foreign Affairs Office, whose function seems to have been such coordination,
set up within the State Council. Although George Jan in 1977 argued that
it still exists and performs this function, Donald Klein in 1974 insisted
it was never resurrected after 1966. He is supported by the Central
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Intelligence Agency, which does not list a Foreign Affairs Office among
the various offices within the State Council in its 1978 PRC Directory .
The author has not seen any references to such an office in any official
Chinese media over the past few years.
If one accepts a differentiation between decision-making and coordina-
tion in foreign policy, then it is possible and useful to view the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs as a hub connecting various spokes that make up a "wheel"
of foreign policy. The wheel helps move the wagon of government along,
but it doesn't "drive" the wagon. The role of coordinating policy-related
inputs up to the State Council, then coordinating the execution of policies
down may seem rather modest to foreigners accustomed to the overdriving
roles of the U.S. State Department and Whitehall in their government deci-
sion-making processes, but the Chinese Foreign Ministry seems to be content
with such a limited role. It has tried to seal itself off from the inter-
necine battles of the political factions by staying out of the decision-
making process at the top.
The rather unique cohesiveness of the Foreign Ministry, based on the
loyalty by its members to their institution and its role, has been demon-
strated in various ways. During the Cultural Revolution, when Foreign
Minister Chen Yi was under severe attack, 91 senior members of the ministry
issued a manifesto defending him, a remarkable act of political courage at
3
the time. Roger Dial has done a fascinating case study of the Foreign
Ministry's defense strategy against radical disruptions over the same
4period, as seen through the actions of the Chinese ambassador in Nepal.
While publicly mouthing the Red Guard slogans, the diplomats overseas
continued to maintain normal diplomatic ties with host countries, which
would have been anathema to the Red Guards, had they suspected.
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The Foreign Ministry has been successful in insulating itself from the
arena of final decision-making in part because the top leaders have pre-
ferred such a relationship. As seen in Chapter IV on China's negotiating
style, Chinese leaders have traditionally been careful to separate diplo-
matic functions from the decision-making process, so that foreigners cannot
directly "reach" the decision-makers. The buffer group coordinated by the
Foreign Ministry is distinctly separate from the decision-making group.
Does this "separation" mean that the Foreign Ministry is without in-
fluence in the decision-making process? On the contrary. The level of
expertise of the Foreign Ministry and the areas over which it exercises
coordination have been steadily growing. Position papers from the Foreign
Ministry going to the State Council and Politburo may well be the most
professional and detailed within the government. This inference is based
on the stability and experience levels of Che diplomatic corps, to which
we now turn.
B. STRUCTURE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
Chart II-l shows the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at
the end of 1978. The Minister, Huang Hua, is directly supported by 10 vice
ministers and four assistant ministers. There are 12 separate departments,
six geographic and six functional. Each department has a director and from
one to 8 deputy directors. The departments are further broken down into
sections, for specific countries and policy problems, but the structure of
these sections is not known in any detail.
The structure of the Foreign Ministry has changed from time to time for
a variety of reasons. From 1949 until the Cultural Revolution, it grew
steadily until it had 6 geographic departments and 9 functional departments,
supervised by 11 vice ministers. The Cultural Revolution saw the purge of
33

5 vice ministers, 6 department directors, and 20 deputy directors, and
a reduction in the number of departments. By the end of the Cultural
Revolution, between purges and transfers, there were only 4 vice ministers,
and the number of departments had been reduced from 15 to 9. Since then,
it has been rebuilding slowly in response to workload pressures. The
number of vice ministers has increased to 10, and the number of assistant
ministers from one to 4. The number of departments is back to 12.
In additional to structural changes, the ministry has also experienced
several major personnel shakeups. Besides the extended one during the
Cultural Revolution, it experienced a major shifting of personnel in the
summer of 1972 and in 1977-1978. The 1972 changes represented in part
that Chen Yi's 14-year tenure was finally broken by a new man, and in part
due to the shift in political winds created by Chou's power resurgence.
The 1977-78 changes occurred after the ouster of Foreign Minister Ch'iao
Kuan-hua, who had supported the Gang of Four, but appear to be less a
purge than an overall promotion for seasoned diplomats into the higher
posts.
The current configuration occurred as a result of a major reorganiza-
tion in 1977-78 that saw, besides a new Foreign Minister, the addition of
five new vice ministers and the transfer of one vice minister, Fu Hao, to
the ambassadorial post in Tokyo. Two of the new vice ministers, Wang
Hai-jung and Chang Wen-Chin, served previously as assistant foreign min-
isters, and had had extensive diplomatic experience. Chang Wen-chin had
served as ambassador to Pakistan and Canada, as a director and deputy
director of MFA departments, and had participated in international nego-
tiations going back to the 1954 Geneva talks and the 1969 Sino-Soviet bor-
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Language Institute and had been a deputy representative at the 26th UN
General Assembly as well as director of the General Department and Deputy
Director of the Protocol Department in the MFA. She had been actively in-
volved in interviews with visiting heads of state and, despite heavy in-
volvement with the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, still appears
to be active despite the recent purges of other GPCR activists.
The other three new vice ministers were also career diplomats. Liu
Chen-hua joined the Foreign Ministry in the early 1970' s after being the
political commissar of an army as late as 1969. He spent over five years
as ambassador to Albania (1971-1976), one of Peking's most important and
difficult overseas posts.
Chang Hai-feng held ambassadorial posts in three Eastern European
countries (Yugoslavia 1973-78; Rumania 1969-73; and East Germany 1964-
Cultural Revolution) . His promotion directly from postings in the Balkans
to the upper level of the Foreign Ministry provides the leadership with
first-hand expertise on the two "maverick" communist states, Romania and
Yugoslavia, which so far constitute China's only contact with mainstream
European communist parties. Hua Kuo-feng's August 1978 trip to Romania
and Yugoslavia was probably organized by Chang. His appointment under-
scores the high interest of current foreign policy initiatives in the
Balkans
.
Wang Shu's background is more obscure. He first appeared as the
delegate with full powers to negotiate establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with West Germany after serving as an NCNA European correspondent.
He became the Chinese embassy's charge d'affaires in November 1972, coun-
selor in March 1973, and ambassador in September 1974. His performance
in Bonn must have been outstanding, because it is extremely rare for the
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Chinese to promote a counselor or charge directly to ambassador within the
same country. From the limited information available, it appears that Wang
is a specialist in West German/NATO/West European affairs, and directs
Chinese efforts to expand contacts that would facilitate high technology
transfers, which are Peking's primary interest in this area. Wang was
editor-in-chief of Red Flag , the party ideological journal, from February
1977 to mid-1978, when he returned to the Foreign Ministry as a vice minister,
Of the other five vice ministers, all but one are career diplomats with
at least twenty years of experience.
Han Nien-lung, who served under Chen Yi during the civil war, has been
a vice minister since 1964, and is accordingly the senior vice minister.
After leaving the army in 1951, he entered the diplomatic service as am-
bassador to Pakistan. Several tours later he became an assistant foreign
minister in 1958 and a vice minister in 1964. He was one of the few vice
ministers to survive the Cultural Revolution, during which he performed
his usual functions. This may have been due to a political savvy reflected
in the fact that his wife, Wang Chen, is one of the deputy directors of the
Information (Intelligence) Department, where she is in an excellent posi-
tion to guard her husband's political flanks. Han Nien-lung supervised
the pre- and postwar negotiations with Vietnam, acting as the ministry's
top spokesman in Peking. He is the senior "Asia hand" in the ministry.
Chung Tsi-tung's career parallels Han Nien-lung's, although he did
not become vice minister until the 1972 reorganization. Chung left the
PLA as a major general in 1961 to become ambassador to Czechoslovakia, a
post he held for 5% years. After the GPCR he served as ambassador to
Tanzania for three years (1969-72) . An interesting incident in his per-
sonal history, and one that boosted his military career, occurred in 1945,
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when he organized a local resistance group to block successfully an
attempted landing by the U.S. Navy's Yellow Sea Squadron.
Ho Ying, perhaps the busiest of the vice ministers, was also promoted
to the job in the 1972 reshuffle. He left the PLA after independence in
1949, having been political commissar of a division, to enter the consular
service in 1951. He served in a number of posts in the ministry and abroad,
but reached preeminence as China's first ambassador to Tanganyika in 1962.
Within the next two years, in a flurry of personal diplomacy, he succeeded
in outpacing the Taiwanese diplomats and established diplomatic relations
for Peking with Uganda (1962) , Zanzibar (1963) , Burundi (1963) , and Zambia
(1964) . He is on excellent personal terms with President Nyerere and the
African revolutionary exiles in Tanzania. While in Tanganyika, he achieved
a reputation for flamboyance for having the second biggest limousine in
the country, after the U.S. ambassador's. He directs Foreign Ministry
activities with Africa and the Mideast, including the PLO.
Yu Chan became a vice foreign minister in 1972 after extensive expe-
rience in Soviet and East European affairs going back to 1955. He heads
the Chinese side of the intermittent Sino-Soviet border talks and is con-
sidered the strategist behind Peking's tentative openings to the Soviet
bloc in Europe.
Ma Wen-po, also a 1972 appointee, is the dark horse of the Foreign
Ministry. He became active in diplomatic activities in Peking in 1968.
Ma had been Vice Chairman of the Military Control Commission of the
Foreign Ministry towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, which led
to speculation that he performs liaison, if not institutional surveil-
lance duties for the PLA General Staff. The heavy involvement of the
Defense Ministry in diplomatic activities would justify the need for
such a figure. He has no known overseas experience.
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As a general rule, the vice foreign ministers are each responsible for
a geographical or functional area, as indicated in Table II-l. This level
of the ministry, decimated during the GPCR to four vice ministers, is al-
most back to its pre-GPCR level of eleven vice ministers. The 1977-78
reorganization added three billets to the seven listed in 1972.
The four current assistant foreign ministers were all appointed in 1978.
Three of the four are seasoned diplomats and the fourth's background is
unknown
.
Assistant Foreign Minister Sung Chih-kuang entered the foreign service
in 1950 and has held numerous posts, mostly in Western Europe. He was am-
bassador to Great Britain prior to his current posting. He appears to have
been appointed to this billet, created to advise the Foreign Minister on
expanding contacts with the high-technology states of Western Europe. He
assisted Chi Peng-fei in Peking talks with Common Market President Colombo
in January 1979.
Lin Chung entered the foreign service around 1958. His background mir-
rors Sung's, only with an emphasis on Eastern Europe.
Kung Ta-pei's most recent posting was as ambassador to Zaire, a country
of special interest to Peking in countering Soviet encroachments in southern
Africa. When Angolan troops with Cuban and, possibly, Soviet advisors behind
them, tried to invade Shaba province in 1977, the panic in Peking was re-
flected in Huang Hua's return flight from the U.N. disarmament talks in
New York, being suddenly diverted to Zaire. A high-level PLA military aid
delegation to Zaire followed within two weeks . It would appear that Kung's
recent expertise is being added to Huang Hua's and Ho Ying's own consider-















First vice foreign minister handling general
functions, but with special expertise on Asia
Northeast and Southeast Asia; headed 1978 Sino-
Vietnamese border talks
Protocol and administration; usually on-hand for
VIP visits, although no longer acts as the offi-
cial interpreter; seems to be developing exper-
tise in North America and Australia
Liaison with PLA; general protocol responsibilities
Africa and Mideast, including PLO
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Seems to be MFA's liaison with the International
Department of the CCP Central Committee
Seems to be shifting duties from Asia to Western
Europe; is an expert on border negotiations and
treaty law
Balkans
Western Europe and NATO; public relations and
propaganda
TABLE H-2
Assistant Foreign Ministers: Areas of Responsibility
Sung Chih-kuang Western Europe
Lin Chung Eastern Europe
Kung Ta-pei Southern Africa
Tsao Chun-keng Administration/personnel
(Source: author's analysis of public appearances 1977-1978)
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Tsao Chun-keng, the fourth assistant minister, served concurrently as
director of the General Department, which oversees the administrative staff
functions for the Ministry. Apart from a four-year tour as ambassador to
Norway (1972-1976), nothing is known of his background. Tsao's promotion
to the inner circle of assistant and vice ministers probably reflected the
need for a general secretary to prepare for and implement results of their
meetings, as the size and work volume of the Foreign Ministry "executive
council" have increased.
The career backgrounds of the incumbent assistant ministers of foreign
affairs are listed in Table II-3.
C. DEPARTMENT DIRECTORS IN THE MFA
The 12 department directorships within the Foreign Ministry seem to
serve as mid-career launch points. Successful foreign service officers
in line to get their first ambassadorship are usually shunted into one of
these directorships, where they come under close surveillance of the MFA
executive group, the assistant and vice ministers. The posts turn over
fairly rapidly. If the foreign service officer passes the inspection of
his seniors, apparently a matter of trust in his judgement, the man goes
directly to his own embassy from the department directorship. He can
expect to rotate from one ambassadorship to another, with a slight chance
of becoming an assistant or vice minister later. In some cases, he may
be sent back to Peking to another department director job, either to ex-
pand his expertise into a different region, or because his talents are
needed in Peking. The career patterns of the incumbent department heads
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The assistant directors to the various departments are junior foreign
service officers, who are working towards counselor, charge, and first
secretary slots overseas, in much the same pattern as the directors work
towards ambassadorships.
D. THE DIPLOMATS ABROAD - GROWTH IN NUMBERS AND EXPERTISE
Several analysts of Chinese foreign policy have contended that the
rapid growth of the PRC's overseas ties has meant that the expertise of
g
its diplomats is rather low. As Chart II-2 shows, the decade 1969-1977
saw the number of overseas missions almost triple, as more countries be-
came willing to establish relations in response to China's more moderate
foreign policies and the end of U.S. containment efforts. George Jan,
in a study analyzing experience backgrounds of Chinese ambassadors in
1975, came to the conclusion that
a substantial number of Chinese ambassadors had little or no
experience in diplomatic service prior to their ambassadorial
appointments. They were transferred from other government
services, such as the military, the party, or the central and
provincial civil administrations to the diplomatic service
without any apparent pattern.
Jan's conclusions from his 1977 study were based on information, frequently
sketchy, on 83 ambassadors of 100 on station (correcting for concurrent
postings to more than one country, and posts filled only by charges or
consuls-general)
.
The picture today is considerably different, in part because more in-
formation is available about diplomats' backgrounds. As of the end of 1978,
there were 103 ambassadors (correcting again for double-postings, charges,
a consul-general, and posts not yet filled in recently recognized countries)
Of these, 66 were known to have previously been ambassadors and another 17
had been charges, giving a total of 83, or 81 percent, who had experience
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TABLE1 4: Cumulative Growth of D:Lplomatic Recognitions
Year (notes) Chang es Total in Effect
1949 13 13










1965 (3) 1 (-1) 49
1966 (4) (5) (6) (-3) 46
1967 (7) (8) (-2) 44
1968 2 46
1970 5 51
1971 (3) (7) 16 (+2) 69








* = denotes corrections for suspended and resumed relations
Notes
(1) Israel recognized the PRC Jan 1, 1950 but the PRC has not recognized
Israel.
(2) Zaire suspended relations Sep 18, 1961; resumed relations Nov 24, 1972.
(3) Burundi suspended relations Jan 29, 1965; resumed relations Oct 13, 1971
(4) Benin suspended relations Jan 3, 1966; resumed relations Dec 29, 1972.
(5) Central African Republic suspended relations Feb 1966; resumed relations
Aug 20, 1976.
(6) Ghana suspended relations Oct 20, 1966; resumed relations Feb 29, 1972.
(7) Tunisia suspended relations Sep 15, 1967; resumed relations Oct 8, 1971.
(8) Indonesia suspended relations Oct 27, 1967; relations not yet resumed.




Adding another eight who had been counselors (equivalent of deputy chiefs
of mission), gives a total of 91, or 88 percent, with senior embassy ex-
perience before becoming a current ambassador. Using the data consolidated
to draw up the career histories of the current (end of 1978) diplomatic
list in Table II-6, one finds that the average ambassador has been a head
of mission 2.5 times, including his current post. He has spent 9.5 years
overseas, of which 6.3 were as an ambassador. By any standard, these
figures reflect a seasoned diplomatic corps.
Chart 11-11 shows that the number of overseas personnel has grown proportionately
with the increase in numbers of missions. This is borne out by Table II-7
which shows, albeit with a dip during the Cultural Revolution, that the
average manning level per mission has remained at about 11 over the past
25 years. This overall growth rate conceals two balancing trends. The
size of China's largest missions has been steadily increasing (see Table
II-8) , while at the same time China has been extending most of its recent
recognitions to newly independent mini-states, such as Fiji, where one or
two-man missions suffice.
The growth of the overseas establishment has roughly kept pace with
the growth of staff in Peking. Taking the data in Table II-9 for 1953-1973,
as compiled by Klein, and using Terrill's figure from the Chinese that the
total 1971 manning of the ministry's personnel in Peking and overseas was
about 1,000 people, one comes up with an estimate of 566 for 1971 in the
Peking headquarters. Using the same ratio of overseas to capital per-
sonnel gives an estimate of 1600 for the Peking ministry figure for 1978,
which seems about right, given the commensurate growth in workload to
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Personnel in PRC Missions Abroad
1953 I960 1963 1966 1971 1972 1973 1978
Number of Missions 17 33 42 48 51 72 89 116
(1)
Average per Mission 9 11 10 12 9 8 11 11 (2)
Notes
1. List includes U.N. mission.
2. See Chart II-3 for source data and derivation of 2.2 multiplier used












1. Sources: 1973 figures are from D.W. Klein, "The Chinese Foreign
Ministry," p. 51, compiled from "U.S. government directories." 1978
figures are from CIA, Directory of the Officials of the PRC , November 1978.
2. Both sets of figures were compiled on the same basis, listing accredited
diplomats down to the level of attache. For the U.S., this excluded 6














o o number of personnel abroad
v \- number of overseas missions
c(pote 1)
1950 1960 1970 1980
Sources: For number of personnel abroad, D.W. Klein, "The Chinese
Foreign Ministry," p. 50 , for 1953-1973 data; for 1978
data, CIA Director-/ of Officials of the PRC, Nov. 1978.
Note 1: Although Klein cites "U.S. government directories" as his
data source, it is not clear down to vhat "level" he is
counting. The CIA lists 566 "accredited officials, plus specific
staff totals for the UN and US. I have used these specific









1953 I960 1963 1966 1971 1972 1973 1978
32 54 76 75 25 56 72 77
154 351 411 582 434 583 879 1245 (3)
Totals 186 405 487 657 459 639 951 1322
Notes
Sources: For 1953-1973, D. W. Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry,"
p. 46. For 1978, CIA, Directory of Officials of the PRC
,
Nov 1978.
These figures constitute only the tip of the bureaucratic "iceberg,"
consisting of the minister, vice ministers, assistant ministers,
special advisors to the MFA, and directors and deputy directors of
various departments. Figures are not available for staff personnel
at lower bureaus and divisions. In 1971 Ross Terrill was told the
MFA had about a thousand people altogether including overseas per-
sonnel ( 800,000,000: The Real China , p. 230). Assuming the same
supervisor-to-staff ratio in Peking was maintained during expansion,
one can estimate an MFA total in Peking of about 1600 people in 1978
a reasonable figure in light of the expansion of PRC's diplomatic
activities.
For derivation of this 1978 estimate, see note 1 in chart II-3.
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The impression held by North and others that the Foreign Ministry was
heavily infiltrated by other government and party groups does not seem to
be borne out by available data. Table 11-10 reflects the known backgrounds
of the current diplomatic list (based on data available on 94 of the 103
ambassadors) . The number of lateral transfers from other bureaucracies is
small, particularly when one considers that this survey spans careers, in
some cases, ranging back 40 years. Most transfers occurred in the 1950's,
when the Foreign Ministry was gearing up. Most ambassadors have come up
from within the diplomatic service as career officers.
The turnover of ambassadors is partially reflected in Chart II-4, which
shows the number of ambassadorial appointments by year. The surge in 1970-73
reflects in part the increase in number of missions to be filled, as well as
the general reorganization in 1972. A similar surge in 1977 reflects the
reorganization of that year. An interesting follow-on study would be to
identify how many "retirements" during these reorganizations were associated
with political purges.
E. DIPLOMATIC TRAINING
The training a diplomat has received depends largely upon when he en-
tered the diplomatic service.
The top diplomats (Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, Wang Ping-nan, etc .)
received their basic training prior to the revolution, and in many cases
overseas. Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping studied in Paris in the 1920 's.
Wang Ping-nan studied in Japan 1929-30. Chou P'ei-yuan, now vice president
of the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, went from Tsinghua
University (1924-physics) to the University of Chicago (BS-1926; MS-1927)
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Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey , June 1977.





































































Foreign Minister (1974-77) did graduate study in Germany. The number of
foreign-educated diplomats, however, has been declining through retire-
ments; there were no inputs after the Long March in the 1930' s.
With the notable exception of Li Hsien-nien, who started as a carpenter's
apprentice, a large percentage of the current top foreign policy experts
have had some higher education within China, either before or after the
revolution.
Huang Hua is a 1935 graduate of Yenching University; Huang Chen (now
Minister of Culture, previously Peking's first envoy in Washington) is a
graduate of Shanghai's Fine Arts Academy; Chi Peng-fei, (former Minister
of Foreign Affairs (1972-74) and now the new director of the CCP Interna-
tional Liaison Department) is a graduate of a military medical college.
Vice President Keng Piao (former head of the Liaison Department and a
career diplomat) graduated from the Whampoa military academy.
As this "second generation" of in-country trained diplomats reaches
the higher levels of the diplomatic service, one might expect a less cos-
mopolitan attitude emerging. This expectation has not proved true. The
extended overseas tours of most of these diplomats has exposed them to
foreign cultures and made many of them fairly fluent in Western languages.
Both Huang Hua and Huang Chen are striking examples of highly cultured,
forceful, and fluent diplomats. The success in training this generation
who left China for the first time in the middle third of their careers
must be laid to Chou En-lai, who energetically pushed to get his young
new diplomats overseas at every opportunity in the 1950 's and 1960's.
Foreign diplomats at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina and the
1961-62 Geneva Conference on Laos were surprised at the size of the
Chinese delegations. In the latter, the Chinese brought 50 people,
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almost ten times the average size of the other delegations. At the time
it was suspected that the Chinese were attempting to make up for expertise
in numbers, that they didn't trust each other in small groups, etc .
In retrospect, it is clear that the junior delegates were receiving a
valuable education in high-level diplomacy.
The third generation of diplomats received more formal training after
the communists came to power in 1949. Almost as soon as the Foreign
Ministry was formed, the Peking Institute of Foreign Languages was started
By the early 1950' s it was graduating several dozen students a year, in
a five-year program that offered English, German, Spanish, French, and
(for the majority) Russian. By 1965, before being closed by the Cultural
Revolution, it was enrolling yearly several thousand students. By the mid-
1950' s at least six other higher schools, including the Shanghai Foreign
Language Institute, were offering a broad range of languages, including
Polish and Czech. By the 1960 's the Shanghai school had about 1,500
students, and English had become the most popular language, followed in
order by French, Spanish, and Arabic. The language institutes began
recovering from the Cultural Revolution about 1971, and have been expand-
ing ever since.
In addition to the language institutes, largely administered and
taught by diplomatic and educational officials who included large doses
of political indoctrination, several ancillary institutes and academies
sprang up to support foreign ministry needs. Little is known about the
non-language aspects of these schools' curricula.
In the mid-1950 's the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs
(CPIFA) came into being. Membership in the Institute seems to be the
mark of acceptance for rising junior foreign service officers. The
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leadership of the Institute has become filled with elderly, successful but
semi-retired diplomats. On the surface, the Institute provides low-key
diplomatic social functions in Peking, such as banquets for important but
non-governmental (at least not in office) foreign visitors. It serves a
12
useful function particularly in hosting out-of-of fice foreign politicians.
The high-caliber of its leadership would suggest that the Institute also
serves as a think-tank for the Foreign Minister in areas of policy research,
in the pattern that the Council of Foreign Relations in the U.S. provides
jobs for retired American diplomats who continue to study diplomatic pro-
blems while maintaining an advisory role to the State Department. Chinese
foreign service officers in mid-career are occasionally seconded to the
Institute between other assignments.
In 1956 the Academy of Sciences established an International Relations
Research Institute. Very little is known about this body, which has not
survived. With the formation of the Academy of Social Sciences in July
1977, a body associated with Teng Hsiao-p ' ing' s push for the re-assertion
of the intellectuals' role in Chinese society, several subordinate insti-
tutes have sprung up, clearly oriented towards re-establishing profession-
alism in areas allied with diplomacy. Three history (ancient, modern,
world) institutes, an institute for foreign literature, a trade and com-
merce institute, a world economy institute, and a world religion institute
have appeared so far. All these institutes will require close contacts
with the outside world, and should provide the government, and particularly
the foreign ministry, with specialists of a kind not hitherto available.
A new, unidentified institute within the Academy of Social Sciences
was also formed, which Teng Hsiao-ping is using to draft key policy docu-
ments, according to Professor Harry Harding of Stanford, who talked with
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foreign ministry officials in Peking about it. The most complete statement
on China's foreign policy, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of
the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism Leninism," of November
1977 (in an unusual 30-page feature in Peking Review ) , was reportedly
drafted by this group. The new body sounds very much like the old U.S.
State Department Policy Research Committee, reflecting in China's case a
move towards greater bureaucratic sophistication. In Mao's time, foreign
policy speeches that he delivered were usually written by Huang Chen and
13
Ch'iao Kuan-hua. Chou En-lai apparently wrote his own. This new body,
under the Academy of Social Sciences headed by Hu Chiao-mu, one of Teng's
closest political supporters, appears to be a political animal designed to
get around the "unliberated" thinking in the foreign ministry. In time,
however, it will probably meld into the foreign ministry as it taps the
brighter middle-level foreign service officers for joint projects.
A fourth generation of foreign service officers is about to appear as
China embarks on a massive overseas education program. Although the first
wave of these students are largely oriented towards the technical sciences
in support of the modernization program, it can be expected that the
social sciences will share as they did in China's internal educational
reform movement. The value of overseas study for language training and
cultural orientation of fledgling diplomats is not likely to be lost.
Presently, the foreign language institutes are falling far behind the
requirements for graduates. Besides the foreign ministry, virtually
every other ministry and bureau is clamoring for language specialists
to help translate the flood of foreign journals and technology pouring
into China. It appears that even the China Travel and Tourism Bureau has
a higher priority than the foreign ministry; the foreign ministry gets the
third "draft" of language school graduates.
71

F. THE DISTAFF DIPLOMATS - A HIDDEN EQUATION
Certainly one of the least investigated but a potentially highly sig-
nificant area of Chinese politics is the role played by wives. Few loom
as high on the political horizon as Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, once did,
but they are to be found from top to bottom of the bureaucracy, usually
in key staff sections, quietly looking out for their husband's political
flanks.
Teng's wife, Cho Lin, has become active diplomatically since 1978,
appearing at public receptions with her husband and accompanying him
abroad. She also holds a sensitive post in the CCP ' s Military Advisory
Commission, where she reportedly keeps watch on security matters for her
14husband. Hua's wife, Han Chih-chun, still seems to be adjusting to the
change from being a provincial official's spouse to being the premier's
wife. She almost never appears in public, and holds a relatively obscure
job as chief of the political section of the state-run Light Industrial
Products Import and Export Corporation.
Within the Foreign Ministry wives have traditionally shared the over-
seas duties, a necessity given the policy of near self-sufficiency of
Chinese embassies. Wives appear on diplomatic rosters as counselors and
secretaries although none have so far been able to parlay that experience
into an ambassadorship; no woman has yet been named an ambassador. Chou
En-Lai's widow, Teng Ying-chao, has been elevated to a vice premiership
and given mainly diplomatic duties, but her position exists outside the
Foreign Ministry structure.
Little is known about Huang Hua's wife. She has become active in the
general trend (since 1978) of wives particpating in diplomatic social
functions and travelling with their husbands. Two long-time stalwarts of
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the Foreign Ministry, former Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua and former
Vice Foreign Minister Chan Han-fu were married to sisters, which may have
facilitated their rise together. First Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung's
wife, Wang Chen, is a deputy director of the Information Department, believed
to be the processing center for intelligence within the Foreign Ministry
(see Chapter III)
.
With wives becoming more accessible on the diplomatic circuit, it
should be possible to identify more husband-wife bureaucratic linkages, and
to analyze their roles. In any foreign service, the "wives' grapevines"
have a significant impact on their husband's career. In a bureaucracy
where the wives are also able to occupy key positions, their influence
must be even greater.
G. SUMMARY
The PRC Foreign Ministry has proven to be one of the more durable govern-
ment institutions. The Ministry has grown rapidly over the years, but
still has managed to maintain institutional integrity through a strong
esprit de corps and by promotions within its own ranks to top jobs. The
willingness of its diplomats in many cases to spend virtually their whole
careers overseas in chain-postings has meant that the heads of mission
have remained a seasoned group despite the proliferation of missions.
The Foreign Ministry has limited itself to a coordination rather than
a decision-making role (see Chart II-5) , which has meant that the Polit-
buro and State Council have had to share a relatively large role in the
foreign affairs decision-making process. The relationship has given the
decision-making elite a buffer against foreign probing, and has also
enabled the Foreign Ministry to keep clear of the frequently cutthroat
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With the rapid expansion of contacts with the West over the past two
years, it seems likely that the State Council's Office of Foreign Affairs
may be resurrected to focus the higher volume of decision-making required.
If this were to happen, the Director of the Office would most likely be
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III. CHINA'S WINDOWS ON THE WORLD

III. CHINA'S WINDOWS ON THE WORLD
A. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
How do China's foreign policymakers look out on the world? How is
information that forms their world view collected, assimilated, and
disseminated? Peking has several "windows" through which it peers to
collect its information requirements. These can be summarized as follow:
(1) news on the world situation (opportunities and policy feedback)
(2) military intelligence requirements
(3) foreign technology requirements for modernization
B. WORLD SITUATION
The bulk of information on the outside world that comes to Chinese
leaders is coordinated by Hsinhua
,
the New China News Agency (NCNA) , in
three kinds of publications: Reference News ("Ts'an-k'ao Hsiao-hsi") ; a
similar but highly classified version called Reference Materials ("Ts'an
Kao Tsu Liao"), which is restricted to the top leadership; and the
Bulletin of Activities of the General Political Department of the People's
Liberation Army . NCNA monitors over 40 stations of 30 news services
around the world (including AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP, TASS, etc.), totalling
about 300,000 words and 281 hours daily in radioteletype. Those por-
tions of the translations harmonious with official policies get included
in the domestic press, such as People's Daily . Policymakers with access
to Reference News or its secret counterpart, Reference Materials ; however,
get a much broader coverage, including sensitive information such as the
Watergate scandal, details of the Allende coup in Chile, etc . , which were
2
not reported in the mass press. Henry Schwarz, who did a detailed ana-
lysis of the few Reference Mews copies available in the West, found that
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83 percent of the information in Reference News came from non-communist
sources, whereas 97 percent of information in the open press came from
3
communist sources. Sixty percent of the wire service news in Reference
News came from four world services — Reuters, AP, UPI, Agence France
Press (AFP) — although local and regional services (such as Kyodo in
4
Japan and Indian services) were also cited. Schwarz estimates that
Reference News began publication around November 1956; one wonders
whether Chou's enthusiasm over the success of his new Bandung policies
had a part in its inception. Its circulation has increased enormously
over the years, from a few thousand in 1957 to 9 million or more today.
Apparently Mao had pushed to declassify the paper, but wasn't able to
get his way until the Cultural Revolution, when he was said to have re-
solved "that such 'elitism in information' was contrary to Communist
practice." Recent visitors to China have reported seeing shopkeepers,
elevator operators, and people in parks reading it openly. It is avail-
able in the offices of production brigades, though not permitted out of
the room. It is not directly available to foreigners. With its declass-
ification and broader dissemination within China, however, it has lost
some of its earlier breadth of reporting and commentary.
The other version, Reference Materials remains classified. Indirect
references to it suggest that it has remained highly objective, with
little if any ideological filtering. It is this publication that Polit-
buro members, Foreign Ministry officials, and foreign affairs institutes
(including diplomats in training) depend upon.
The secret PLA Bulletin of Activities became known when the U.S.
government released several copies in the mid-1960 's. At a time when
Western military strength was publicly underplayed, the Bulletin was
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frank and detailed about Western power, and relatively free of heavy-handed
ideological jargon. Its circulation at the time was limited to commanders
and political commissars at the regimental level and above. Other bureau-
cracies also appear to have counterparts to Reference Materials. These
classified news summaries have not been available in the West, but it is
clear that all of China's top official are well versed in current affairs,
including details within their own specialties.
The New China News Agency itself is an interesting cog in China's
foreign affairs structure. Besides monitoring foreign broadcasts and
g
news services, it fields a network of over 57 foreign bureaus and offices,
in addition to a vast internal media system, which reaches down to village
newspapers. A typical overseas NCNA office, such as the one that opened
9
in Lisbon in March 1978, has an office head and 6-10 staff journalists.
In some cases the offices and bureaus operate within PRC embassies, in
other cases separately.
The agency's main office in Peking is virtually a self-contained
community. Besides gathering and processing domestic and foreign news,
it houses a foreign languages school, a childcare center, a kinder-
garten, and an infirmary for its 2,000 or so employees. This self-
sufficiency is not unusual in Chinese enterprises, yet it does enhance
the security of its operations.
There has been a long history of personnel interchanges between
China's foreign policy bureaucracy and NCNA. Two foreign ministers,
Ch'iao Kuan-hua (1974-76) and Huang Hua (1976-present) , entered the
Foreign Ministry after NCNA tours in Hong Kong and Chungking, respec-
tively, just prior to independence. Ch'iao continued his journalistic
career after becoming a diplomat, by writing world affairs articles for
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Red Flag , the Party ideological monthly, under the pseudonym Yu Chao-li.
A current vice minister of foreign affairs, Wang Shu, came from the
editorship of the same journal, serving from February 1977 until mid-
1978. As a NCNA bureau chief in the early 1970's in Bonn, Wang was in-
strumental in negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations be-
tween China and West Germany, later becoming Peking's ambassador. As
another instance of overlap, four of the six directors and deputy directors
and deputy directors of NCNA before the Cultural Revolution held concurrent
12positions on major "friendship associations" with foreign countries.
C. CHINA'S INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM
There is no satisfactory analysis of China's intelligence apparatus,
13
although speculation based on scanty information abounds. It is not
even clear what individual, or institution, coordinates national-level
intelligence. From the 1930 's until his death in December 1975, K'ang
Sheng appeared to be more or less the director of central intelligence
operations, which were mainly oriented towards liaison activities —
support for revolutionary parties — and internal security. The intelli-
gence structure prior to the Cultural Revolution was similar to that in
the Soviet Union, where K'ang had studied security practices from 1933 to
14
1936.
Under K'ang the system appeared to have four parts: 1) the Social
Affairs Department of the CCP Central Committee (roughly analogous to the
KGB); 2) the PLA security groups (the GRU-like military secret police, the
Political Department of the General Staff, and the Foreign Affairs Division,
which supervised the military attaches); 3) the Ministry of Public Security;
and 4) the Foreign Intelligence Department of the Foreign Ministry, whose
agents reportedly operated, like those of most other nations, through
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embassies, legations, the NCNA, overseas Chinese, etc . The Social Affairs
Department, with an estimated 25,000 employees, was though to dominate the
other services until it "disappeared" during the Cultural Revolution.
Apparently its functions were divided into two current bodies under the
Central Committee, the International Liaison Department, nominally in
charge of relations with other communist parties, including insurgent
groups, and the General Office, which combines the functions of the CCP
CC Secretariat (which also "disappeared" during the Cultural Revolution)
with those of political intelligence.
The Liaison Department was recently taken over the Chi Peng-fei, who
had previously been general secretary of the Standing Committee of the
NPC, and before that, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1972-1974). Chi has
a long career of overseas postings. From 1971 through early 1979 the
department was headed by Keng Piao, another long-time diplomat, who is
now a vice premier and Politburo member. As China's foreign policy goals
shifted from inciting Marxist revolutions in the 1960 's — a policy that
backfired in Africa — towards enhancing state-to-state relations in the
Third World in the 1970' s, the Liaison Department's functions have ex-
panded into the diplomatic levels of united front activities, as differen-
tiated from the mass organization, non-government-oriented activities of
the Central Committee's United Front Department, under another Politburo
member, Ulanfu.
Keng Piao travelled extensively in his last year in the Liaison
Department job, more than any other senior Chinese official, covering four
continents, visiting North Korea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, Tobago,
Jamaica, Guyana, Malta, Algeria, Mali, Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria, and
Somalia. His Peking appearances in 1978 included the usual visits by
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pro-Peking Marxist-Leninist splinter parties around the world, but he also
hosted important visitors from key non-communist countries, such as Zaire,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Singapore, Japan, Chad, Thailand, Burma, and the
U.S. His replacement, Chi Peng-fei, started out with a multi-stop tour
through West Africa prior to assuming the job. It would appear that the
Liaison Department is expanding its role into non-communist area intelli-
gence, at the probable cost of the General Office.
The General Office of the CCP Central Committee is located inside the
leadership enclave, known as Chungnanhai
, which forms the western section
of the Forbidden City. The General Office appears to have been put together
during the Cultural Revolution by Mao and his one-time (pre-1949) bodyguard
Wang Tung-hsing. The functions of the CC Secretariat (run for a decade
prior to the Cultural Revolution by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who was purged with
many of his secretariat staff members for opposing Mao during the Cultural
Revolution), and the Social Affairs Department (the CIA equivalent up to
that time) were merged into the General Office under Wang, who was then
charged in December 1965 by Mao: "Tight control of confidential matters
and security work are most important. Make sure the party's secrets are
well protected against exploitation..." Wang apparently supervised both
18
foreign and domestic intelligence. Bypassing the Ministry of Public
Security (which reported to the State Council under Premier Chou En-lai,
who tended to be a brake on Mao's Cultural Revolution goals), Mao had
Wang organize his old security command, PLA Unit 8341 (the so-called
"Peking Palace Guard" responsible for CC members' security) so that it
contained at least one reliable member from each province. Mao would
then send these men out from time to time to quietly get him first-hand




policies. Since Mao's death, this close association with Mao has hurt
Wang despite his key role in arresting the Gang of Four in October 1976,
20
thereby ensuring victory of the moderate faction under Hua. Since
November 1978 Wang appears to have been eased out of effective control
over his intelligence and security posts, including the General Office,
which reportedly has been taken over by Yao I-lin, due to Wang's opposi-
tion to Teng's de-Maoif ication programs. It is too early to be certain,
but it appears that Teng may be again separating the secretariat and
security functions to break up Wang's power base and get the system back
to the way he ran it as secretary general of the party from 1956-1966.
Internal party discipline has been assigned to a new CCP Discipline
Commission, headed by Vice Chairman Ch'en Yung, a cohort of Teng's, who
suffered the same purges by the radicals in the past. Keng Piao may
be moving into a cross-institutional role as foreign intelligence coordi-
nator, overseeing the separate activities of intelligence groups in the
Liaison Department, Foreign Ministry, and the PLA. His seniority, broad
international experience, and Politburo status would fit him for such a
role, for which there is a clear need. It would also mirror the trend
toward consolidation of institutional functions, exemplified by Ch'en
Yun's new Finance and Trade Commission, which has made him economic
czar over half a dozen ministries.
D. FIELD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
With most countries, it is possible to reconstruct the central intel-
ligence structure from analysis of its field activities. The sparse data
available on Chinese clandestine activities offers little help in this
regard, although a general pattern is emerging.
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Since 1970, there have been only three publicized cases of Chinese
agents being caught at clandestine activities. This incredibly low
profile — compared with the CIA and KGB — is in part because the
Chinese have been able to meet most of their needs, nearly saturating
their translation capabilities, through open sources. Overt collection
will be dealt with in later sections.
The most recent "hand-in-the-cookie-jar" case occurred in Japan in
June 1978, when Tokyo police arrested a spy ring that had been funneling
"thousands" of "sensitive documents" from the Defense Agency, the Nippon
(national) Telephone and Telecommunications Company, and the transport
and trade ministries to China through two overseas Chinese bookstores in
Tokyo. The documents were restructed in dissemination to senior officials,
and some dealt with missile research and troop movements. The case broke
into the open when the court sentences (two years) were announced just
prior to the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty in July, which
may explain Japanese attempts to downplay the incident by describing such
21
documents as unclassified. The spy ring had been operating about ten years.
The second case surfaced in 1975 when Canada expelled Kuo Ching-an,
a press attache in the Chinese embassy in Ottawa, for activities "incom-
patible" with his diplomatic work. The government-owned Canadian Broad-
casting Company later revealed that Kuo had been making weekly trips be-
tween Ottawa and Washington, to pick up military and defense secrets for
transmission to Peking. The Chinese apparently were reluctant to use
their Legation Office in Washington, for fear of souring chances for
normalizing relations. Equally reluctant to cause direct embarrassment,
the F.B.I. , who had been watching Kuo ' s regular trips, elected to pass
22
the information on to their Canadian counterparts for action.
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The third case occurred in 1974, when the Soviets expelled a low-level
Chinese attache (type not revealed), in retaliation for an earlier arrest
and expulsion of three Soviet diplomats and two of their wives. The
Soviets charged that the attache, Kuan Heng-kuang, had been caught with
espionage material while making contact with a Chinese-born Soviet agent
in Irkutsk. Kuan was arrested on his way home to China after a six-year
tour in Moscow. The Soviets provided no particulars of his alleged
activities, although the Chinese published lurid accounts of the Soviet
23
diplomats' liaisons.
The record is a lot fuller in the 1960's, when China actively sought
to incite revolutions. NCNA correspondents were frequently expelled for
active contacts with such movements. The following illustrative cases are
24drawn from Alan Liu's study of the NCNA in 1972.
Kao Ling, one of NCNA's more colorful correspondents, was recruited
in 1957 and sent out as a correspondent to New Delhi in 1960. The Indian
government expelled him the same year for gross interference in its inter-
nal affairs, and closed down the NCNA bureau in New Delhi shortly after
his departure. Kao showed up the following year in Dar es Salaam, where
he built up contacts with refugees and revolutionaries from South Africa,
Nyasaland, and Rhodesia, as well as exiled African nationalist leaders in
Tanzania. He travelled extensively in East Africa. Colin Legum in 1964
described Kao as the "key figure... who carried out the exploratory probes
for Ho Ying" (then ambassador to Dar es Salaam; now a vice foreign
minister) and "acted as a go-between for the diplomats and their African
contacts." Later he was reported to have taught at a school in Djove,
Congo-Brazaville, where he instructed members of the Youth Section of the
National Revolutionary Movement in military techniques. He went on to a
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tour in the U.N., where he continued to make use of his contacts with SWAPO
and other liberation groups. He is now a counselor in the Chinese embassy
in Lagos, Nigeria.
In 1964 two NCNA journalists in Brazil, Wang Wei-chen, a journalist
of some 20 years experience, and his young interpreter-assistant, Chu
Ching-tung, were arrested by the military junta on charges of scheming
with Brazilian leftists to stage a communist revolution. Both had been
in Rio since 1961.
In 1968 the Ethiopian government expelled NCNA correspondent Li Yeh-
tseng and his wife, who had worked in the Mideast area since 1958. In
the same year the Senegal government expelled NCNA correspondent Wang
Yu-chang on charges of meddling in student demonstration.
NCNA reporters in Latin America are reported to have passed money
to groups having pro-Chinese orientation, particularly newspaper and
magazines that were financially weak.
Liu notes that NCNA correspondents abroad seldom mingle with reporters
from other countries, being known as "remote and cloistered." They are
seldom given a byline. A NCNA teletype operator who defected in Cairo
has stated that the CCP usually plants a loyal cadre, sometimes under the
title of "photographer," who is charged with surveillance over other
members of the bureau or office.
The same defector also recounted an interesting incident between the
Chinese ambassador in Cairo and the NCNA bureau chief there in 1959.
NCNA's head office in Peking wanted its Cairo bureau to run a piece
which could only worsen the ambassador's already strained relations with
Nasser. At first the ambassador snapped, "I am the ambassador to Cairo,




business." He later killed the piece. The quote suggests that the
NCNA's activities were not fully answerable to the Foreign Ministry as,
for example, the U.S. Information Agency is to U.S. ambassadors. The
point is not certain, however. Several scholars believe the NCNA's
intelligence functions are directed by the Foreign Ministry through its
Information Department. George Jan, in his 1977 study of the Foreign
Ministry, believes that the ministry's Department of Intelligence had
its name changed to Department of Information in 1954 to euphemize its
27
title. According to a diplomat recently serving in Peking, the Infor-
mation Department today does fulfill routine public affairs functions.
But apart from the Ottawa press attache expelled in 1975, there is
nothing substantive to connect the Foreign Ministry's Information Depart-
ment with covert intelligence activities in the past few years. Yet
one looks in vain on the Foreign Ministry's organization chart for any
other department that could serve the necessary in-house function of
coordinating the ministry's foreign intelligence requirements. When one
considers Peking's diplomatic intelligence needs, it is probably fair to
say that the majority of them can be met through normal news channels.
NCNA interviews with key government or opposition figures enable the
Peking leadership to probe attitudes and interests as they affect China.




The foreign affairs bureaucracy has a limited overlap of interests
with the Ministry of Defense bureaucracy. Apart from the purchase of
British Rolls Royce fighter engines and some French helicopters in early
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1970' s, the PLA did not begin to send high-level delegations to the West
for modern weapons on a regular basis until late 1977. Since then it
has held frequent talks with NATO countries over prospective arms purchases,
trying to soak, up as much modern military technology as possible in the
bargaining sessions. PLA observers even accepted an invitation to observe
NATO maneuvers. The prospect of China's obtaining sophisticated modern
weaponry has sparked warnings from Soviet President Brezhnev of the "heavy
29
consequences" of proceeding with the deals. Only West Germany has
failed to rebut the veiled threats, however. An Italian electronics exe-
cutive has complained, on the other hand, of Chinese arm-twisting:
"The Chinese have made clear to us that nations that sell arms
to them will get preference in commercial deals. Privately,
they put it more bluntly - no arms, no business."-50
Since Washington refuses to sell China arms, Peking must operate gingerly
in a diplomatic environment where COCOM restrictions could close off direct
access to military technology. Even some "civilian" sales, such as com-
puters, infra-red devices, avionics, etc
.
, could have enormous military
spin-offs. A Japanese sale of co-production facilities for large integrated-
circuit (LCI) televisions has caused some concern, as has a proposed sale of a
31
French reactor similar in design to reactors used in U.S. nuclear submarines.
Huang Hua, Fang I, Ku Mu, Li Chaing, and other senior officials have toured
32
European capitals at critical stages of arms talks. Chinese diplomats
are also using Third World contacts to absorb technology indirectly, such
33
as Soviet MiG-23's from Egypt and Libya.
F. MILITARY ATTACHE SYSTEM
The Foreign Ministry has also opened the way for the PLA's General Staff's
Foreign Affairs Division to send increasing numbers of miltary attaches over-
seas in Chinese embassies (see chart III-l) . At end 1978, China had 60
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military attaches and 25 assistant military attaches posted in 49 countries
and with the U.N. Military Affairs Committee, out of a total of 116
countries with which diplomatic relations had been established. These
attaches were distributed as follows:
Area Military Attaches Assistant Military Attaches
Africa 6 1
Asia 22 7
Western Europe 13 7
Eastern Europe 11 7
North America 3 1
Latin America 2 1
U.N. 3 1
TOTALS 60 25
(Source: CIA, Directory of Of ficials of the People's Republic of
China
, November 1978)
Although several countries had several full militry attaches (the USSR
has four), only in the U.N. are naval and air attaches (one each) identi-
fied as such. Donald Klein found in 1974 that the trend was for most
attaches to serve only a single tour, a practice common to most countries.
Those few who had repeat tours tended to serve in the same geographic area,
a pattern a typical for the diplomatic community as a whole. Only rarely
34
did a military attache switch careers to the foreign service.
Practically nothing is known about the training and activities of
these attaches. They host receptions on PLA's anniversary, participate
in the routine attache social functions in their respective capitals, and
presumably run low-key collection programs in the common international









A - Countries having diplomatic relations with^china,
B - Countries where China has military attaches.
/
1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979
(Sources: Klein, "The Chinese Foreign Ministry," pp. 144-
CIA, PRC Directory of Officials of PRC, Nov 78)
Note: Data not acquired 1974-77
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prior to the abolition of ranks in the PLA they ranged from majors to
colonels, except in the Soviet Union, where general officers were sent.
The incumbent senior attache in Rome, however, has been identifed as a
major general. Whether seniority is creeping into the attache system
may become clearer if the PLA reintroduces an overt rank structure,
which they reportedly are considering. The rapid increase in assistant
military attaches suggests that the PLA is taking advantage of the oppor-
tunity to get bright junior officers aborad, where they can be exposed
to advanced military technology, gain language experience, and acquire a
broader understanding of the world. Given the implicit certification of
loyalty that comes with selection for overseas duty, these young officers
are likely to rise quickly through the higher ranks and have a marked
impression on PLA doctrine and development.
G. HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS
The Chinese foreign affairs establishment also makes good use of a
steady flow of high-level foreign visitors, official and unofficial, to
glean strategic information. Stanley Karnow has reported that U.S.
Presidential advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski shared sections of a top secret
strategic assessment of the Soviet Union (Presidential Review Memorandum
- 10) with Vice Premier Teng during their talks on the world situation in
35
May 1978. British Chief of Staff Neil Cameron reportedly had equally
frank talks about the Soviet military. Retired Japanese generals and
admirals have visited China several times, and Tokyo has kept Peking in-
formed about Soviet fleet movements out of the Sea of Japan at critical
times, such as prior to the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war. Soviet
Ambassador Dobrynin warned Secretary of State Vance in January 1979 that
the release of satellite imagery of Soviet defenses in Asia to China
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could gravely imperil relations in general and SALT II in particular, after
it became known that LANDSAT-3 photos of the Soviet Union had been sold
earlier to an outlet in Hong Kong representing the PRC. Bonn was also
embarrassed in late 1978 when it became public knowledge that its intelli-
37
gence agency had sold uranium to China. The multi-dimensional relation-
ships between Chinese and foreign bureaucracies that open up after visits
by senior officials are perhaps the best indicator of the Foreign Ministry's
symbiotic role with military intelligence.
H. ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY
From dynastic times, Chinese leaders have been distrustful of foreign
influences on their society. In communist China, this distrust has been
a political tool of radical factions seeking to suture off foreign en-
tanglements and dependencies, relying instead upon revolutionary fervor
to keep China safe and progressive. The autarky of the Cultural Revolution,
when outside economic and diplomatic contacts bottomed out, left a legacy
that any leader who sought to open China to baser outside influences must,
by definition, be a revisionist. Since being a revisionist was, in Mao's
words, tantamount to being a "monster and a demon," — therefore a plague
to be stamped out — most Chinese leaders seeking moderate reforms avoided
this particular minefield. It was only after Lin Piao died and his fol-
lowers had been purged at the 10th Party Congress that Chou En-lau had
enough political clout to raise the issue of again "making foreign things
serve China." He managed to expand trade in the early 1970s with the
West, including the purchase of Rolls Royce Spey fighter engines, Trident
jets, and French helicopters for the PLA, as well as 8 major chemical fer-
tilizer factories from the U.S. for China's hard-pressed farms. Chou's
declining health and newly rehabilitated Teng Hsiao-p' ing's increasing
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problems with the Gang of Four caused a backing away from foreign contacts
in 1975. It was not until Mao's death and Teng's third rehabilitation in
July 1977 that the issue was again raised, this time with growing momentum,
that foreign technology was vital if China were to achieve the Four Modern-
izations by the end of the century. In 1978, over 90 top Chinese leaders
38
and over 30 provincial leaders left China to visit foreign countries.
For many of them, including Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, it was their first trip
outside China. This record hejira was almost certainly promoted by Teng
39
who, according to diplomatic sources in Peking, was pushing political
elites overseas to see first-hand how far behind the rest of the world
China had lapsed.
The campaign to acquire foreign technology was organized by Vice
Premier Fang I, minister-in-charge of the State Scientific and Technical
Commission of the State Council. He had the Academy of Sciences metho-
dically research China's needs, establish priorities, and draw up a shop-
ping list. They picked 27 subjects from basic science, production, and
other fields, and chose 108 items out of those areas. They then selected
eight critical items out of the larger list. These top items were agricul-
tural, raw materials, energy resources, computer, lasers, space science,
40
high-energy physics, and genetic engineering.
With this list approved, Fang I and the State Council began to explore
ways of meeting the requirements. At this point, in 1978, procedures
were considerably less methodical. Goals were announced, such as sending
10,000 students overseas, and expectations raised, such that local fact-
ories began to negotiate directly for advanced-technology whole-plant
imports, which were far beyond China's resources. It was not until late
1978 - early 1979 that something approaching rational centralized coordination
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began to emerge. Throughout the earlier chaos, the Foreign Ministry stood
by like an overloaded switchboard, trying to sort out the confusion between
eager Chinese bureaucrats and the equally eager foreigners. The nadir
came in March 1979 when the Foreign Ministry was trying to soothe strained
relations with Japan over China's attack on Vietnam. The State Planning
Commission, apparently on orders from new finance czar Ch'en Yun, froze
negotiations worth $2.5 billion that Japan thought were already signed and
41
committed. After a late March working conference sorted out the chaos,
Vice Premier Teng Ying-chao (Chou En-lai's popular widow and an increasingly
important Politburo figure in foreign relations) was sent to Japan in April
to pick up the pieces and reassure the Japanese that commitments would be
42
met, albeit on a differently prioritized production schedule.
I. STUDENT OVERSEAS STUDY
The plan to send 10,000 students overseas to study quickly fell apart
when attempts were made to implement it. In late 1978 the Ministry of
Education and the Foreign Ministry were frantically making whatever arrange-
ments were possible, which ended up being about 3,000 students for 1979,
a high percentage of them starting study overseas with the host country's



















Romania (still under negotiations)
(Source: Japan Times
, 26 December 1978)
These students' areas of study were as indicated in Table III-l.
The Chinese were unprepared for the complexities of paperwork required
by foreign universities and governments. They were also apparently appalled
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at some of the costs, particularly in France. The paperwork had to be
done in foreign languages, and the Ministry of Education had to examine
candidates' linguistic proficiencies (a major problem, given the geographic
spread of applicants in China) to provide the Foreign Ministry with its
overseas language training requirements. The crucial importance of getting
a new generation of scholars competent by world standards, after losing a
whole generation from 1966-1978, was clear to all, if China were to absorb
and use the expensive technology hardware being purchased. The Foreign
Ministry acted as the conduit for these increasing exchanges.
J. SCHOLARLY EXCHANGES
As the barriers to the West were dropped in 1972, with the U.S., Japan,
and several NATO countries giving up their PRC-isolation policies, Peking




Initial Chinese Students to U.S.:





Material Sciences & Technology 15

















Source: Committee on Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of China
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been happening in the arts, sciences, and humanities in China over the
preceding 25 years. First from Japan, and then increasingly from the
U.S., scholars in every field from seismology to infant-care flocked to
China. Almost as quickly, exchange visits were arranged, principally by
the Committee for Scholarly Exchange with China, and the National Arts,
Sciences, and Humanities Foundations. Chinese scientists began to tour
and talk with American specialists at leading universities and such places
as the Houston Space Center, major electronics laboratories, and huge
agribusiness centers. The flood of American specialists to China was co-
ordinated by the China Tourist Service through the overseas embassies and
the appropriate host agencies in China. The foreign scholars not only
paid their own expenses, in most cases, to visit China but also facilitated
upon their return the subsidization of reciprocal visits to the U.S. by
Chinese scholars through American professional organizations. By mid-1979,
according to the State Department, about 30 Chinese groups a month were
visiting the U.S., more than four times the rate in 1978. The pace of
exchanges occasionally got ahead of monitoring by high-level officials
on both sides. When Vice Premier K'ang Shin-en, who also heads the State
Economic Commission, visited Treasury Secretary Blumenthal in Washington,
they enthusiastically hit upon the idea of American assistance in recover-
ing additional oil from China's existing oilfields, only to find that a
44
special Chinese delegation was already in the U.S. on that mission.
Even tourists provide China with a significant flow of valuable ex-
pertise, even though its influx is relatively unguided. In many cases,
foreign tourists are given opportunities to meet with Chinese from their
own occupations during the prescribed tours. Whether farmer-to-farmer,
mechanic-to-mechanic, or whatever, useful information is passed along.
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The China Travel and Tourism Bureau reported that in 1978 more than
100,000 foreigners and 400,000 overseas Chinese "compatriots" visited
the PRC.
The Chinese have not overlooked the opportunity to siphon off advanced
and intermediate technology from less advanced countries. By 1977 China
had signed economic and technical exchange agreements with over 60 coun-
tries, including many in the Third World. A Chinese broadcast to South-
east Asia in February 1978 pointed out, China's activities in promoting
the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge with all friendly nations
in the world have become more vigorous than ever. China has signed agree-
ments for scientific and technical cooperation or has established such
relations with many countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.
The events of the past few years prove that although various coutries have
their strong points in the field of science and technology, they must learn
from each other. Based on the requirements for developing out national
economy and in line with the principle of maintaining independence, keeping
the initiative in our own hands, relying on our own efforts and following
the policy of making foreign things serve China, various visiting groups
were sent out from China in 1977 to observe advanced techniques in foreign
countries in the fields of petroleum, chemical engineering, coal mining,
metallurgy, architecture, railway transport, electronics, aeronautics, and
shipbuilding. These groups gained experiences which can be used in the
ii46
development of industrial and agricultural production in China.
K. MAIL ORDER TECHNOLOGY
In addition to coordinating scholarly exchanges, the overseas Chinese
embassies have also collected and sent back to China an enormous volume
of technical literature in the public domain. The program to buy large
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numbers of unclassified technical journals and books in the U.S. began with
a low profile, with sympathetic Chinese-Americans sending them to Guozi
Shudian (International Bookstores) and Waiwen Shudian (Foreign Language
Bookstores), which in turn sent them back to Peking.
In 1971 Stanley Greenfield of the Ziff Davis Publishing Company, which
acts as a book purchasing agent for libraries and governments, thought he
saw an opportunity to cash in on opening contacts with China. After getting
clearance from the State Department, which advised him to write the Chinese
embassy in Ottawa, he offered to act as purchasing agent for publicly avail-
able documents in the U.S. The Ottawa embassy, which was either already
running, or preparing to run, a covert agent to Washington, ignored his
letter. Fourteen months later Greenfield resubmitted the proposal to the
PRC trade mission in New York. He received a response 10 months later
and, after some extended bargaining, had a going business with the China
National Publications Import Corporation in Peking by January 1975.
His first order was for all microprint versions of the previous year's
documents of the State Department, Defense Department, NASA, National
Science Foundation, Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Standards, and
Joint Publications Research Service, Army Navy, and Marines, a grand
total of 548,000 pages, for which Greenfield charged $10,000.
Greenfield got about 500 orders a year, each time for specific docu-
ments, reflecting the thorough bibliographic knowledge in Peking.
Greenfield became aware that the Chinese were carefully perusing the in-
coming flood when he received a complaint a month after he had sent his
largest shipment (all of NASA's 1963 and 1964 documents, a total of 560,000
pages), requesting a few missing microfilm strips. While China was con-
ducting above-ground nuclear tests, Peking asked Greenfield for a Ph.D.
48
dissertation on air currents over the Northwestern U.S.
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The Chinese government has also begun to use the services of the
Declassified Documents Reference System of Carrollton Press, which is run
by an ex-CIA officer named W.W. Buchanan. The company specializes in




It is hard to generalize about the quality of embassy reporting, much
less its role in policymaking in Peking.
Through Reference News the Chinese stayed very well informed about the
U.S., even without the benefit of diplomatic relations. Ross Terrill, one
of the few foreigners to have talked extensively with Foreign Ministry
officials in Peking, reported in 1971 that "the Chinese seem to be as well-
informed as the foreign ministries of medium-ranked nations," but gave
their "political shrewdness" in using that information much higher marks.
The opinions of foreign diplomats in Peking are contradictory. Terrill
quotes a Scandanavian ambassador who spent four and a half years in Peking
as saying:
Going to the Foreign Ministry here has been just the
same as going to the Quai d'Orsay. The level of
knowledge is similar. You have the same kind of free,
rank exchange about world affairs. Of course, it's
not as close as when we talk to Washington or London
— for with these two my country has a special tie.
But it's about like talking with the French. 51
A Christian Science Monitor correspondent who surveyed the Chinese diplo-
matic service, quoted an Asian diplomat who had recently served in Peking
in 1966: "Many (Chinese) envoys cable home only what Peking wants to
52hear." This perception may have been colored by the milieu of the
Cultural Revolution, or it may reflect a tendency common among lesser
diplomats of all nations to report what superiors are interested in and
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want to hear. Donald Klein's discussions with foreigners and his own im-
pressions were that, except for a handful of top-notch ambassadors, he
53
was "struck forcefully by a seeming lack of curiosity."
The lifestyle of overseas Chinese diplomats tends to be frugal and
withdrawn as well. As a rule Chinese embassies are self-contained — all
staff, including domestic housekeeping personnel, drivers, etc
.
, are Chinese
Local people are not employed within the diplomatic compounds. This is true
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world-wide. In the large Moscow embassy, there is even an attempt to
grow their own food in plots within the compound, with the ambassador help-
ing with the gardening. This tendency towards insularity does not foster
rapid, close contacts with the local people; there is nothing like "living
on the economy" to strengthen language skills and assimilate local customs
that pave the way towards greater understanding and trust with a host
country's inhabitants.
Samuel Kim, who did a study covering the first six years of the PRC's
diplomatic interactions at the U.N., found that most U.N. diplomats des-
cribed the Chinese delegates as quiet, good listeners, and generally re-
ticent, even to the point of not appearing to. lobby actively off the
Assembly floor. Descriptions of how the Chinese participate in the consul-
tative process included such comments as these: "in a very passive way";
"like a diligent student listening, observing, and learning"; and "yes,
but they never assume the posture of leadership."
The Chinese U.N. delegation, then under Huang Hua (1977), asked a lot
of questions but avoided answering questions directed at themselves. When
there was a need for mutual consultation — almost always bilateral rather
than in any form of caucus — the Chinese would seek out the other delega-
tion, never the other way around. In short, the Chinese maintained a
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generally passive, listening stance at the U.N., only occasionally actively
seeking out information, and scrupulously avoiding being put in a position
where the Chinese delegates would have to give a personal opinion before
the official stance was worked out in Peking. The U.N. delegation routinely
passed up rotating chairmanships of various committees.
A last indicator that embassies appear to have a secondary role in infor-
mation exchange with other governments is the locus of negotiations China
conducts with other nations. Douglas M. Johnson and Hungdah Chiu compiled
a list of approximately 2,300 agreements signed between 1949 and 1967.
Of these, 80 percent were signed in Peking, a proportion fairly consistent
over time and for both developed and less developed countries. This pro-
portion probably reflects, as Klein points out, both China's limited com-
munications capabilities and the concentration of experts (economic,
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military, and scientific) in Peking available to decision makers. The
key negotiations for normalization of relations with the U.S. and the
Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan in 1978 also occurred in Peking
with foreign envoys, rather than through China's diplomats in Tokyo and
Washington.
This preference to talk through foreign envoys in Peking rather than
querying China's own envoys in the field may be a habit carried over from
days when Chinese envoys were a fairly green group. This is no longer the
case. As China's communications with her embassies become more sophisti-
cated, it is reasonable to expect this practice to reverse itself, as Peking
begins to use these experienced ambassadors more actively in the host coun-




The Chinese leadership uses the full range of opportunities available
to it to collect information on the outside world. Its leaders have access
to world events through a wide range of international news services.
Through its embassies, NCNA bureaus and offices, and through VIP and
other exchanges, it is able to collect a high volume of valuable intelli-
gence on World affairs. By carefully maintaining a positive international
image, China has received enthusiastic help from the non-communist world
in filling its needs for technology. Although China has from time to time
been caught at covert collection activities, it appears to have found
over the past few years that it can satisfy its immediate and near-term
needs in the West through overt activities. The present situation is
likely to continue until either (1) China has absorbed the 30 years of
technology it lost and begins seeking state-of-the-art military and
proprietary secrets, or (2) China's relations with the West sour, for
whatever reason. The current arrangement balances the West's desires
to see China reinforce its normative state-to-state behavior by a
better understanding of, and interdependence with, the existing inter-
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1
The process of negotiations between two nations is essentially the reactional
lavior pattern of one country to another. As such, in cybernetic terms, it can
characterized as the changing output of each country's foreign relations
item to a specific external environment, under specific conditions. Wars,
momic boycotts, formal conferences, media exchanges, etc . , can be, and should
considered forms of negotiations, the interreactive output of foreign policy
icesses. This broad view of the negotiating process is particularly important
>n one attempts to dissect decision-making in the Chinese case, because the
.nese definitely weigh factors beyond the bargaining table in their negotiating
lavior.
This chapter will examine past and current Chinese negotiating styles. The
;ntification of national interests, the probing of the other side's position,
i signalling methods, the bargaining techniques, the use of external power as
assure, and the resolution "end-game" tactics employed by the Chinese will all
examined. Because of the difficulty in recreating the nuances and evolving
3ues of past negotiations, this analysis will draw primarily from first-hand
:ounts, such as Admiral Turner Joy's experiences at the Panmunjom talks,
ineth Young's at the Sino-U.S. Warsaw talks, Arthur Lall's at the 1961 Geneva
Lks on Laos, and Gilbert Verhif 's at the PRC-Tanzanian 1962 treaty talks.
rrent patterns are derived mainly from appraisals of the 1972-78 Sino-Japanese
ace and Friendship (PFT) treaty talks, the 1978 Sino-American normalization
relations talks, and recent contract bargaining sessions between U.S.
siness firms and Chinese trade officials.
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NEGOTIATION - NOT ALWAYS TO REACH AGREEMENT
It is generally considered "bad faith" in Western societies to enter into
otiations without some commitment to reach a compromise settlement, or at
ist the intention to seek a full and frank exchange of views that might clear
perceptions blocking agreement. As the Committee for the Judiciary of the
.
Senate once put it:
To an American, negotiation is the least troublesome method of
settling disputes. Negotiation may be exploratory and serve
to formulate viewpoints and delineate areas of agreement or
contention. Or it may aim at working out practical arrange-
ments. The success of negotiation depends on whether (a) the
issue is negotiable (that is, you can sell your car but not
your child) ; (b) the negotiations interested not only in
taking but also in giving are able to exchange value for value,
and are willing to compromise; or (c) negotiating parties
trust each other to some extent— if they didn't, a plethora
?
of safety provisions would render the "agreement" unworkable.
An experienced American negotiator explains, "In a successful negotiation
3
'ryone wins; each party should have a stake and gain in the outcome."
Such notions of fair play and good faith reflect Western behavioral norms.
;Michael Blaker discovered in his in-depth analysis of 18 major negotiations
iducted by Japan, non-Western countries may have very different sets of
>avioral norms and expectations for negotiations. He found the Japanese
j infrequently entered negotiations without expectations of any agreement,
iply to avoid loss of face by appearing unreasonable. Appearances of
icerity and harmony were frequently more relevant than progress towards
: promise. Bargaining success or failure, according to such reasoning,
4
Eomes ascribable to impersonal forces, fortune, or caprxce.
The Chinese negotiating style superficially resembles the Japanese in its
flexibility and seemingly endless patience in probing out an adversary's
ek points. Both nations will enter negotiations, if necessary, without
>ectations of progress towards an agreement. However, the Chinese attitude
cards negotiations, and techniques, tend to be vastly different.
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The Chinese view negotiations as a tool in adjusting a favorable "correlation
forces" towards their objectives, not as an end in themselves.
From 1949 to 1971, when Sino-U.S. relations were virtually non-existent, it
an achievement for the Chinese to get the U.S. to a conference table on
Lhing approaching equal terms. The U.S.-P.R.C. ambassador-level Warsaw talks
a 1955 through the 1960 's achieved very little but served Chinese national
arests in getting the U.S. to make some limited concessions to their existence.
energetic Chinese efforts to negotiate cultural and trade agreements around the
.d helped win China's acceptance as a legitimate member of the world community.
negotiations for these agreements seldom dealt with anything more substantial
i increasing contacts and establishing mutual respect.
As an American legal adviser to the Tanzanian foreign ministry observed during
negotiations for the first Sino-Tanzanian cultural exchange agreement,
Because they involve no significant commitment by either party,
I
cultural exchange agreements are easy to negotiate. The expedi-
tious and friendly manner in which the negotiations proceed serves
to create an image in each other's eyes of reasonable, well-
meaning people with whom one can do business. In the early stages
of relations between two states the establishment of such an image
may be far more important than the subject of the agreement
itself. 5
The Chinese negotiating position at the Korean Armistice talks at Kaesong and
aunjom from 1951 to 1953—a pattern later used by the North Vietnamese at the
is peace talks—is another case where Chinese interest in progress towards a
rlement was questionable. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese used a protracted,
Lexible stance at peace talks to influence what they perceived as waning
. domestic support for war. The negotiators kept the talks open as a forum
propaganda and as a convenient basket for U.S. concessions, as pressures
it for a resolution of the conflict.
Negotiations provide the Chinese the opportunity to disabuse Western leaders
:iny ideas that battlefield losses have attrited their resolve. They provide
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.milieu to marshal world opinion on their behalf, to make their opponent
eel he is isolated by his unreasonableness. And they provide a window to
;tudy changes in their opponent's behavior, to exploit tactically in the
alks or elsewhere.
It is not hard to get the Chinese to the negotiating table, but their
iresence there may not denote that they are ready to seek a compromise.
Anyone preparing to sit down with the Chinese to negotiate—whether it
e a cease-fire armistice or the financing of a Marriott hotel in Shanghai
—
lust first take a broad look at Peking's national interests. Is there a
tiddle ground of common interests? Can China gain by dragging out the talks,
it will it cost to do so? What other key Chinese interests are affected by
he topics under negotiation? The record is clear that China will negotiate,
.f need be, just to gain information; that Peking's negotiators will pre-
aricate and not budge if this shows promise of concessions from the other
dde, and that China will reach a compromise agreement only when it is
onvinced no further concessions are forthcoming, and further delay is at
Ihina's cost.
In cases where the Chinese have entered negotiations with some intention
though not always an immediate one) of reaching a settlement, their tactics
lave followed a fairly set pattern. Borrowing from traditional negotiations
heory (based in turn on game theory), one can identify three distinct stages;
cumulation and presentation of the initial position, maneuvering and probing
or the adversary's minimum position, and the end-game.
These three phases are examined in detail below.
>. INITIAL PHASE—SEIZING THE HIGH GROUND
The initial tactical moves by Chinese negotiators are designed to throw
heir adversary off balance and put him in a defensive stance through the
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ist of the negotiations. For Westerners accustomed to beginning talks by
jtting a positive tone, establishing personal rapport, and probing gently
ie hardness of the other side's positions, these Chinese tactics are
requently rather unsettling and disorienting.
Chinese behavior during the initial phase has five elements.
1. Extensive Homework . Before the Chinese agree to even* begin talks
ley have thoroughly researched the issue at hand, historical precedents,
ie backgrounds of the opposing team members, and the peripheral politics.
1 every case studied over the past 28 years, the negotiators facing the
linese have been unexpectedly surprised at the thoroughness of the Chinese
reparations for the talks. As Arthur Lall has noted,
The meticulous attention to concrete details has been adopted
by the Chinese in the conduct of international negotiations.
Writing in 1944, Mao said, "Treat all problems analytically
instead of negating everything." And again in the following
year he said, "He who makes no investigation and study has no
right to speak." These injunctions impose exacting disciplines
on Chinese negotiators. They work hard to conform to Mao's
dictum, and this generally helps them to gain an impressive
mastery of the issues and situations that are under negotiation.
: the Korean talks the Chinese and North Korean negotiators made extensive
»e of historical details about border arrangements, previous U.N. and U.S.
:atements that conflicted with later statements, precedents in international
iw and the U.N. charter, etc . , to buttress their arguments and put the U.N.
igotiators on the defensive. Similarly, at the 1961 Laos talks they made
requent references to details of the 1954 Geneva Indochina talks. In current
ilks with American private companies over contract terms, they have exhibited
^tailed knowledge about specifications and processes that came as a surprise
a their Western counterparts, one notable example being their detailed speci-
Lcations for communications satellite equipment. The extensive collection
fforts and windows China uses to collect such background data for talks are
Lscussed in Chapter II.
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2. Get China's Agenda Adopted . At the Korean armistice talks, U.N.
igotiators found the Chinese and North Korean delegations had prepared a
^tailed "loaded" agenda which, in the words of the senior U.N. delegate
miral Turner Joy, was "composed of conclusions favorable to their basic
„8
;jectives, such as items setting the course of the demilitarized zone and
le removal of "foreign troops." The importance of insisting upon a neutral
i against a prejudicial agenda is not readily apparent to the general public,
; Ambassador Young points out: "American negotiators are frequently
•iticized because they will not concede what seems to be a trivial or
ichnical point of sequence or semantics in the agenda. But the whole out-
line of the negotiation may be at stake and the entire issue won or lost in
le initial process of battling over a "neutral agenda." Chinese Communist
9
tgotiators are tough, adroit, and persistant at that stage." Another U.S.
ibassador, Arthur Dean emphasized the importance of agenda-setting in
jnilar terms:
The battle for the agenda is fundamental to Communist nego-
tiators, because they believe they can humiliate the other
side and win or lose a conference in this first battle...
Quite often, they are correct. 1^
abassador Averell Harriman brought the 1961 Geneva talks to a standstill for
iveral weeks over the agenda sequence, refusing to discuss a statement on
ios' independence and neutrality until firm safeguards were established
>r the effective operation of the supervisory International Commission.
Besides the obvious advantage of getting an agenda which will treat
ssues in a sequence favorable to the development of your own position, without
iking premature concessions to the opponent's key positions, the U.S. nego-
Lators hint, but don't say outright, that a favorable agenda is important to
le U.S. because, as talks drag out, the U.S. position inevitably weakens,
i the face of political pressures for "progress." Since the U.S. position
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usually strongest at the earlier stages of talks, a favorable agenda
nances favorable momentum while a hard-nosed position is still possible.
The Vietnamese negotiators, similar practitioners of the loaded
enda, encountered the same Chinese tactic when they started to negotiate
end to the 1979 Sino-Viet war. The Vietnamese refused initially to
oceed to other topics until the Chinese vacated remaining footholds in
etnamese territory, while the Chinese refused to proceed to implement a
asefire until the Vietnamese met a list of eight demands. Apart from a
isoner exchange, no agenda was ever worked out that enabled the talks to
ogress.
A similar standoff exists in the ongoing Sino-Soviet border talks,
e Chinese refuse to go on to other issues until the Soviets demilitarize
eir common border, including Outer Mongolia, a demand the Soviets are not
epared to discuss at the early stages of talks, if ever. The Chinese will
t negotiate under the overt Soviet threat.
In short, the "agenda battle" constitutes China's preliminary sparring,
a testing of the opponent's firmness.
3. Seize the Initiative From the Start . The Chinese have used a variety
means to "set the stage" as talks begin, ranging from crude attempts at
miliation, such as sawing short the chair legs on the U.N. side of the table,
: subtle ploys with visiting U.S. businessmen, such as was done to a senior
'ior Corporation executive who, having been invited to Peking to discuss
1 /eloping a Chinese copper property, was blithely met with "Welcome to China.
U are you here?", making the Fluor delegation respond defensively for five
12
Us before the talks got off the ground. The Chinese moves are intended
: put the adversary on the defensive from the very beginning.
When the Geneva talks on Laos opened on 16 May 1961, Ch'en Yi, China's
E "eign minister and senior representative, insisted on making an opening
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latement, despite the fact that only the conference chairman, Prince
iLhanouk, was scheduled to speak the first day. Ch'en Yi then made a
;rong opening statement, labeling the U.S. the culprit in the Laotian
Ltuation, playing up China's good deeds and high motives, and demanding
roof of goodwill from all the other participants:
Provided all the countries participating in this conference
have the sincerity to truly settle the question, there is
no reason why our conference cannot achieve positive results.
'ien the talks are bilateral and major Chinese interests are involved, the
linese are not above staging incidents to frame the other party. A few days
iter talks started at Kaesong in Korea, a Chinese patrol was "ambushed" and
few days later the meeting place was bombed, both incidents being blamed
1 the U.S., despite Kaesong being well within the North Korean side of the
ittleline. The Vietnamese have charged similar incidents since the start
£ the 1979 Sino-Viet border talks, as well as during the earlier, abortive
ilks in July-September 1978 . Such incidents may be clear fabrications to
le Chinese opponent, but they serve effectively to put international
aspicion on the good faith of that opponent.
4. Submission of an Initial Proposal . Can one expect the Chinese to
Lways table their own initial proposal? Not always. The decision to submit
a initial proposal seems to depend on the Chinese need to preempt the
ituation.
At the 1953 Korean armistice talks, the 1961 Geneva talks, and the
979 Sino-Viet talks, the Chinese elected to submit an initial position. In
ach case, it is safe to assume, they realized that there was little likelihood
lat the talks would proceed favorably for them in the immediate future. By
dapting a hardline stance that put their opponents in a defensive position,
hey reduced the chances that the talks would proceed smoothly from their
pponent's positions. At Kaesong and Geneva they needed to maneuver international
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)inion behind their position that foreign troops must be withdrawn from
>rea and Laos. Given the strategic geography, the U.S. was not likely to
mcede this point at the initial stages of talks. In Vietnam's case, the
linese were unwilling to concede a ceasefire until the Vietnamese sub-
-.antially altered their relationship with the Soviet Union, a demand that
is unlikely to be met under the initial conditions of the talks.
In other cases, the Chinese have elected not to submit an initial
isition at negotiations. During the Sino-American talks in Warsaw from
•55 on, the Chinese rarely submitted proposals. In the current contract
igotiations with American, Japanese, and European firms, the Chinese elect
i use the initial phase to continue probing the firms' proposals rather
ian to seek an early resolution.
In cases where negotiations are non-adversary, such as talks to
ach cultural, sports, and scientific/ technological exchanges, an initial
sition is irrelevant; common practice dictates the terms of such
reements.
5. Responses to Others' Proposals . In the event the Chinese initial
oposal is countered by a proposal from the other side, the Chinese nego-
ators immediately make it clear that there is no common ground, that their
ponents' arguments are intrinsically wrong, evidence bad faith, and are
neath consideration. Their attacks leave little doubt in anyone's mind
at the Chinese refuse to proceed with any kind of further discussion of
ese proposals.
Nam II, rejecting the U.N. proposals for a ceasefire line, gave a
pical example of this total-rejection tactic:
It has been proved that your proposal is untenable
and that our proposal is based on reason.... I can
tell you frankly that as long as you do not abandon
your untenable proposal, it will not be possible for
our conference to make any progress. As for our proposal,
its reasons are irrefutable; therefore it is unshakeable. 1^
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Ch'en Yi, ten years later, used the same tactic, emphasizing the
/rongness" of the U.S. proposal and the immorality therefore in striking
balance:
The Franco-American draft protocol cannot be the basis
for our discussion, nor can it be compared and reconciled
with the Soviet proposals. How can we lump together right
and wrong and then strike a mean between them?15
, MIDDLE PHASE—MANEUVER AND PROBE
By the completion of the initial phase, most Western negotiators feel the
)reliminaries are out of the way" and serious give-and-take can begin. This
; usually a false assumption. Chinese negotiating behavior from this point
>rward resembles nothing so much as besieging a medieval town, or the 10-year
>sault on Troy. The Chinese employ a wide variety of strategms with seemingly
lfinite patience to probe for weak spots and wear down their adversary. They
:e not yet in a position to force the issue, but they believe time is on
leir side.
The conduct of the protracted talks in the middle phase varies significantly
rom the initial and final phases. Routine exchanges are taken over by deputies
id liaison officers, with the senior delegates appearing from time to time to
inctuate key points and, occasionally, new positions. The Chinese have an
iterest in keeping the talks going, but are not above tactical suspensions
: the talks to try to shake up the other side. Such suspensions are usually
:" short duration, and will be ended on the Chinese side if their opponents
> not first seek to reenstate the talks.
1. Probing for Soft Spots in Opponents' Positions . Despite their initial
:ance that the opposing side's initial proposals were totally unacceptable,
ie Chinese negotiators soon begin to work on them. Using a slash-and-thrust
'.chnique of vilifying a particular point, then proposing more acceptable
iriations, the Chinese seek to find out which proposals are fixed in cement
d which are susceptible to change.
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Arthur Lall, the senior Indian delegate at the 1961 Geneva talks,
ried to break a Chinese-American impasse with his own draft changes. After
brief huddle among themselves, the senior Chinese negotiator at that session,
lang Han-fu, came back elliptically with further probing:
We've not said we don't accept (your draft proposals)
.
We've told you that many improvements cquld be made.
Why should we accept them in their present form when,
as you can see now, they can be improved? Don't you
think our suggestions are good? Then, do you think
the Americans will accept them? We don"t think they
will. Here is fresh tea. Please let us have some. 16
e Chinese have not in fact submitted a counterproposal, but rather have put
eir opponents in a position of being forced to respond in such a manner as
show whether they will "move" on given points.
2. Divide-and-Conquer Through World Opinion . The Chinese are aware that
e persuasiveness of their arguments on their opposing counterparts is fre-
ently not as important as its effect on the world outside. Even wildly un-
ibstantiable points known to be fabrications by members of the conference
iy receive significant acceptance in the world at large, or even among key
igments of their oppositions' home populations. When talks stall, the general
nlic becomes impatient and wants to know why; the Chinese propaganda mill is
:idy to supply a plethora of examples of bad faith and unreasonableness on
:h part of their adversaries.
The use of a fabricated "ambush" of a Chinese patrol and the bombing
> the Kaesong meeting site are examples of media manipulation. The Chinese
since that the U.S. was unreasonable is not agreeing to a general statement
J Laos ' independence and neutrality before proceeding to specific proposals
b increase the effectiveness of the supervisory International Commission
U sufficient sympathy to get the British delegation to accept the point,
i ;pite U.S. intransigence. As the impasse dragged on, the U.S. delegation
t>' ame increasingly isolated from general world opinion. Even the allegations
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U.S. use of germ warfare in Korea, while generally discredited, served to
eate a tainted aura around the U.S. position. Most recently in talks
th the Vietnamese, the Chinese media have played up themse of Vietnamese
utality and aggressiveness, which have received responsive reverberations
non-Communist Southeast Asia public opinion, at a real cost in Vietnamese
plomatic aspirations.
A similar, though less aggressive, approach is used in business
gotiations. After getting the most comprehensive specifications possible
a Western firms' products and services, the Chinese will ask the firm to
ote a price, then bargain hard for a discount, usually implying strongly
at a competitor will provide one. In the highly competitive international
sh for Chinese business, this is a credible threat. Stanley Lubman, a
n Franciscan-based attorney who has made 19 business trips to China,
presenting among others Bethlehem Steel's bid for a $100 million iron ore
oject, states, "Chinese officials are quick to label a company's offer
t competitive. Often the Chinese side may not even make a counter offer,
t only continue to whittle prices down." The effect is the same; the
inese are playing on their opponent's insecurities about external conditions
e Chinese can manipulate bilaterally and secretively.
3. Selective Ambiguity . The Chinese love for ambiguity and circum-
cution is well ingrained in their literature and language, and provides a
18
dden flexibility that is difficult for Westerners to penetrate. Mao
19
eated a whole policy science out of selective manipulation of contradictions.
Arthur Lall points out, "We must not expect to find fixed and verifiable
anings even in seemingly rigid statements," which adds to the negotiator's
lemma in "reading" the Chinese's real position:
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This faculty that Peking has developed, of using the same
words to cover a long spectrum of meanings, adds considerably
to the difficulty of negotiation with China. One fundamental
factor in negotiation is the need to discover the minimal re-
quirements of each party to the negotiation. In the case of
Peking it is especially difficult to make this discovery.
It is a closely guarded secret. 20
ie ability to move behind a smokescreen of vagueness not only helps obscure
ina's interim positions, but is useful at later points when China finally
ects to reach an agreement. Vague statements about postponing resolution
territorial claims with Burma in the 1960 border treaty, similar statements
er the contested Senkaku Islands in the final phase of the 1978 Sino-
panese PFT talks, and the "agree to disagree" explanation of differing
S. and Chinese stands on arms sales to Taiwan after normalization in 1978,
1 served to make it possible for China to reach negotiated settlements
thout giving up their claims. In the negotiating process itself, however,
ch hard-nosed obscurantism acts as a brick wall until the final Chinese
Icision to reach a settlement.
4. The Anvil of Time . Perhaps the most common observation made by those
;o have treated with the Chinese is that they are "endlessly patient." The
lility of Chinese negotiators to hammer away hour after hour, week after week,
;th the same questions is maddening to their Western counterparts, and the
iinese know it.
Even in negotiations with Western businessmen, when the desire on the
linese side to reach an agreement is clear, talks can drag on for weeks and
itiths, becoming a test of patience.
During these deadening sessions, the Chinese are probing continuously
fr signs of weakening. David Janet, an executive of the Houston-based
FLlman Kellogg Company that got into the China market early with a $200 million
dal for eight huge chemical fertilizer plants in the early 1970 's, points out,
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"o the Chinese an indication of anger is a demonstration of a loss of self-
nf idence.
Admiral Turner Joy came to the conclusion that the Chinese used delay-
g tactics simply to play upon the known intolerance of the Western public
ward lack of progress:
As a general matter, Communists believe that once nego-
tiations have been initiated, to delay progress towards
consummation of agreements tends to weaken the position
of their opponents. They hope to exploit the character-
istic impatience of Western peoples. 22
Ambassador Arthur Dean, the first civilian negotiator at Panmunjom,
hoed Admiral Turner Joy's sentiments upon his departure in 1953:
Communists are in no hurry. They have no timetable.
They think time is on their side and that Americans,
being optimistic, friendly, truthful, constructive and
inclined to believe and hope for the best, will become
discouraged.
They believe that at a long-drawn-out conference the
American negotiators will be forced by American public
opinion to give in, in order to have a successful con-
ference. Impatience mounts as no progress is reported.
People ask: "What progress did you make today?" The
Communists know this and burn bonfires under the American
negotiators and utter rude, insulting, arrogant demands
that the American negotiators stop their unconstructive
stalling tactics. 23
In 1963 Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, one of the State Department's
nior Asia hands, joined the others with this observation:
During the almost four years that I was negotiating
with the Chinese Communists at Geneva, between 1954
and 1958, what I found most annoying and frustrating
was their supreme self-confidence that they need make
no concessions of any kind and that if they just
waited long enough we would be forced to make all the
concessions to them.^




Being Chinese and Marxist-Leninist simultaneously,
the Chinese Communist negotiator implicitly believes
that time and victory are on his side. While the
historical process may be nudged along, it does not
need to be hurried, should that be disadvantageous.
Success in bargaining, whether for a piece of goods
or the enemy's defeat, will come more easily if no
sense of haste or concern is shown. Viewing negotia-
tions in extended periods of time, Chinese Communist
negotiators give the impression that they can wait
forever, if necessary. .. .25
t this view, the Chinese are willing to forgo short-term gains for long-term
accesses.
Although they may have different rationales for the Chinese propensity
<r drawing out negotiations, all experienced negotiators agree with Rudyard
.pling that the White Man who "tries to hustle the East" has chosen a dis-
;trous course. As long as the Chinese perceive a chance of gain by outwaiting
leir opponent's patience, they will not likely make concessions themselves.
5. Milking Concessions . During the protracted middle phase of negotiations,
te Chinese tend to view unilateral concessions by the other side as a general
:akening to be exploited. Admiral Turner Joy said:
Whenever Western negotiators make a concession to
Communist views for the purpose of making progress,
Communists consider this action is evidence of a de-
teriorating Western position. Therefore, they press
even more strongly for further concessions, and become
more confident that time plays on their side. 26
Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing,
merely to make progress. .. .Never imagine any point is
unimportant. To concede a minor point without a like
concession from them is but to convince them that in
more substantive issues you will ultimately submit to
their viewpoint. 27
ibassador Young agreed with this fixed conclusion:
Making a concession or adjustment is the trickiest
technique of all in adversary negotiating. If a move
toward compromise is made too emphatically or too soon,
the Chinese Communist negotiators will look upon it as
a sign of weakness and defeat. They will be even less
inclined to show any interest in any such American
proposal, nor will they advance a version of their own.
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How and when to move from what is bargainable to what
is not negotiable, to the bedrock of minimum demand,
is never easy. Americans tend to put too much material
between what can be conceded away and what cannot be
given up under any circumstances than do the Communists.
The essential technique for the Americans is to submit
only clear, specific, and self-enforcing compromises
which are reciprocal. 28
imiral Turner Joy is more sanguine about the chances of reciprocal concessions.
2 advises expounding a firm position, declaring it final, then maintaining
aneral silence, refraining from extended defense or justification of your
Dsition. Silence and finality rattle the Chinese and will eventually bring
29
iem to you.
6. Social Contacts . The Chinese make use of social functions (the excep-
ion being the Korean talks) to get to know their counterparts better. As a
jle, business is never discussed at these functions. The Chinese have a
ibit of extended toasting, calling upon guests to respond to toasts with a
?am bay" ("bottoms up") exhortation. The unwary Westerner may not notice at
Lrst that the Chinese rotate this duty among themselves. The general rule
2ems to be that four toasts is an acceptable maximum, but the Chinese will go
30
ar up to ten if you don't demur. The origin of the custom, which happens
3 be common throughout the Far East, is not clear, nor is it clear whether
lis form of socializing is done among the Chinese themselves when Westerners
re not present. The Chinese use it to break the ice, but don't make a practice
f it; there is no indication that the Chinese use alcohol on a recurring
isis to wear out the opposition.
. FINAL PHASE—SUDDEN DENOUEMENT
It is virtually impossible to predict at what point a breakthrough is
ukely to occur in negotiations. There are so many invisible inputs into
ie decision-making process, not the least of which are domestic political
Jncerns, that the negotiator is left, like the ancient Roman seers, to look
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jr signs in the wind. There is probably no less exact science, or less co-
srent art, than the avocation of China-watching. Unidentified Washington
fficials have put it:
Signals remain terribly important in dealing with the
Chinese, at least when active negotiations are possible
or in progress. .. .The Chinese rarely respond to points
directly in face-to-face talks. They will not acknowledge
that they have absorbed your point and agree with it. They
will adjust their policy, but not acknowledge that any
adjustment has taken place. They don't betray their eager-
ness for anything. 31
le Chinese broke the deadlock in the 1961 Geneva talks without acknowledging
iy shift in position. After denying in June that any compromise between
right" (China's position) and "wrong" (the U.S. position) was possible,
l'en Yi blithely called for "a conciliatory spirit for reaching agreement
i a reaonsable basis" in July, after four weeks of deadlocked talks. When
sked how this was to be done, Ch'en Yi said that the way was shown by a
„32
linese saying, which he quoted, "Seek common ground and reserve divergencies."
) acknowledgement was made that the Chinese position had shifted.
1. The Chinese Negotiating Team and Peking . Even in a slow-moving nego-
Lation, as occurs with the Chinese, a negotiator must have some sense of two
ital questions if he is to pace his proposals properly: (1) How much latitude
)es my counterpart have to make concessions, and (2) How long does it take my
coposals to get to decision-makers and back to my counterpart?
It is clear that the Chinese negotiating teams are intentionally split
com the decision-making group, whatever the type of negotiation. Ambassador
)ung has speculated that this division derives from the formation in 1861 of
ie Tsungli Yamen , the embryonic foreign ministry under the Dowager Empress.
srtainly even from the earliest trading contacts with Europeans, the Chinese
ive sought to maintain intermediaries between the Imperial court and "foreign
2vils." Whether or not the practice reflects vestiges of an ethnocentric
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Middle Kingdom" prespective is moot, and to a degree, irrelevant. The
rrangement allows the Chinese to concentrate experts on foreign affairs
nto the probing and communicating process, without any danger of precipitate
ommitment
.
Peking charges its negotiating teams with initial positions and in-
trusions, based on exhaustive research of the issues, then sends them out
n that limited charter. In Young's words, "Peking keeps its negotiator
33
ccurately informed and precisely instructed." ' The insistence on keeping
ontrol of negotiations in Peking underscores the larger strategy of Chinese
egotiations. What goes on at the negotiating table is only part of a much
arger campaign involving all aspects of the foreign policy apparatus—media,
nternational forums, diplomatic contacts, and in some cases military
perations. Peking acts as a concert master, in Ross Terrill's view: "The
hinese foreign policy machine is like an orchestra of diverse instruments.
ow a drum is used; now a violin for a mellow effect; now a flute to achieve
34
delicate and modest melody line; now a trumpet such as Radio Peking...."
International businessmen recognize the efficiency of negotiating
.n Peking, and most bilateral state negotiations are conducted there. A study
f over 2,000 agreements reached between 1949 and 1967 revealed that about
35
percent were signed in Peking.
The second question—What is the turn-around time for decision on a
:abled proposal— is harder to answer.
When the senior Chinese delegate at the Korean armistice talks,
General Hsieh Fang, was asked how long it would take his superiors to
nrovide him with guidance on a certain question, Hsieh retorted, "I have no
:alent for prophesy."
A limited survey of out-of-Peking negotiations suggests that four to
six weeks usually elapses between submission of a proposal and discernible
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hanges in the Chinese stance. The local negotiating team may continue to
robe the proposal, but will not usually respond to it within that time-
rame, unless a serious external event occurs, as occasionally happened on
he Korean battlefield.
One can speculate that it takes from several days to a week for the
ocal negotiating team to transmit the proposal and its recommendations,
deluding follow-up probing results, to Peking. Another week is probably
onsumed in staffing the report through the relevant department of the Foreign
inistry through the appropriate Vice Minister, who in turn coordinates with
ther ministries, including in times of conflict the PLA General Staff. The
oreign Minister would probably be ready to submit the fully staffed position
aper to the State Council and Politburo between the third and fourth week,
enneth Lieberthal, on a sketchy analysis of Politburo member appearances,
as estimated that the Politburo met about every nine days in the 1950* s and
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bout every ten days in the 1970' s. The final decison would probably be
ransmitted almost immediately through the Foreign Ministry to the Chinese
egotiating team directly after the decision was reached. The fact that the
egotiators shift position gears without any preliminary footwork suggests
hat they put forward the response position almost immediately, without
oncern for the embarrassment it might cause for arguments presented the day
efore.
Compression of the staffing cycle could occur if an overriding crisis
eveloped, which caused the Politburo to monitor events daily. Again, this
nusual situation appears limited in the past to wartime environments.
In contract talks with foreigners, a similar cycle appears to exist,
'ith split negotiating-decisionmaking halves. Decision-making on contracts
.n the past was probably made below the Politburo level, once the general
conomic plan was approved. The level is hard to determine, although
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i Hsien-nien, the top financial expert in the Politburo, probably oversaw
he bigger contract decisions. After the shakeup of the system in the spring
f 1979 and the formation of an overarching Economic and Finance Commission
eaded by Ch'en Yun, it is likely that these decisions fell to Ch'en.
The precipitate agreements reached on contracts after foreign firms
ad given up on negotiations and were "about to depart have entered the
epertoire of international businessmen's favorite tales. A few examples
rill demonstrate the pattern.
Marshall Goldberg, director of administration for Brooklyn's Monarch
fine Company, which now holds the license for importing Chinese beer and
rodka, got into a futile dispute with the Chinese over how much advertising
rould be necessary to sell the brews in the U.S. After three weeks of heated
:alks, Marshall says, "we walked away, saying, 'Let's part in friendship.'
The Chinese then took us to the Peking opera that evening and the next morning
put us on a train to Ts'ing-tao to see the brewery there. Through the train
window, they said, "We'll see you in Peking to resume negotiations.' They had
wanted to see if we might say something different, the night before, when we
were together socially. We didn't, so they knew we meant business." A deal
quickly followed.
A West German steel company which had similarly come to a deadend in
negotiations had packed up and turned in intending to leave China the follow-
ing day, when a note signed by Vice Premier Fang Yi was slipped under their
hotel door at midnight, agreeing to terms for a $14 billion steel mill
package.
E. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
While the techniques of Chinese diplomacy have remained fairly constant,




The Chinese have been shifting away from ideological priorities towards
ational interest priorities. As far back as 1956 India's ambassador Panikkar,
10 had extensive dealings with the Chinese leadership, observed a basic
jntradition between the two interests:
The sense of universalism inherent in a great revolution is
basically contradictory to national interests and therefore
is incompatible with interntional usages. From this fact
flow the anomalies and contradictions of revolutionary
foreign policy. 39
imes Chieh Hsiung has drawn a parallel between China and the Soviet Union in
jing through this adjustment phase:
Not unlike the Soviet Union in the early years, the CPR is
caught in a very uncomfortable position between a militant
ideology and a physical milieu compelling practical sobriety.
The result is a strange combination of verbal militancy and
prudence in real action. The degree of verbal militancy may
increase in direct proportion to the degree of compulsion
which dictates prudence. ^0
A few characteristics, on the other hand, have remained constant. China
merally has an excellent record in adhering to its international commitments.
linese leaders have put great emphasis on establishing their credibility—"We
aan what we say" is probably the most oft-repeated refrain in the Chinese
Lplomatic lexicon. This holds true of business dealings as well. The Chinese
ive scrupulously carried out their obligations once the hard-fought negotiations
ire completed. Where later disagreements emerged, all were resolved through
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ltual negotiation, without pursuing lengthy arbitral procedures.
Another characteristic that has remained constant is Chinese sensitivity
wards being treated as an equal. The Chinese carefully arrange their rela-
''ons with other smaller states on equal terms; this is one of the foundations
) their claim for leadership of the Third World. They are not an hegemonic
iper power because they do not exploit smaller states. The Chinese are
ctremely sensitive that other major powers treat them as equals, however.
ie intransigent Chinese stand against rapprochment with the Soviet Union is
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i no small part due to the Chinese perception that Moscow refuses to treat
tan as an equal. The Chinese have insisted on the demilitarization of their
cnmon border, including Outer Mongolia, before they will sit down to nego-
tate differences.
F SUMMARY—DO'S AND DON'TS IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE
It is hard to improve upon Ambassador Young's recommended procedures in
ngotiating with China:
1. Stand firm on the agenda and keep the initiative.
2. Stick to details and avoid principles and generalities, which the
Chinese may consider tricks.
3. Avoid "agreements in principle" at the start; proceed with concrete
propositions one at a time.
4. Avoid the Western style of explaining the same point from different
angles; this leads to confusion and inefficiency.
5. Only submit concessions tied to a similar concession expected from
the Chinese. Unilateral concessions tend to be viewed as signs of
weakening and lead to a hardening of the Chinese position, nor are
they likely to submit a counter proposal.
6. During periods of impasse, when the Chinese use invective and
threaten to suspend negotiations, the American technique should be
43
to remain silent and wait.
While the climate of relations with China may affect to some degree the
me of negotiations, it does not change the basic style of negotiations.
ie Chinese negotiatiors will probe positions with frontal challenges,
iconnaissances of flanks, and tests of resolve and patience. They are
'-eking the best deal they can get for Chinese interests, and will not
icrifice those interests to short-term goodwill. Attempts to win their
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friendship" in negotiations are not as effective as convincing them that
ju are bargaining with them as equals in good faith. They are unlikely to
>mpromise until they are satisfied that they have gotten you down to your
Lnimum position, that your defenses cannot be breached further. If they
jel those terms are in China's best interests, and there is no point in
aeking deals elsewhere or delaying further, they will accept those final
arms and the concessions required on their part. To the extent that the
linese are convinced that your position is final and that you intend to
Lose the talks after a reasonable period, you may be able to accelerate
1 agreement. Judging that point is tricky, however, and one is advised to
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ARLY STUDIES—PATTERN CONSISTENCY
We have no equivalent of Graham Allison's Cuban missile crisis study
'or Chinese crisis management. The arguments and counter-arguments of the
.eadership elites in crisis periods are not available.
Until the memoirs of Chinese leaders become available, or some of them
ire willing to discuss what went on in Politburo and Military Affairs Committee
leetings, we must rely on what the Chinese media said during crises—a wealth
if information in itself, and probably reasonably accurate in terms of the
'inal consensus—and actual Chinese behavior. Chinese crisis behavior has
teen fairly consistent, which enables outsiders to assess the criticality of
:urrent Chinese actions and warnings, even without access to deliberations of
:he inner councils, by comparing current actions with past behavior patterns.
The first study of note was Allen Whiting's China Crosses the Yalu (1960)
/hich combined analysis of China's statements about the Korean War and its
ictions prior to entering that war to show that China's decision to intervene
/as not premeditated long in advance, but that China had indeed had to rush
:roops up to the Korean border after U.S. /U.N. troops posed a threat to China
itself
.
The development of data analysis techniques and field theory in the 1960 's
las yielded a series of studies which provide interesting insights but hardly
: irm conclusions about China's crisis behavior patterns.
A typical study by the Institute of Political Studies at Stanford
fniversity in 1970, "Trend Analysis Study of China in Its Relations With The
lajor Powers and Selected Medium Powers from 1922 Until 1968," used a series




COMPUTATIONAL EQUATIONS AND KMPIRICAL MODEL
OF CHINA'S ATTRIBUTES f, CAPABILITIES
iiircc: Stanford Institute of Political Studies, "Trend
Analysis Study of China in Its Relations With
the Major Powers and Selected Medium Powers from
1922 Until 1963, -p. 8)
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X, = Defense budget
X = Men under arms
X. = Average level of conflict behavior or violence
u = Disturbance term
b = Beta coefficient (equivalent to p — path coefficient for standardized
variables) .
It should be noted that our model does not draw upon all the
indices of economic capability we have collected. This is yet to be done,








;o come up with the conclusion:
In terms of absolute levels our results indicate that
China's conflict peaks are most responsive to the actions
of Taiwan , the USSR , Japan , and the United Nations toward
China—in that order.
* * * *
In this analysis United States' behavior toward China
does not feature as a significant determinant of Chinese
behavior . *•
Another study two years later by Sang Woo Rhee at the University of
lawaii, entitled "China's Cooperation, Conflict and Interaction Behavior:
/iewed from Rummel's Status-Field Theoretic Perspective," looked at two of
lummel's 13 theorems explaining status dependent cooperation and conflict
jetween nations, in this case China and the major powers. Rhee found that
China's antagonism towards more powerful states increased the greater the
relative power gap, and but that the greater the economic distance between
>hina and another power, the less antagonism was likely to develop.
Accordingly Rhee predicted ever decreasing tension between Japan and China,
since it appeared Japan would not rearm, while China closed the power gap,
ind Japan would at least maintain the economic gap, Che "conflict-dampening
factor." Rhee felt the USSR's relations with China would become worse,
since the USSR's pwoer edge over China would increase as it continued its
expansion of strategic weapons systems, while not maintaining as wide an
jconomic lead over China as the U.S. China's relations with the U.S. were
Likely to improve, since the U.S. had frozen its power ceiling (defined by
Ihee as ICBMs and SLBMs) while expanding its economic lead. Rhee did not
explicate in great detail why a power gap was an intensifying factor in
:onflict, and his explanation of the conflict -dampening effect of an economic
3
jap was essentially that of a dependency relationship.
In 1974 Andres Onate published an interesting study testing the hypothesis
:hat domestic conflict within China led to conflict in its external relations,
ising data for the study from the New York Times Index . Onate found such a
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noderate" correlation between domestic conflict and external conflict that
e declined to posit a clear causal relationship. What he had not expected,
at came out of his data, however, was a much stronger correlation between
xternal conflict and ensuing domestic conflict. He correlated this finding
ith the propensity for high-ranking party figures associated with foreign
Dlicies to be purged (P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Liu Shao-ch'i, etc .) .
In 1975 Allen Whiting came out with another book, The Chinese Calculus
f Deterrence , analyzing China's conflict management of its Indian and Indo-
ainese (1960's) crises. From this analysis he extracted "a modest codification"
£ deterrence principles that reflect the patterns of perception and behavior
anifest in the crises he examined:
Threats and Their Deterrence as Seen from Peking
1. The worse our domestic situation, the more likely our
external situation will worsen.
a. A superior power in proximity will seek to take
advantage of our domestic vulnerability.
b. Two or more powers will combine against us if
they can temporarily overcome their own conflicts
of interest.
c. We must prepare for the worst and try for the best.
2. The best deterrence is belligerence.
a. To be credible, move military force; words do not
suffice.
b. To be diplomatic, leave the enemy "face" and a way
out
.
c. To be prudent, leave yourself an "option."
d. If at first you don't succeed, try again but more
so.
3. Correct timing is essential.
a. Warning must be given early when a threat is
perceived but not yet imminent.
b. The rhythm of signals must permit the enemy to
respond and us to confirm the situation.
c. We must control our moves and not respond accord-
ing to the enemy's choice. -*
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The most promising and interesting work in pattern analysis has come in
hemid-1970's from three authors, Steve Chan, John Kringer, and Davis Bobrow,
com the University of Maryland and Texas A&M University, working under a
ontract for ARPA.
In one study, the three have conducted a fairly exhaustive analysis of
hinese writings, extracting a cognitive map of how Chinese decision-makers
lew policy options. A part of this study, specifications for Chinese
ecision structure in second-order crises, follows:
Rule 1: Identify China's main enemy.
Rule 2: Assess the involvement of China's main enemy in the
crisis.
Rule 3: (a) To the extent that China's main enemy is heavily
involved in the particular second-order crisis
in question, Chinese policies should be designed
to maximize his loss or vulnerability, and to
minimize his gains.
(b) To the extent that China's main enemy is not
heavily involved in the particular second-order
crisis in question, Chinese policies should have
a higher threshold for direct involvement.
These policies should be designed to maximize
the gains of the "progressive" forces and mini-
mize the loss of these forces, as determined by
Rule 10.
Rule 4: Identify the intermediate actors (including China's
secondary enemies) in the crisis.
Rule 5: Assess the level of opposition of these intermediate
groups to the policies of China's main enemy, or the
potential of mobilizing their opposition to the
policies of the latter.
Rule 6: (a) To the extent that these intermediate actors are
strongly opposed to the policies of China's main
enemy, Chinese policies should have a higher
threshold for direct involvement. These policies
should emphasize "divide and rule" or "balance of
power .
"
(b) To the extent that these intermediate actors are
weakly opposed to the policies of China's main
enemy, and to the extent that Rule 13(b) is
satisfied, Chinese policies should encourage




(c) To the extent that these intermediate actors
are badly divided among themselves or are
supportive of the policies of China's main
enemy, or to the extent that Rule 13(b) is
not satisfied, China should generally abstains
from involvement in the crisis.
Rule 7: Assess the efficacy of Chinese policies based on
6(a) or 6(b).
Rule 8: (a) To the extent that these Chinese policies are
successful for impeding the objectives of
China's main enemy, or to the extent that
they are considered to be adequate for that
purpose, they should be continued or imple-
mented .
(b) To the extent that these Chinese policies are
unsuccessful for impeding the objectives of
China's main enemy, or to the extent that they
are deemed as inadequate for that purpose,
more direct forms of Chinese involvement
should be considered.
Rule 9: Identify the direct conflict participants in the
second-order crisis.
Rule 10: Assess the relations of the direct conflict partici-
pants with China's main enemy.
Rule 11: (a) To the extent that the direct conflict partici-
pants are friendly with China's main enemy,
China should raise its threshold for direct
involvement. Chinese policies should emphasize
the exploitation of the effects of their conflict
on their relations with China's main enemy.
(b) To the extent that one of the direct conflict
participants is hostile to China's main enemy,
China should lower its threshold for direct
support for it in the conflict.
Rule 12: Assess the domestic or internal characteristics of
the conflict parties.
Rule 13: (a) To the extent that the party friendly to China's
main enemy is strong, stable, and united, or to
the extent that the party hostile to China's
main enemy is weak, unstable, disunited, and of
questionable class background, China should
raise its threshold for direct involvement in
the crisis.
(b) To the extent that the party friendly to China's
main enemy is weak, unstable, disunited, and
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"reactionary", or to the extent that the
party hostile to China's main enemy is strong,
stable, united, and "revolutionary," China
should lower its threshold for direct involve-
ment in the conflict.
The above specification of Chinese decision calculation in second-order
irises can be operationalized into a computer model. The flow-chart of such
model can be delineated as below:
5^>-*yes (6a) or (6b)-» <j\-»no (8b)-5J 9
J
yes J, v|/
g° CO 9 8a Aoy friendl y
hostile r (lla )
(lib)
V
12 > bad (13a)
good
13b
In a second study, the three have taken the above decision structure and
Dmpared actual Chinese behavior in 36 actual crises, using Peking's level of
ivolvement as the dependent variable. Involvement was partitioned into four
road categories: (1) apparent inactivity, (2) verbal agitation, (3) limited,
Dnverbal posturing, and (4) massive, direct intervention.
Chart 5-1, taken from the study, shows three decision levels: Does the
risis involve China's main enemy? Is the crisis likely to have a qualitative
ffect on international power relationships? And is the crisis likely to




Table 5-2, also from the study, provides a summary breakdown of what
:hinese responses historically have been for each decision path in Chart 5-1.
The third study was in the form of an article in 1978 by Steve Chan,
/herein Chan took five military conflicts in which China participated (the
Corean War, 1950; the Sino-American confrontation over Quemoy, 1958; the Sino-
!ndian border conflict, 1962; the escalation of the Vietnam War, 1964-1965;
ind the Sino-Soviet border clashes, 1969), and identified five "rather
listinct sequences" of actions which China followed as the crises escalated:
;i) probing, (2) warning, (3) demonstration, (4) attack, and (5) detente.
!he study is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, as in Whiting's
rarks, it emphasizes the value of listening to China's signalling efforts,
rtiich are usually quite credible. Second, Chan's model for Chinese conflict
:alculus turned out to be one hundred percent predictive of the Sino-Vietnamese
?ar of February 1979, a few months after the article was published.
The next chapter takes a closer look at that Sino-Vietnamese war, in
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VI. CHINA'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE 1979 SINO-VIET WAR—A CASE STUDY

I - INTRODUCTION
On February 17, 1979, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) attacked
.etnam across the entire 450-mile Sino-Vietnamese border. Twenty-seven days
iter, on March 15, after penetrating between 10 and 30 miles into Vietnamese
irritory and fighting several large-scale battles, which resulted in thousands
:
casualties on both sides, Beijing (Peking) unilaterally withdrew its forces
•om all but a handful of "contested" points along the border.
This study analyzes the factors which account for the nature and timing
: the Chinese action. Its research reveals a complex interrelationship of
tions and events, which indicates that far more than the historical relation-
.ip between "imperial" China and a "tributary" state was involved. What,
en, were the key components of the Chinese decision?
The Cambodia-Vietnam conflict, along with Hanoi's propensity for closer
es with Moscow, created a situation which became intolerable to Chinese
terests and which required positive action. Vietnam refused to become a
rty to Beijing's "anti-hegemony" united front directed against the Soviet
ion following the United States military withdrawal from Indochina in April
75. In Cambodia, a radical, ultra-nationalist communist state under Pol Pot
ruck out against its own people and its Vietnamese neighbor, which it had
ng feared and distrusted. Cambodia's hostility toward Hanoi threatened
etnam' s socialist reconstruction and forced Hanoi to take action. Supported
the Soviet Union, Vietnam's actions in Indochina would come to be perceived
Beijing as an unacceptable threat to its national interests. Indeed, there
e many parallels between the way Vietnam reacted to Cambodia and the way
ina reacted to Vietnam.
As the Cambodia-Vietnam conflict escalated, Beijing would eventually decide
at only the use of military force would suffice to remedy the situation. In
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)75 Beijing had adopted a carrot-and-stick policy toward Vietnam, holding out
ie promise of aid and assistance while taking a strong "anti-hegemonist"
psition. Beijing's domestic turmoil and instability in 1976 and early 1977,
])wever, complicated its ability to measure the direction and implications of
ie escalating conflict in Indochina. From Zhou Enlai's (Chou Enlai) death in
.muary 1976 through the purge of Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) , the death
I Mao, the rise and fall of the "Gang of Four," and the coming to power of the
oderates under Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng) in October, Chinese decision-making
is fragmented. Even after Deng's rehabilitation in July 1977, his primary
)ncern was to broaden his political base and introduce the bold new economic
ad administrative reforms (the four modernizations) intended to make China a
xlern nation. Between mid-1977 and mid-1978, Beijing continued its carrot-
id-stick policy toward Vietnam, even after Hanoi had committed itself to a
ardline anti-China position. The Vietnamese crackdown on overseas Chinese in
ietnam in March 1978, Vietnam's entry into the Soviet-dominated Council for
utual Economic Assistance in June, severe Vietnamese military pressure on
ambodia in June and July, and conflict on the Sino-Vietnamese border pre-
ipitated a crisis in Sino-Vietnamese relations. At the same time, the growing
pectre of Soviet involvement in the crisis motivated Beijing to change its
olicy toward Vietnam.
The decision to respond to Soviet-Vietnamese "hegemonism" with a limited
se of military force was motivated by Beijing's desire to avoid forcing the
oviet Union into becoming directly involved militarily in the Sino-Vietnamese
onflict and by a desire to avoid those actions which might undermine China's
ong-range goals of detente with Japan, the United States, and the Third World,
uring the latter half of 1978 Deng continued to consolidate his political
ower base in China while moving by diplomatic means to improve China's
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nternational position in order to support his programs to strengthen and
lodernize China. Vietnam's hostility and "collusion" with the Soviet Union
ras perceived in Beijing as a serious and immediate threat to China's national
iecurity and Deng's modernization efforts. Finally, the Soviet-Vietnamese
)eace and friendship treaty in November 1978, Vietnam's formation of a Kampuchean
mited front and its attack on Cambodia in December, and the overthrow of the
3ol Pot regime in January 1979 set the stage for the implementation of China's
decision to attack. Following the normalization of relations between China and
the United States in January, and Deng's visit to the U.S. in early February,
the Chinese crossed the border.
The invasion, which lasted less than a month, was essentially a demonstration
of China's determination to oppose Vietnamese and Soviet expansionism and hegemon-
ism in Southeast Asia. Beijing wanted to make it clear to Moscow, Hanoi and the
world that it would not stand by and permit Moscow to "place too many pawns on
the World's chessboard." In the minds of Chinese leaders, China's credibility
as a world power and its legitimacy as the leader of the Third World were at
stake. In an attempt to reinforce its credibility and in the hope of modifying
Vietnamese behavior, China engaged in a manner of force diplomacy such as it
has employed on several occasions in the past, going back to the Korean War.
The significance of this study in endeavoring to estimate the immediate
and long range effects of the China-Vietnam conflict in terms of China's inter-
national development and national security is clear. Chinese domestic and
foreign policies are intimately related. When the power center is fragmented,
foreign policy is far less effective. Nevertheless, China acted as any other
nation might have acted to preserve its national security interests. The risks
in attacking Vietnam were measured against the possible gains and carefully




II - THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT
he Traditional Perspective
Those who have studied Chinese and Vietnamese history are always quick
o point out that there is a long history of conflict between these two countries,
.t times of internal weakness in China, Vietnam has traditionally tossed off the
onds of a tributary state and expanded its own empire within the region known
is Indochina. After consolidating its affairs under a new dynasty, China would
respond by sending out expeditionary armies to reassert its suzerainty over its
.ndependent-minded southern neighbor. This historical process has led many ana-
.ysts to adopt a shorthand to explain the dynamics of this relationship. Vietnam
Ls seen as an inherently virile, expansionist military state. China is labeled
i Confucian "father state" seeking ever to reestablish moral harmony between
tributary buffer states and the "Middle Kingdom."
The temptation to reduce contemporary Sino-Vietnamese relations to this
<ind of shorthand is strong, but doing so obscures the many complex variables
Chat are actually at work. The historical traditions no doubt color the per-
ceptions of Chinese and Vietnamese leaders but they are not completely deter-
ministic. In the case of the 1979 invasion of Vietnam by China, the variables
which influenced Chinese and Vietnamese decision makers appear to be more
closely related to contemporary international political realities than to
traditional trends. Indeed, it can be argued that China and Vietnam have
acted in much the same manner that any nation in similar circumstances might
have acted.
Vietnam and China's "Anti-Hegemony" Foreign Policy
In many respects, the year 1975 is the benchmark for most of the decisions
that led to the Sino-Vietnamese war.
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In 1975 Zhou Enlai, the architect of China's foreign policy for decades,
ay on his deathbed slowly succumbing to cancer. He appeared briefly in
anuary at the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) , to oversee the elec-
ion of his chosen successor, Deng Xiaoping, to the post of First Deputy Premier
f the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chief of Staff of the PLA.
hroughout 1975 Deng would attempt to carry forward the policies which Zhou
ad formulated in the post-Cultural Revolution period. The previous year Deng
ad expounded the most important of these at the United Nations. The "Three
'orlds" thesis, proclaiming that China no longer acknowledged the existence of
he "socialist camp," was a declaration that China would take upon itself the
eadership of the Third (developing) World in its struggle against the hegemony
if the imperialists (the United States) and the social imperialists (the Soviet
fnion.) This policy was another manifestation of Beijing's efforts to marshal
2
:he widest possible united front against its "main enemy" - Moscow.
For Deng and Zhou in 1975, the successful implementation of this counter-
;ncirclement strategy heavily depended on creating a nucleus of Asian socialist
3
;tates to build upon. Other states in Latin America and Africa could not be
ran to the Chinese side without a credible bandwagon effect. Zhou's earlier
jfforts to tilt the non-aligned nations movement and the Afro-Asian solidarity
:onferences had been generally unsuccessful for the lack of such momentum.
In the spring of 1975 the sudden collapse of the Lon Nol and Thieu regimes
Ln Cambodia and South Vietnam caught China somewhat unprepared. Beijing had
seen urging Hanoi to proceed more gradually with its major offensives since
l972, citing the need for greater development of the Maoist "people's war"
novement in South Vietnam. Furthermore, the Chinese, now on much better terms
rfith the United States, were in no hurry to see North and South Vietnam reunited,
Since the early 1970's China had grown increasingly apprehensive about the role
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lat an independent, unified, and resurgent Vietnam would play in a Southeast
sia where American influence was dwindling.
During the summer of 1975 Deng visited France, the Philippines, and
aailand and had been successful in persuading both Ferdinand Marcos and
hukrit to include the now familiar "anti-hegemony" clause (a Chinese codeword
or anti-Sovietism) in the communiques establishing diplomatic relations. In
ugust Prince Sihanouk signed a similar anti-hegemony statement on behalf of
ambodia. In an attempt to maintain this momentum, Chinese Vice-Premier Chen
ilian (Chen Hsi-lien) was sent to Hanoi the following month to lay the ground-
ork for a joint Sino-Vietnamese anti-hegemony communique.
Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Workers Party, arrived in
eijing on September 22. He had come to claim the promises Zhou had made in
973 to extend aid to Hanoi for another five years. Beijing greeted him warmly,
-ut Le Duan apparently refused to sign an anti-hegemony statement in exchange
or such aid. Le Duan departed Beijing without hosting a reciprocal banquet
ind without the usual joint communique. A month later he showed up in Moscow,
/here he received promises of reconstruction aid, and supported Moscow's foreign
>olicy line in a joint communique.
By the end of 1975, Sino-Vietnamese relations were cool but not antagonistic.
Hie state bureaucracy under Zhou and Deng appeared to have decided on a carrot-
and-stick policy, intended to maintain a strong stance against closer Hanoi-
Moscow relations while holding out the promise of assistance, which Hanoi needed
to rebuild its war-torn economy. The events of the following year, however,
made it extremely difficult for Beijing to implement this policy successfully.
In 1976 China entered a period of great internal turbulence. Zhou died in
January. Deng was formally purged from his posts in April. After a brief
ascendency of the radicals under the Gang of Four, Mao died in September and
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a coup led by the moderate faction under Acting Premier Hua Guofeng and aging
Marshal Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying) took control in October. Although not as
disrupted as it had been during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese foreign policy
in 1976 was concerned only with the most pressing and immediate issues. South-
east Asia was not yet in this category.
Continuing Conflict in Indochina
The expectation that the reunification of North and South Vietnam and the
overthrow of the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh in April 1975 would mean an
end to more than 30 years of war in Indochina was quickly shattered. Hanoi soon
became involved in a series of escalating crises with its socialist neighbor,
the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea (Cambodia)
.
Within weeks of these communist victories, Vietnam and Cambodia were on
the verge of violent confrontation. In June their troops clashed over contested
islands in the Gulf of Thailand. It was no coincidence that these islands had
been on the verge of development by Western oil companies. Socialist solidarity
not withstanding, national interests made control of the seabed vital. Neither
state had any short-term hopes of developing other significant export industries
in their ravaged economies.
In an attempt to sort out their new relationship, Pol Pot visited Hanoi
in June and Le Duan made a visit to Phnom Penh in August. Vietnam sought a
"special relationship" because, as one Vietnamese official later explained,
"there is not another example in history of such a relationship where the two
4
people have shared each grain of rice, every bullet, suffering and victory."
The new Pol Pot regime rejected this idea because it resembled too much the
old Indochinese Communist Party relationship, through which the Vietnamese
had dominated the Cambodian and Laotian communist parties in the 1930 's and
1940' s. Cambodia demanded a "normal" relationship between equals, which
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Vietnam rejected as inadequate. The belief in Phnom Penh that Hanoi was seeking
to establish an "Indochinese federation," although consistently denied by Vietnam,
took root and grew rapidly following Hanoi's call for a special relationship.
This distrust would lead to the breakdown, in May 1976, of the last peacetime
talks between Hanoi and Phnom Penh over their border disputes.
Inside Cambodia, Pol Pot's government had initiated radical domestic reforms
that resulted, among other things, in the mass evacuation of its cities and the
brutal purge of a major portion of its population. These draconian measures
were apparently prompted by a severe paranoia in the leadership that pro-Western
and pro-Vietnamese "spies and criminals" were seeking to overthrow their govern-
ment before it could establish itself. The new leaders, of peasant origin, were
also convinced that the forced establishment of communes was the only way the
new socialist Kampuchea could feed itself. This warped world view, however,
would scarcely have been sufficient to lead to a confrontation with Vietnam had
not the upheavals that followed in its wake poured out across its borders. The
Cambodian government was not able to stem the mass exodus of its people in spite
of setting up "free-fire" zones several kilometers deep along its ill-defined
borders with Thailand and Vietnam. By 1978 over 150,000 refugees had swarmed
into southern Vietnam, creating massive squatter camps in and around Ho Chi
Minn City. Besides being an enormous economic burden, these refugees com-
plicated Hanoi's own efforts to set up "new economic zones" in the border areas.
Hanoi was unable to divorce its economic reconstruction program in the south
from the explosive situation along its border with Cambodia.
By early 1977 Vietnam found itself enmeshed in a growing crisis with its
intractable neighbor to the west. From March to May Cambodian forces staged
several serious border incidents, shelling border towns and accelerating the
flood of refugees. In June Hanoi proposed high-level talks to de-escalate the
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tensions. When Phnom Penh turned the proposal down, Hanoi sent its defense
minister, General Giap, to Beijing in an attempt to seek Chinese assistance
to resolve the difficulties. In Beijing Giap emphasized Sino-Vietnamese
friendship:
We will never forget the lofty and fine deeds of the
Chinese people who, in the spirit of proletarian inter-
nationalism, supported the Vietnamese people in their
resistance against the French colonialists and U.S.
imperialists.
6
Giap's overtures, lacking any commitment to an anti-Soviet stance, did not win
any promises from the Chinese, who were neither inclined nor able to exert
leverage on Hanoi's behalf. On his return from Beijing, Giap personally in-
spected Vietnamese defenses along the Cambodian front.
In May Hanoi reasserted its independence by promulgating a 200-mile terri-
torial zone in the South China Sea that encompassed the Paracels and the Spratlys,
laying claim to their oil-rich seabeds, which until 1975 Hanoi had acknowledged
to be Chinese. Along the Sino-Vietnamese border, Vietnamese and Chinese troops
were engaged in frequent rock-throwing incidents, harassment of border guards,
and the movement of the 300-odd border markers back and forth 50 to 100 meters
during the night. It is unclear, at this point, to what extent the deterior-
ating situation between Cambodia and Vietnam contributed to the deterioration
of relations between China and Vietnam, but in the summer of 1977 Hanoi found
itself increasingly at odds with both Beijing and Phnom Penh.
Chinese leaders were particularly disturbed with Hanoi in July when Hanoi
signed a long-term peace and friendship treaty with Laos, which sanctioned a
40,000 man Vietnamese occupation army on Laotian territory. These forces
served as a blocking force which could prevent any direct Chinese troop move-
ments down the road the Chinese were building in Laos toward Cambodia or
Thailand. They were also putting pressure on the easily malleable communist
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government in Vientiane to adopt a pro-Vietnamese position vis-a-vis Chinese
interests. This diplomatic maneuver along with the growing tensions along
the Sino-Vietnamese border, was particularly unsettling for the Chinese, who
were at the time deeply involved in their own domestic political problems.
Ill - PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES
The development and implementation of a nation's foreign policy is a com-
plex process which involves taking into account the interrelationship of a
broad spectrum of independent and dependent variables relating to the problems
at hand. When a nation is responding to the circumstances and events leading
up to a potential crisis, it is imperative that a nation's decision-making
body have a clear picture of the advantages and risks involved in each of
several policy options. In the case of China's response to Vietnam's growing
hostility and increasing partnership with the Soviet Union, the ability of
Beijing's decision-makers to select a policy that would result in the modifica-
tion of Hanoi's behavior was complicated by several factors. Domestically,
the Chinese leadership was involved in what was perhaps the most serious suc-
cession struggle in its history. The Maoist and moderate factions were engaged
in a bitter battle over who would determine the direction of Chinese domestic
and foreign policy for decades to come. In mid and late 1977 it was not at
all clear how serious the Vietnam-Cambodia border conflict would become.
Although relations between Beijing and Hanoi had deteriorated considerably,
Beijing still apparently believed that its carrot-and-stick policy would
bring Hanoi around. Finally, the involvement of the Soviet Union in Vietnam
had yet to become the serious problem for the Chinese that it would become
when Hanoi and Moscow signed a treaty of peace and friendship in November 1978.
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Throughout the last half of 1977 and the first few months of 1978, then, the
major factors that Beijing had to take into consideration did not appear to
be approaching a crisis stage. Meanwhile, domestic political considerations
were more pressing.
The Rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping and the Four Modernizations
With Zhou's death and Deng's purge in early 1976, the decision-making
structure in Beijing fragmented. Even with the death of Mao in September and
the purge of the Gang of Four in October, the new leadership under Hua Guofeng
had failed to establish an effective political base. By early 1977 the economy
was in chaos, food was scarce in parts of the country, the railroad system had
all but come to a stop, and the campaign to purge supporters of the Gang of
Four had become bloody without approaching a conclusion. As a result, very
little national-level attention was being paid to any but the most critical
external problems.
The decision to rehabilitate Deng at the Third Plenum of the 10th Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (July 16-22, 1977), came as a
result of two factors: (1) strong lobbying on his behalf by Wei Guoquing (Wei
Kuo-ching) and Xu Shiyou (Hsu Shih-yu) , leaders in southern China, and (2)
recognition in the Politburo that only Deng had a strong enough political
base throughout the country to restore order, having coalesced the old oppo-
nents of Lin Biao. His rehabilitation had been bitterly argued all spring
because many members of the Politburo and the Central Committee, including
Chairman Hua, had participated in Mao's "deepen the criticism of Deng" cam-
paign in 1976. Deng's reemergence marked the beginning of a slow but steady
centralization of authority and decision-making.
For the month after his reemergence, Deng would have little time for much
else than domestic politicking. It was critically important, if Deng were to
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carry out his bold new programs, that his own supporters get elected to the
11th Party Congress to be held in August. His success in these efforts
resulted in 55 percent of the entire 10th Central Committee members being
dropped and a majority of the new members being rehabilitated cadres who shared
i 9Deng s pragmatic approach to party policies.
First on Deng's list of priorities was to reintroduce the "four modern-
izations" policy that Zhou Enlai had first introduced at the Fourth National
People's Congress (NPC) in 1975. The primary objective of the four modern-
izations (agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology)
was to make China a modern industrial nation by the turn of the century. This
policy was an outgrowth of an earlier confrontation between the radicals and
the moderates following the Cultural Revolution. The magnitude of the task
was enormous. Not only would China have to make up for long years of isolation,
during which its general level of technology had fallen 20 years behind the
West, but China would have to heal the deep scars left over from the bitter
years of the Cultural Revolution and the maneuverings of the Gang of Four.
Virtually no sector of the economy or the society had been untouched. The
memories of these years were still fresh in the minds of every Chinese. Deng
had to overcome psychological as well as visible obstacles. Furthermore,
radicals and supporters of the "gang" were still a force to be dealt with.
As 1977 came to a close, Deng made significant strides in consolidating
his power. With his close political ally, Wei Guoquing, installed as head of
the Political Department of the PLA in October, a new Central Committee behind
him, and another round of purges and executions in progress through the pro-
vinces to eliminate non-supportive officials and radicals, he had the power
centers sufficiently in hand to look outside China's borders. In September
he sent a high-level military delegation to France, the highest ever to leave
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China for the West since 1949, to shop for modern weapons. The same month he
announced to the world that China had successfully tested missiles with nuclear
warheads. For the first time since Mao's death, China began to move forward
under an effective leader.
At the same time, however, the border conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam
was escalating and tensions were mounting on the Sino-Vietnamese border. The
Chinese leadership at first had been slow to react to the oncoming crisis, but
as Deng consolidated his position and initiated economic and administrative
reforms to support the new modernization program, he viewed the hostility of
the Vietnamese and the spectre of Soviet involvement in Southeast Asia increas-
ingly as serious threats to his fourfold modernization drive.
The growing problem with Vietnam threatened China's modernization campaign
in two ways. China needed time to develop its economic base upon which its in-
dustrial and military establishments could grow. A strong, independent Vietnam
with Cambodia and Laos firmly in its camp and linked to Moscow in a "military
alliance" directed against China, would confront Beijing with a new and more
serious military threat. China would be forced early-on to devote ever in-
creasing resources into the military sphere in order to cope with this threat.
This in turn would deprive other spheres (agriculture, industry, science and
technology) of resources needed for development and would in the long-run
slow the entire modernization program. In addition to the external threat,
domestically Deng was faced with the challenge of broadening his base of
political support and dealing with those who opposed his bold new policies.
As the Sino-Vietnamese relations approached a crisis, Deng would come under
increasing pressure at home to deal with the problem in a manner which would
be accepted by critics and supporters alike. If Deng's policies toward
Vietnam and Moscow failed to secure China's interests, Deng risked losing
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his base of support. Because the four modernizations program was primarily
a "Deng show," with Deng gone the modernization program most probably would
not survive
.
Escalation of the Cambodia-Vietnam Border Conflict
On September 24, 1977, four Cambodian divisions attacked along the border
of Tay Ninh Province, killing over 1,000 Vietnamese civilians, by Hanoi's count,
between the end of September and early November. As the Cambodian forces dug
in on the Vietnamese side of the border, another flood of Cambodian and Viet-
namese refugees streamed into Ho Chi Minn City and the surrounding countryside.
Four days after the assault had begun, Pol Pot arrived in Beijing to partici-
pate in National Day festivities, giving Hanoi the impression that China sup-
ported the invasion. Chinese weapons and ammunition had made the assault
possible, and Pol Pot received no public rebuke for the attack while in Beijing.
The Vietnamese withheld their counterattack, which seems to have been
planned since at least early summer, until Pol Pot returned to Phnom Penh on
October 4. The counterattack, 13 divisions strong, mauled the invading Cam-
bodian forces. As the Vietnamese pushed the Cambodians back across the border,
Hanoi sent its top negotiator, Phan Hien, to Beijing for two weeks of talks.
The following month, November, Le Duan himself, the top Vietnamese party
leader, headed a delegation to Beijing. The visit received "cordial" and
"friendly" greetings, the last time the veneer of friendship was to be applied
for Vietnamese leaders.
On December 31, Phnom Penh and Hanoi broke diplomatic relations. On the
following day Vietnamese forces began a major offensive into Cambodia, driving
30 to 40 kilometers before stopping, reportedly because of a warning from
Beijing that further advance risked a direct confrontation with China. At
this point Hanoi still seemed to shy away from such a confrontation. Beijing
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responded to the Vietnamese drive into Cambodia by airlifting critical ammuni-
tion to Phnom Penh and by stepping up deliveries of heavy armaments (artillery
12
and aircraft) , to two shiploads a week.
Beijing continued its carrot-and-stick policy toward Hanoi through 1977.
Over 60 aid projects continued in progress, although Beijing refused to step
up aid needed for Vietnam's postwar reconstruction until Hanoi fell in line.
Hanoi's economy was in severe straits, with rice rations dropping toward the
subsistance level as floods and other dislocations dropped production below
13
pre-liberation levels. It no doubt occurred to Beijing that the cost of
countering Cambodian belligerence might be the straw to break the back of
Vietnamese intransigence. In fact, it only pushed Vietnam closer to Moscow,
as Beijing would soon realize.
Beijing and Hanoi Commit to Forward Strategies
Until 1978, the actions of both Vietnam and China were severely limited.
Vietnam had attempted to avoid full-scale hostilities with Cambodia and China
was circumspect in dealing with Vietnam. As the year began both China and
Vietnam shifted to more active policies, leading to increasing friction. A
fatal interplay of forward policies began.
In January a National Conference on overseas Chinese in Beijing issued
a proclamation:
We (Chinese) adopt a policy of uniting with those overseas
Chinese who belong to the bourgeoisie. As to those who
still harbor misgivings about the motherland and are even
hostile to us, we should likewise work energetically among
them 14
This proclamation aroused deep suspicion in Hanoi. After putting off the
socialization of southern Vietnam's economy for almost three years, the Viet-
namese leadership was about to close down the thriving private market system,
still dominated by "overseas Chinese bourgeoisie." The proclamation from
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Beijing expressing solidarity with these "capitalists" made Hanoi aware that
confrontation with Beijing, whether over Pol Pot's regime, their border dis-
putes, the overseas Chinese, or any combination of the above, was becoming
increasingly difficult to avoid.
Also in January Deng took time to make a six-day visit to Burma and a
three-day visit to Nepal, apparently to take political soundings in these two
neutral states on China's periphery. Zhou Enlai's widow, Deng Yingchao (Teng
Ying-Chao) , was sent with a Foreign Ministry delegation to Cambodia. The new
Beijing leadership found that respect for Chinese influence had slipped and
that its neighbors were impressed by Soviet gains in Africa and elsewhere.
The need for a more active stance became obvious.
On February 16, China and Japan signed a non-governmental agreement for
an eight-year trade agreement for $20 billion. On February 23, the Central
Committee of the CCP announced an ambitious 10-year plan to implement China's
modernization goals and make China a modern industrial nation by the year 2000
.
And on February 25, the Fifth NPC opened with a speech by Premier Hua which
committed China to an active opposition to the Soviet Union:
But so far as the overall situation is concerned, there
is a strategic task common to the people the world over,
and that is to consolidate and expand the international
united front against hegemonism.-^
Hua went on to accuse the West of accelerating the approach of world war by
appeasing the Soviet "social-imperialists," and of having "the fond hope of
saving themselves at the expense of others." If the West could not stop the
Soviet hegemonists, China and those who resisted Russia would. "Our attitude
toward a new world war is: 'First, we are against it; second, we are not
afraid of it.'" In short, Beijing had come to the conclusion that Western
impotence over Soviet encroachments in Africa and elsewhere, along with its
policy or detente and disarmament in Europe, would enable Soviet armed forces
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to shift to the eastern frontier, gravely threatening China's security. China
was going on record as being committed to checking Soviet global expansion,
and was inviting others to join in an international united front to stop the
Kremlin, Siad Barre, president of Somalia, then fighting Soviet advisors and
Cuban forces in Africa, was entertained in Beijing a month after the conference.
A series of high-level Chinese delegations were scheduled to cover Africa for
the rest of the year.
At the same time Vietnam was also embarking on a more active policy course,
In February Hanoi offered Phnom Penh a three-point peace proposal calling for:
(1) an immediate ceasefire with international supervision; (2) a 10-kilometer
demilitarized zone, each side pulling back five kilometers; and (3) a border
agreement and a peace and friendship treaty. The Pol Pot regime rejected
this proposal, insisting talks could not begin until Vietnam proved its good
intentions by "not firing a shot" for seven months. Hanoi termed the response
"ridiculous" and convened a secret Central Committee meeting in Hanoi.
According to Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Nayan Chanda, it
was at this Central Committee meeting that Hanoi decided to go ahead with the
18
training of a Cambodian refugee "army" to overthrow the Pol Pot government.
Other major decisions apparently made at this meeting involved the economic
integration and socialization of the reunited south and a crackdown on
"bourgeois trade" and "capitalist elements" primarily in the Chinese Cholon
section of Ho Chi Minh City. The Central Committee seems to have also approved
closer contracts with Moscow and the buildup of forces along the Chinese border,
After the meeting, it was rumored that General Giap flew to Vientiane to talk
with visiting Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Pavlovsky. Le Due Tho toured
the Cambodian border commands, briefing them on Politburo decisions, as he had
done before major offensives in 1968, 1972, and 1975.
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The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Becomes a Crisis
Relations between China and Vietnam deteriorated rapidly during the first
months of 1978. In February Chinese and Vietnamese forces had clashed at Don
Van and Mong Cai, with 30 Vietnamese reported killed at Mong Cai. The pro-
paganda war heated up quickly, with both sides charging the other with border
violations, which occurred with increasing frequency. Then on March 24, Hanoi
implemented a program, decided on at the Central Committee meeting in February,
cracking down on the "bourgeois trade" and "capitalist elements" in Cholon and
Hanoi. The primary targets of this campaign were the ethnic (overseas) Chinese
traders and merchants in Cholon, who controlled the wholesale rice trade and
had continued to trade in gold and foreign currency after the fall of Saigon
in 1975. This included Chinese engaged in both legitimate and illegitimate
banking and commercial interests. Hanoi also cracked down on the traders and
shopkeepers, mostly Chinese, who dominated that city's small private sector.
Within days a mass exodus of the Chinese living in Vietnam had begun and
within weeks serious fighting was reported on the China-Vietnam border. On
April 30 Liao Chengzhi, long-time head of China's Overseas Chinese Affairs
Bureau, expressed concern over the increasing numbers of overseas Chinese
trying to return to their homeland from Vietnam and promised them protection.
On May 4, Xuan Thuy charged that Chinese subversive groups were spreading
horror stories in Vietnamese cities to aggravate tensions, and that the
rumor-mongers were causing the exodus. By the end of May Beijing's propa-
ganda machine dropped any semblence of restraint and began accusing Vietnam
of atrocities against the overseas Chinese. The pro-communist press in Hong
Kong initiated charges that Vietnam was carrying out such "Moscow's designs,"
and becoming a "second Cuba," by giving the Soviets a base at Cam Ranh Bay
(themes which the Beijing press soon picked up on). On May 27 Hanoi's
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foreign minister called for an end to polemics and proposed early talks. On
June 9, the Chinese Foreign Ministry rejected the call for talks and announced
a major cutback on aid to Vietnam, claiming that money had to be diverted to
settle the mass of Chinese refugees that had been robbed and brutalized by
Vietnam.
As May came to a close, Beijing dispatched two ships from Guangzhou (Canton)
to pick up Chinese "victims" of Vietnamese "persecution" at Haiphong and Ho Chi
Minh City. Hanoi flatly refused to permit the ships to land, standing on its
right to control emigration. After two months, the ships finally returned to
Gauangzhou without having picked up any refugees. On June 16, China announced
it was closing the Vietnamese consulates in Kunming, Nanning, and Guangzhou,
ostensibly in retaliation for Hanoi's footdragging in responding to Beijing's
requests for Chinese consulates in Ho Chi Minh City, Haiphong, and Da Nang.
Although China professed concern about its rights to look after the sizeable
Chinese populations in these areas, each capital was probably trying to prevent
the other from observing significant military preparations along their common
border.
Claiming that the Chinese were reinforcing their border, the Vietnamese
strengthened their own border forces, reorganized the military command in the
border area with more senior cadres, and purged pro-Chinese generals, In
mid-June the newly reorganized Vietnamese army began a major military thrust
into eastern Cambodia, seemingly aimed less at taking territory than at chew-
ing up Cambodia's modest army. Heavy air strikes and artillery barrages were
to continue all summer and fall. Despite solid resistance by the Cambodian
forces, Vietnamese cannon-fodder tactics inexorable ate up Cambodian reserves.
As the Cambodian army became hard pressed, a wave of an estimated 53,000
Cambodian refugees slipped through the cordon into Vietnam, trying to avoid
16:

the mayhem of war and Pol Pot's excesses. The emigre army in Vietnam grew
steadily larger under the command of So Phim, who had been a Pol Pot army
leader until he mutinied in May 1978 after an alleged coup attempt.
Vietnam, hard-pressed by the costs of its war with Cambodia and expe-
riencing a catastrophic flooding of its ricelands, needed ever-increasing
amounts of assistance. On June 28 Hanoi announced it was joining the Soviet-
controlled Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) , the Soviet bloc equiv-
alent of Western Europe's Common Market. The move reflected Moscow's efforts
to share the increasing financial burden of support to Vietnam with other CEMA
members. The price of greater help by the Soviet Union was the abandonment
of Hanoi's pretense of neutrality between its two communist benefactors. On
July 2, Beijing responded to this action by terminating the last of its 60-odd
economic aid programs to Vietnam. The CEMA countries picked up less than a
dozen of these. Hanoi's efforts to seek U.S. assistance and investments to
bolster its economy were shied away from by the United States, which refused
to normalize relations with Hanoi, even after Hanoi dropped its insistence
19
on war reparations in July. Cut off from Chinese aid because of the ever
deteriorating relations between Hanoi and Beijing, and refused U.S. assistance,
Vietnam had turned again to Moscow. Unlike previous years, Hanoi would find
it much more difficult to resist Moscow's pressure for "base rights" and
similar concessions by playing Moscow and Beijing off against each other.
June and July were months of serious stock-taking in Beijing. Vietnam's
offensive in Cambodia had undermined Beijing's earlier confidence that they
could "bleed" Vietnam by a drawn-out struggle on foreign soil against a hostile
population. It was becoming clear that the Cambodian army could not long
survive the heightened level of conflict.
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Domestically, Deng was encountering problems overcoming inertia. Despite
the rehabilitation of about 110,000 persons who had been detained for periods
of as far back as the 1950' s, local and regional officials were dragging their
feet over full rehabilitation. They were concerned about old scores being
settled, about competition for jobs, and about the viability of Deng's new
policies. The rapid zig-zags of Beijing politics made many wary of going as
far as Deng was pushing them.
In July Deng issued, over his own signature, the "July 4 Important
Instruction." Its exact contents were not revealed publicly, but it started
a new purge of Gang of Four sympathizers, particularly in Beijing, Tianjin
(Tientsin), and Guangzhou. Top Deng aupporters such as Wei Guoquing and Xu
Shiyou went back to their home regions to supervise the execution of this
instruction. By the end of the summer Deng's rehabilitation program, his
"seek truth from facts" campaign, and his control over regional and local
20bureaucracies were well established. Deng's political bandwagon was moving
throughout the country, giving him the clout he needed for the final showdown
with his politburo opponents in the fall.
His political debts to Wei and Xu were also increasing, however. By late
summer the economic burdens of settling and providing for 160,000 refuges, with
more expected, were putting a heavy strain on Wei's and Xu's political base
in the drought-stricken southern provinces. Deng was forced to pay greater
attention to the growing crisis in the south. Vietnam had become a major
domestic issue as well as a foreign policy problem.
China and the Soviet Union
Until China assumed its active anti-Soviet stance in March, Soviet leaders
appear to have been hopeful that a rapproachement could be reached with Mao's
successors. The lull in active diplomacy in 1976 and 1977, coupled with clear
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signs of factional differences, led the Soviets to believe that there might
be elements in Beijing willing to seek better relations, despite the anta-
gonistic official rhetoric. This hope was probably whetted by a brief warm-
ing on the Chinese side in November 1977, when Foreign Minister Huang Hua
showed up at the Soviet Embassy reception celebrating its National Day, the
first time a high Chinese official had done so in 10 years. Following up on
this opening, the Supreme Soviet sent a let-bygones-be-bygones letter to its
Chinese counterpart, the Fifth NPC, in February 1978. Hua, however, delivered
an anti-Soviet diatribe at the Congress and in March the NPC sent an official
note to the U.S.S.R. condemning the Soviets for failing to keep alleged past
promises (such as demilitarizing Mongolia) and called for "real deeds, not
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hollow words." ' At the same time the Chinese extended the period of military
conscription for each of the services by one year. In apparent reaction to
these signs of renewed hostility, Soviet President Brezhnev and his defense
minister made a highly publicized tour of Soviet military commands along the
Chinese border from March 28 to April 9.
Chinese hostility increased Soviet interest in Vietnam. When Sino-Viet-
namese relations plummetted over the overseas Chinese issue in May, the
Kremlin obligingly dispatched a naval taks force (two Kresta II' s, one Krivak,
and one Kashin destroyer) to exercise in the Philippine Sea, a short steam
from the contested Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes. On May 11 a serious
shooting incident erupted on the Sino-Soviet border, recalling similar inci-
dents in March 1969. Belated, vague Soviet excuses about "chasing a prisoner"
did not dispel the impression that heavy pressure had been brought to bear
on China at a time when China was beginning to bear down on Vietnam.
Two other events occurred in May which no doubt heightened Soviet con-
cerns and further tinged Sino-Soviet relations.
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On May 5, Premier Hua Goufeng started his first trip ever outside China
by visiting Pyongyang. North Korea's Kim Il-sung, who had committed a size-
able Korean aid program to Pol Pot, for the first time adopted a public posi-
tion that fell only slightly short of espousing Beijing's "anti-hegemonist"
line. Addressing a rally welcoming Hua with words about "dominationalists,
"
Kim said:
Imperialism and other dominationalist forces are engaged
in a furious scramble to draw the third-world countries
into the sphere of their domination by estranging them
from each other and dividing them, and resort to crafty
schemings to disorganize the non-aligned movement and
the world revolutionary forces . . . The non-aligned
countries
. . . must not allow the imperialist, colon-
ialist, and dominationalist forces to set foot in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. 22
The Vietnam-Cambodia war promised to provide Beijing a major dividend
by putting Pyongyang on China's side against the Soviet Union on this issue.
Also in May, President Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski visited Beijing. His hardline anti-Soviet ("polar bear" threat)
statements won him a much warmer reception than moderate Secretary of State
Vance had received the previous year. Brzezinski and Deng held extended dis-
cussions about the world situation, after which they publicly stated that
they were in agreement. Speculation that Brzezinski may have given all or
part of a Top Secret strategic assessment (Presidential Review Memorandum 10)
to Deng led Moscow to warn the U.S. against sharing intelligence information,
23
such as satellite data on Soviet force deployments on the Chinese border.
IV - CHINA COMMITS TO ACTION
Beijing Clarifies Its Options
By mid-July 1978 Beijing was moving to clarify its options in Indochina.
It was becoming evident to the Chinese leadership that its policies toward
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Vietnam were failing to curb Moscow's and Hanoi's "hegemonistic" actions in
Southeast Asia. Vietnam's entry into CEMA foretold ever increasing coopera-
tion between Vietnam and the Soviet Union; Beijing may have even anticipated
the eventual signing of the peace and friendship treaty between Moscow and
Hanoi. An invitation was sent to Hanoi to set up talks on the deputy foreign
minister level, in Hanoi if desired, to try and resolve differences. After
having withdrawn its ambassador in the heat of the refugee crisis, Beijing
was now ready to reestablish communications with Hanoi on a high level. The
deputy foreign ministers met in Hanoi on August 8, and China's Deputy Foreign
Minister Zhong Xidong, presented a proposal on overseas Chinese on August 19.
Hanoi rejected the proposal. The talks dragged on with intensifying rhetoric
paralleled by increasing violence along the border until the talks were ter-
minated on September 26.
Pursuing a second option in July, Beijing sent a senior PLA officer to
escort Cambodia's Deputy Premier for Defense, Son Sen, to China. During talks
held from July 29 to August 6, amidst festivities for China's Army Day, Deng
told Son Sen that China's aid would be to no avail if the Pol Pot regime did
not win the support of its people. He encouraged the Cambodian leadership to
liberalize the harsh domestic programs, to bring Prince Sihanouk out of house
arrest and into a broad unified front, and to prepare for a "people's war"
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in the countryside in the event their army weakened any further. The Pol
Pot government, however, failed to follow Beijing's advice to link more closely
the Cambodian government and the Cambodian people.
By early autumn Beijing came to realize that its policies had been based
on two faulty assumptions. Since late 1977 it had assumed that the Cambodian
army, with Chinese supplies and advisors, could tie down Vietnam in an incon-
clusive but costly border war. Vietnam's previous offensives in October and
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January had not exceeded two weeks before tapering off. There had been major
skirmishes since then, but Pol Pot's forces had managed to handle them. How-
ever, after four weeks of high-intensity operations starting in mid-June,
Beijing was forced to admit that Hanoi was capable of sustaining the conflict
at a level of intensity that would soon destroy the Cambodian army. The other
assumption, that its pressure on a war-ravaged Vietnam would in the end force
Hanoi to soften its position toward Beijing, had in fact pushed Hanoi steadily
closer to Moscow. Recognition of its miscalculations played a large part in
the reassessment of its military position and the readjustment of its inter-
national geo-political position.
In an attempt to maneuver into the most advantageous position from which
to counter Soviet-Vietnamese "hegemony" in Asia, Beijing shifted a major por-
tion of its efforts towards improving its relations with Japan, the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States. Beijing
sought to create a more favorable climate of international public opinion
and to strengthen its international position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and
Vietnam. As Beijing was beginning to decide that only a bold military response
would suffice to blunt Vietnam's "aggression" in Cambodia and demonstrate its
opposition to Soviet-Vietnamese "collusion," it became essential to bolster
its strategic position by seeking understanding from Japan, ASEAN, and the
United States.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the conclusion of a peace
and friendship treaty with Japan and the normalization of relations with the
United States—and steps to improve its general international position, espe-
cially with the key ASEAN states of peninsular Southeast Asia—were key com-
ponents of Deng's strategy to modernize China. If China were successfully
to meet the goal of the four modernizations, to make China a modern industrial
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power by the year 2000, massive inputs of Western and Japanese capital and
technology would be required. Between Deng's rehabilitation in July 1977
and August 1978, however, little progress had been made on these issues.
Indeed, the normalization of relations with the United States and the peace
and friendship with Japan had been "in the mill" since China's diplomatic
detente with the West in 1972. Thus, the advancement of Sino-Japanese, Sino-
American, and Sino-ASEAN relations would serve a double purpose. It would
contribute to the four modernizations and it would improve China's ability
to deal with the Soviet-Vietnamese problem in Indochina.
Diplomatic Activity Further Strengthens China's Geo-Political Position
In May China agreed to reopen talks with Japan on a peace and friendship
treaty. The talks, which had begun in 1972, had been stalled by Japan's reluc-
tance to antagonize the Soviet Union by accepting an "anti-hegemony" clause in
the treaty stating: "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region
or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other
country or group of countries to establish hegemony." Both sides were now
anxious to resolve this issue; Japan because its premier was coming up for re-
election and needed a foreign policy "success" and because of heightened
Japanese concern over the Soviet military presence in Asia, and China because
closer ties with Tokyo were part of its overall strategy for modernization and
because of the increasing hostility with the Soviet Union and Vietnam. China
and Japan worked out their differences on the anti-hegemony clause and concluded
an agreement on August 12, 1978.
One of the motivating factors for Beijing to enter into the peace and
friendship treaty at this time was to make it difficult for Tokyo to feint
neutrality toward Beijing's and Moscow's escalating competition for influence
in Southeast Asia. Not only would more cordial and friendly relations between
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China and Japan enable China to obtain the technology and capital needed for
the four modernizations, but the peace and friendship treaty might serve as
a deterrent to increased Japanese-Vietnamese and Japanese-Soviet economic
cooperation by forcing Japan eventually to choose between foregoing the bene-
fits accruing from better relations with China or supporting Beijing's anti-
hegemonist policies.
In an editorial in Peking Review on August 18, 1978 Beijing left no doubt
as to the significance of the anti-hegemony clause. "At present, hegemony is
on the rampage in the world, carrying on aggression, interference, expansion,
and subversion everywhere . . . Therefore, opposition to hegemonism is a major
task in the work of defending peace and an important part of the treaty ."
(Emphasis added.) The anti-hegemony clause, included in Article II of the
treaty, strengthened the Chinese anti-Soviet, anti-Vietnamese stance, but
later proved to be embarrassing for Japan when China attacked Vietnam.
In August, just after the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty, Premier Hua
Guofeng made his much publicized trip to the Balkans and Iran. According to
diplomatic sources in Beijing, the trip was encouraged by Deng, who wanted Hua
exposed to the modern world outside China, the better to appreciate the huge
technological gap that had to be closed. Hua's willingness to leave the country
stilled foreign speculation that he and Deng were vying for the top position in
the party, except in Moscow, which continued to insist that a severe factional
struggle between the two was in progress. Nevertheless, Hua's sojourn into
this area of primary Soviet interest was an attempt to improve Chinese rela-
tions with these countries and to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that China
intended to oppose "hegemonism," and not just in Asia.
In September and October, Premier Pham Van Dong toured the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, promising along the way not to support
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communist insurgencies in these countries. His attempts to forge closer ties
with ASEAN were politely rebuffed.
In October Beijing also shifted its position on India. Having castigated
India for twenty years as a "bully to its neighbors" and having conducted two
limited territorial wars against India, the Beijing press now began to praise
the Desai administration in New Delhi, which had been steadily moving away
from the close ties with Moscow established by the Nehru government. India's
Foreign Minister Vajpayee, scheduled to visit Beijing on October 27, postponed
the trip due to "illness." The trip would be made later in February 1979.
On October 26, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued its first clear threat
to Vietnam: "The Vietnamese authorities must shoulder all responsibility for
the consequences arising from their encroachments upon Chinese territorial
integrity and sovereignty." In a Xinhua commentary on the following day, head-
line, "How Much Further Will Hanoi Go?" Beijing signalled that it felt it was
being pushed toward war:
Since mid-September the situation has gone from bad to worse. . .
the Vietnamese authorities created an atmosphere of military
tension by stepping up their war preparations in the border
areas. . . With lies and fabrications, they have tried to con-
found right and wrong. . . For more than a month, Moscow openly
incited Hanoi "to hit back" at China and declared that Vietnam
"may today as it did yesterday count on the support of the
Soviet Union." Moreover the Kremlin has vastly increased its
sea and air shipments of arms and military equipment to Vietnam
... On September 7, Hoang Son, member of the Central Commit-
tee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, even intimated the
threat of war saying: "We must admit to the existing danger
of war (with China) and prepare to fight" ... It is still
China's hope that they will become a little sober. Should
they obdurately persist in their border provocations, their
threats of war, they will certainly become victims of their
own evil deeds. Let's see how much further the Vietnamese




In the months of November and December 1978, a series of precedent-
shattering events occurred which rapidly moved China and Vietnam and their
respective allies to the brink of war.
On November 3, Le Duan and Brezhnev signed a 25-year peace and friend-
ship treaty, stating in Article 6, "in the event that one of the parties is
the object of an attack or threat of attack, the high contracting parties will
immediately begin mutual consultations with a view to eliminating that threat
and by taking appropriate and effective measures to ensure peace and security
1 fci
for their countries." At the signing ceremony Le Duan made no evasions that
the treaty was aimed at Beijing.
In an effort to prevent this development of events, imperialism
and the forces of reaction are doing everything they can to stem
the onward march of history. It is indicative that the reaction-
ary grouping in Peking's ruling circles is knocking together
forces wherever it can and creating a new alliance with imperi-
alism and fascist toadies. . .
From November 5 to 14, Deng toured the ASEAN border states (Thailand,
Malaysia, and Singapore), and made a brief stopover in Burma. Although the
talks were "secret," the word quickly got out that Deng was probing ASEAN
leaders on their position should the Pol Pot government fall to Vietnamese
aggression. Talking to a group of Thai journalists, Deng openly mentioned
the possibility of the fall of Phnom Penh and said, "If my expectation is
correct Cambodia will then be completely overrun, and it will prove to the
world what kind of regime the Vietnamese have. Then will be the time for
28
ASEAN to play an important role in solving the problem^' From later events
it appears that Deng also reached some kind of unpublicized and unacknowledged
understanding with Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak over the movement of




Deng went out of his way to seek favorable publicity, even to the point
of attending a religious ceremony and meeting with the foreign press. When
asked about Chinese support for insurgencies, Deng got a generally favorable
response from the press for his frank reply in Bangkok: "I will not copy Pham
Van Dong in lying (about supplying insurgents) . Sincerity is the prerequisite
29
for good relations among states."
As Deng moved through Southeast Asia, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Firyubin also toured the area. In his case, however, every effort was made
to avoid publicity. At the same time a separate Chinese delegation met in
Phnom Penh with Cambodian leaders. Headed by Wang Dongxing (Wang Tung-hsing)
,
a specialist in security matters and including Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang) (Deng's
close friend and supporter) , the delegation reportedly urged Pol Pot to prepare
to evacuate Phnom Penh and start guerrilla fighting in the countryside.
Deng barely had gotten off the plane after returning to Beijing when he
convened an extraordinary session of the enlarged Politburo. Borrowing a trick
from Mao, he stacked the Politburo with supporters from the provinces and mili-
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tary regions and called the session an "enlarged working conference." Deng
adroitly manipulated the Beijing media, rallies, and wallposters, and his own
backers in the Politburo to force self-criticism from Hua, Wang Dongxing, Wu
De (Wu Teh) and others who had opposed his pragmatic policies for modernizing
China. The incredible events of that fortnight (November 15-30) resulted in
Deng's complete control of the party center and its policies. From this point
on, Deng spoke without hesitation in formulating policies. Hua and his backers
receded into secondary roles. A full plenum (the Third) of the 11th Central
Committee was rapidly assembled in December to ratify Deng's policies and a
mass campaign was conducted throughout China to indoctrinate the population
on these policies, issued as a 19-point document under the heading "Deng and
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Li's talks with foreign friends." From now on Deng could move quickly in high-
risk areas without having to compromise with critics. Events would show that
Deng was indeed ready to take high risks to make up for lost time.
In the midst of these events the war between Vietnam and Cambodia approached
its climax. On December 3, Hanoi announced the formation of the Kampuchean
National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) , taking the final steps
to implement its decision to overthrow the Pol Pot regime made at the February
Central Committee meeting. On 25 December, 100,000 Vietnamese regular army
forces and nearly 20,000 KNUFNS forces invaded Cambodia and drove for Phnom Penh,
entering the defenseless capital 15 days later. The remnants of the Pol Pot
government and its Chinese advisors fled into the countryside or over the border
into Thailand. China lodged protests with the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing and
with the United Nations, but before a more direct response could be undertaken
there remained unfinished business in China's foreign relations.
China and the United States
On December 4 Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nianlong (Han Nien-lung) (sub-
stituting for Huang Hua, who was ill), called on U.S. Liaison Office chief
Leonard Woodcock and indicated China was willing to make certain concessions
on the terms for normalization of relations with the United States. Following
a flurry of messages between Woodcock and Washington, a final agreement was
reached by December 15 and announced with a joint communique, which included
the familiar "anti-hegemony" statement. Premier Hua, in his press conference
following the announcement of normalization, made clear Beijing's understand-
ing of the new relationship: "The content of opposing hegemony is included
in our joint communique. And this, I believe will contribute to the struggle
in Asia and the world against both big and small hegemony. We oppose both
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Responding to the invitation issued by President Carter in early December,
when the U.S. and China agreed to normalize relations, Deng departed on January
28, 1979, for a nine-day visit to the U.S. During his visit Deng had little to
say publicly about Vietnam or its attack on Cambodia. He focused primarily on
the "hegemonists" in Moscow. Cautious at first, Deng increasingly used his
appearances as a forum for attacks on the Soviet Union. Deng did refer speci-
fically to Vietnam when he told members of Congress that to safeguard China's
borders and security "we need to act appropriately, we cannot allow Vietnam
to run wild everywhere. In the interests of world peace and stability, and
in the interests of our own country, we may be forced to do what we do not
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like to do." ' Deng concluded his trip on February 5, calling the visit
"smooth" and "successful" and trailing an informal invitation for the United
States to forsake detente with the Soviet Union and to join in an informal
alliance with China against the Soviets.
On his way home, Deng visited Tokyo, again making statements that indicated
Beijing's intent to invade Vietnam. During a visit with former Jpanaese Prime
Minister Takeo Fukuda he said "the United States is allowing the Soviet Union
to place a lot of pawns on the World's chessboard" and "things cannot be allowed
to go on this way." Vietnam must be "punished" and China would have to apply
:tions."
As in the case of the peace and friendship treaty with Japan, the normal-
ization of relations with the United States was a key element in Deng's stra-
tegy for China's modernization, but pressing security matters dictated that
Beijing adjust its timetable for accomplishment of this major foreign policy
objective. There are several reasons why it was to China's advantage to com-
plete normalization prior to its attack on Vietnam.
It is reasonable to conclude that Deng, a seasoned politican, wanted a
face-to-face meeting with President Carter to judge the U.S. response to the
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idea of an attack by China to "punish" Vietnam. Assistant Secretary of state for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, has stated that Deng, al-
though he did not state it explicitly, left no doubt in President Carter's
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mind that China intended to attack Vietnam. Since improved relations with
the United States was a key element in Deng's modernization strategy, he wanted
to be sure that China's attack would not severely impede the rapid progress
that was being made in improving relations with the U.S. In fact, during Deng's
trip his repeated references to the "big and small hegemonists" and statements
indicating that China would have to "punish" Vietnam drew only mild responses
from U.S. government officials and Congressmen. At no time did President Carter
or any other member of the administration indicate that an attack by China on
Vietnam would result in a slowdown in improving relations between the U.S. and
China or that the U.S. might take some punitive action, economic or otherwise.
If China waited until after its attack on Vietnam, opponents of Beijing's
conditions for normalization in the United States could point to Chinese "ag-
gression" in Vietnam as a sign that China could not be trusted to rely on
peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan problem. In addition, even if this
domestic political opposition could be overcome in the wake of a Chinese
attack, a delay until the spring or summer of 1979 might have found the Carter
administration in a less receptive mood and, as the time for the U.S. presi-
dential elections drew near, less willing to attempt to deal with this issue.
Finally, although Beijing probably placed little value on the ability
of the United States to deter the Soviet Union from retaliating against China
for an attack on Vietnam, normalization of relations between the U.S. and
China and Washington's moderating counsel to Moscow apparently did serve as
a counter-influence on the Soviet Union. Richard Holbrooke stated that




communication with both Beijing and Moscow." Communicating through Washington,
Beijing could make its limited objectives known to Moscow along with Washington's
concern that any Soviet action in response to China's attack would be of "great
concern" to the United States. The relaxation of COCOM restrictions on the
sale of arms by NATO countries in November 1977, the spectre of increasing
technology transfers to China from the United States, and the normalization of
relations between the U.S. and China, intended or not, gave Moscow the impres-
sion that the United States was "behind" China.
China Attacks
On February 11, just six days before the attack, Beijing rejected overtures
by the Vietnamese calling for a cease-fire along the border and a United Nations
supervised demilitarized zone on both sides of the border.
Finally, on February 17, Chinese forces, over 100,000 strong, attacked
Vietnam along the entire border area. The same day, Vietnamese Premier Pham
Van Dong, who had arrived in Phnom Penh just hours before the invasion began,
went ahead with the planned signing of a 25-year peace and friendship treaty
with the new Vietnam-supported Cambodian government. Included in the treaty
were commitments for mutual defense against "international reactionary forces,"
legitimizing Vietnam's military presence in Cambodia.
Following China's initial thrust into Vietnam, the attack slowed on
February 20 and there was a general battlefield lull lasting about two days.
While many Western news agancies were suggesting that this lull was an indica-
tion that Chinese forces might soon withdraw from Vietnamese territory, this
pause enabled Beijing to measure Hanoi's and the Soviet Union's responses to
the attack and gave Hanoi an opportunity to "reassess" its position. Peking
also later admitted to terrain intelligence problems during this initial phase.
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In the initial attack, Chinese forces apparently met with much stiffer
resistance than they had anticipated and Hanoi failed to respond in the desired
manner. Thus, battlefield activity intensified once again on February 22.
In the heaviest fighting of the six-day-old war, Chinese forces launched fresh
attacks on Highway 1 north of the Vietnamese provincial capital of Lang Son
against Vietnamese units guarding the approaches to Hanoi. Chinese government
officials announced that China's "punishment" of Vietnam was not yet finished.
On February 23 the PLA clashed for the first time with well-equipped regiments
of the Vietnamese regular army that had been deployed in the Lang Son area over
the preceding few days.
The inability of China's forces to win a clear-cut victory over the Vietnamese
in the initial phase of the attack required further escalation of the conflict
in Beijing's "punishment" were to be effective. Although the Soviet Union did
not intervene directly in the conflict, they had sent a high-level military
delegation to Hanoi, rushed military supplies to Vietnam, and by February 23
had a naval cask force of 13 warships off northern Vietnam. These actions,
intended to intimidate the Chinese, and the intense Vietnamese propaganda
claiming the Chinese invaders were suffering severe losses, placed Beijing in
an awkward position. If China withdrew at this point it would appear that it
had been defeated by the smaller Vietnam force or had backed down in the face
of Soviet threats.
On February 26, during a lull in the fighting, Vice Premier Deng told
reporters from Japan's Kyodo News Agency that China's invasion of Vietnam
would end in about 10 days, or perhaps a little longer "because Vietnam is
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stronger than India."
The attack was escalated to a new phase when on February 28, Chinese
forces began a large scale attack on Lang Son with the intention of inflicting
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heavy damage on the Vietnamese regular forces defending the city. By March 3,
after an intense battle, Chinese forces drove back the Vietnamese and captured
Lang Son. China immediately called for a cease-fire and announced that it was
ready to withdraw from Vietnam. Although the attack was not an overwhelming
victory for China, the PLA had inflicted sufficient damage on Vietnamese regular
forces to strengthen their position vis-a-vis Hanoi and again demonstrate to the
world that the PRC would take military action when it perceived its national
security interests were threatened. Beijing was now ready to explore detente
with Hanoi.
The day after the attack on Lang Son, on March 1, China initiated detente
measures intended to prevent the conflict from escalating further. The Chinese
government sent a note to the Vietnamese Embassy in Beijing proposing talks
"as soon as possible" to end the two-week-old border war. Beijing proposed
devising "any constructive measures that ensure peace and tranquility" along
the border and then proceed to settle their border disputes "concerning the
boundary and territory."
On March 5, Xinhua announced that China had begun withdrawing its troops
from Vietnam, stating that the invasion force had been pulled out "after achieving
the goals assigned them." On March 15, Beijing announced that all Chinese PLA
units had been withdrawn from Vietnamese territory.
V - COMPONENTS OF THE DECISION
The foregoing discussion has traced the development and interrelation of
the many complex variables that led to China's decision to use military force
in Vietnam and those actions taken by China to deal with the developing crisis.
Based on an analysis of these variables and events and Chinese statements made
after the attack, it appears that China's decision to invade Vietnam can be
broken down into three components.
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The first decision component was that positive action was necessary to
change a situation which had become intolerable to Chinese interests . With
Vietnam's entry into CEMA in June 1978, the signing of a peace and friendship
treaty with Moscow in November, and the formation of the KNUFNS and attack on
Cambodia in December, it became progressively clear to Chinese decision-makers
that previous policies and actions toward Hanoi had failed to prevent a serious
escalation of the conflict or to modify Vietnamese behavior. In addition
Beijing considered this problem in the broader context of Sino-Soviet relations
Beijing believed that it was necessary to demonstrate to both Hanoi and Moscow
that it could not permit this threat to its security and modernization efforts
to go unchecked. A strong Vietnam with control over Cambodia and Laos would
effectively cut China off from a powerful and influential role in Southeast
Asia.
Vietnam's intensification of the armed conflict reflected
the will of both Hanoi and Moscow. If this will prevails
unchecked, China's southern borders areas will never be
stable, her territory and sovereignity will be trampled
on, and her socialist modernization programs will suffer
from increasing interference; Vietnam will become more
unbridled in its drive for expansion and, like Cuba, it
will act wildly without being punished, and in that case,
the peoples of Laos and Kampuchea will directly suffer
from the bitter fruit of aggression and the peace and
security of the Southeast Asian countries will also face
growing pressure and threat. ^6
The second decision component
—
that force was essential to remedy the
situation—was based on the experiential belief that anything short of force
would not suffice to change Vietnamese behavior.
Facts have proved that in dealing with the Vietnamese author-
ities, restraint and forebearance were regarded as an invita-
tion to more bullying and all appeals, advice and warnings
have fallen on deaf ears. Their bullying has gone beyond
the limit of our forbearance.-^
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As far as Beijing was concerned they were confronted by "Vietnamese author-
ities (who) are nationalist expansionists," who were conspiring with Soviet aid
and protection in the encirclement of China.
Hanoi wishfully hoped that so long as China refrained from
making any counterattack against its armed provocations in
the Sino-Vietnamese border areas, it would be able not only
to have an advantage over China in the north, but also to
use this as a kind of show of force to intimidate the
Southeast Asian nations so that it could ride roughshod
over Southeast Asia and expand there. °
A public display of China's willingness to employ force to protect its
interests was important not only for its impression on Hanoi and Moscow, but
on the rest of Southeast Asia and the World. If a small country like Vietnam
could ride roughshod over an ally of China, humiliate overseas Chinese, and
act provocatively on China's very border, anything less than a resolute display
of force would be interpreted as pusillanimous. The credibility of China's
legitimacy as the leader of the Third World against the superpowers was at
stake. In declaring a victory after the invasion, the Chinese asserted "The
situation has not developed as Hanoi and Moscow hoped. "No hegemonism, whether
39global or regional, can frighten people except those who are weak willed .
(Emphasis added.) Deng's repeated promises before the attack that "China
means what it says" revealed the importance in Chinese thinking of establish-
ing such credibility. In the specific case of Vietnam, China also felt it
was important to "explode the myth of Vietnamese invincibility." The cautious
stance adopted by ASEAN countries after the blitzkrieg on Phnom Pneh in
December-January clearly had eroded Chinese influence in the region. China's
"punishment" of Vietnam got a generally favorable press reaction later, and
helped to reverse this slippage.
The third decision component
—
how much force should be used, and in what
manner—was essentially a question of risk exposure. Extreme use of force, to
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overrun major Vietnamese population centers, or to occupy a large amount of
Vietnamese territory, posed unacceptable hazards. Moscow might have had no
choice but to respond massively to roll back Chinese forces, or lose face.
Strategically, this response would logically have had to come as an invasion
along the Sino-Soviet border or in the form of a punitive nuclear strike.
Beijing was not prepared to provoke a such a response from Russia. The alter-
native was a limited war, a form of force diplomacy with which Beijing had
had considerable experience in the past. The gradual escalation of military
pressure through a series of phases (probing, warning, demonstration, attack,
and detente) has been a pattern of Chinese conflict management behavior in
40
confrontations going back to the Korean War. China s use of this kind of
limited warfare makes a maximum use of signalling devices as increasing pres-
sure is brought to bear. The element of surprise is minimal.
Beijing's election of this option reduced its risks but also reduced its
chances of obtaining a clear-cut success in its war aims. By choosing to
"punish" Vietnam with a limited strike into Vietnamese territory, it forewent
the greatest psychological advantage in warfare: convincing the enemy you will
keep escalating pressure until he is no longer willing to endure the punish-
ment and capitulates to your demand. Beijing could hope that Hanoi would
transfer its forces in occupation of Cambodia to the new front, it could hope
that Vietnam would move enough regular army units to the war zone to permit
the Chinese army to win a major battle, it could hope that the hardpressed
Vietnamese people would despair of the unceasing military adventures of their
leaders under this new pressure, but it could not guarantee these results
with the constraints it imposed on itself.
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VI - AFTERMATH: THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 was clearly a watershed, but the full
significance of the event remains to be seen. Three questions are particularly-
pertinent: Will China "punish" Vietnam again? How has the war affected
Chinese domestic politics? And what was the role of the United States in the
development of the China-Vietnam situation and what light does the U.S. role
shed on the development of the strategic triangle (China, the Soviet Union,
and the U.S.)?
Will China "punish" Vietnam again ? Although the war improved Beijing's
image among the non-communist Southeast Asian states and enabled China to
41dispell the "myth of Vietnamese invincibility," China's action failed to
relieve the primary concerns in Beijing: (1) Soviet military penetration of
Southeast Asia; (2) the threat of Soviet-Vietnamese military collusion to the
four modernizations (and Deng's domestic political position); (3) Vietnamese
control over Cambodia; and (4) Vietnam's attitude toward the overseas Chinese
in Vietnam.
The strains of war has actually opened the way for greater Soviet military
access in Vietnam. Arguing the need to support Vietnam most effectively during
the war, the Soviets for the first time have been able to forward-stage TU-95
reconnaissance (BEAR) bombers in Vietnam and obtain permission for Soviet war-
ships to use Vietnamese port facilities. It also appears the Soviets have
been allowed to set up an electronic intelligence-gathering facility in Vietnam.
In Cambodia, even after the Chinese attack, the Vietnamese went on to
conduct a major offensive. Although some forces may have moved north in the
postwar mobilization as Chinese troops withdrew, an estimated 100,000 Vietnamese
occupation troops remained in Cambodia, securing the country for Hanoi's
puppet regime. To oppose these Vietnamese moves, China, on the military
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front, has continued to support the Khmer Rouge resistence movement; diploma-
tically, it has taken active measures to undermine the legitimacy of the new
Cambodian government, such as attempting to block seating of the Heng Samrin
delegation at the Colombo talks.
Both Vietnam and China still have formidable forces facing each other
across their common border. Since February, the Vietnamese were reported to
have more than doubled the number of their troops in the north . to over 140,000.
Despite a charge in May by Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem that
China has massed "up to 10 divisions" on its border, Western military analysts
have suggested that China has considerably reduced its strength in the border
provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, leaving some 250,000 to 300,000 troops, and
42
pulling back equipment and planes for maintenance. Beijing would probably
not attempt to launch a new attack until Pol Pot's forces had been regrouped
and resupplied, so that they could rise up in coordination with China's new
invasion, prepared to exploit any resulting weakness in Vietnam's position
in Cambodia. If and when the Chinese do strike, the attack may once again
take place along the Sino-Vietnamese border or it might occur in Laos, where
the Vietnamese are even more vulnerable.
Certainly the negotiations to end the war showed no desire to improve
relations on either side. China rejected Vietnam's three-point proposal for
a cease-fire, return of territory, and a demilitarized zone and the Vietnamese
rejected China's eight-point proposal, which insisted on a change of alignment
in Vietnam's foreign affairs, the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia,
and, significantly, the return of overseas Chinese forced out of Vietnam. A
May 5 Xinhua report claimed that 20,000 more refugees had been driven into
China since April 1. Each side has claimed continuous, serious border viola-
tions by the other side after hostilities ceased.
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On May 2, Deng Xiaoping told UN Secretary General Waltheim that it might
43
be necessary to "teach Vietnam another lesson." The statement came at the
end of a two-week enlarged party working conference in late April, similar
to the one in November 1978 that cleared the way for final preparations for
the February attack.
How has the war affected Chinese domestic politics ? Quarrels over foreign
policy in China usually exacerbate already existing struggles for authority,
44
status, and influence among leaders in the Politburo. Sources in the leftist
Hong Kong press give the impression that Deng's dominant party is opposed by
the remaining Maoists, led by Wang Dongxin , but give no evidence to show that
the Maoists opposed the decision to invade Vietnam. Apart from two short-
lived wall-posters (which may have been put up by a human rights group, or
even by someone in connivance with the Soviets) , there is every indication
that the war won wide-spread national support. Deng's press was slow to an-
nounce that the war had begun (it was several days until the Chinese people
heard about it from their own media) , but this reticence was probably due to
Deng's caution in waiting for the gamble to show some positive results that
could be dressed up before he committed himself publicly. Wang's faction may
have taken issue with peripheral decisions made in preparation for the war,
such as accelerating ties with Japan and the U.S., and Chinese concessions
on the Taiwan issue, but there is no public record of such footdragging. One
sole intriguing hint, which may not be directly connected with the war except
in time, came with a front-page editorial in People's Daily on March 10 as
Chinese troops were withdrawing from Vietnam. Headlined "Settle Grudges and
Tighten Solidarity," it warned that "There are grudges among many comrades
of the party that, in the worst case, led to the formation of a major breach."
Further elaboration on what provoked such an editorial at this critical time
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will be required before it can be related to the war. The fact that Deng per-
sonally investigated the situation in Southeast Asia immediately before the
November party meeting, and travelled in the U.S. just prior to a final leader-
ship meeting on the eve of the war, also supports the speculation he was gar-
nering evidence to quell opposing arguments in the Politburo.
The only faction in China strong enough to curb Deng is the PLA. Despite
heavy losses in the war, admitted by Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiuquan to be
45
20,000 killed and wounded, the PLA appears to be in Deng s camp. Furthermore,
the PLA stands to benefit substantially from Deng's modernization program. In
the 1979-80 budget, the military sector received a major increase.
What was the role of the U.S. in the development of the China-Vietnam
situation and what light does the U.S. role shed on the development of the
strategic triangle ? For months prior to China's attack, U.S. officials were
preoccupied with the effects of possible hostilities on U.S. national interests.
In a New York Times story on Hodding Carter's press conference on the day of
the attack, it was admitted that the U.S. had been urging China, Vietnam, and
46
the Soviet Union to avoid an armed conflict since September 1978, and that
these efforts included meetings with Vietnamese diplomats and messages from
47
Vance to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and to Chinese officials. Assis-
tant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke
reportedly summoned the PRC ambassador twice in the week prior to Deng's U.S.
visit, to warn him that an attack during the visit would deeply embarrass the
48
U.S. And just prior to the attack, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon
conveyed hope to Gromyko that the Soviets would show restraint if an attack
49
came. The U.S. was in the unusual position, as a White House official
"who asked not to be named" (probably Brzezinski) pointed out, of being the
only global power in a position to talk effectively with both Moscow
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and Beijing. This role appears to have played a critical function before,
during, and after the unfolding crisis.
While these diplomatic activities were taking place a constant stream
of intelligence appeared in the Washington, Tokyo, Bangkok, and Hong Kong press
to the effect that the size of the Chinese forces near the border was limited,
most of the Chinese forces in the south were in defensive positions, and
Soviet forces neither reinforced their units on the Russian-Chinese border nor
ordered mobilization until after the attack had begun. This information
tended to ensure that none of the active participants (China and Vietnam)
,
or a possible participant (the Soviet Union) overestimated and overreacted to
changes in the situation.
The conduct of the belligerents and the Soviet Union in this war was
strange, judged by any standards. All concerned knew well in advance a war
was imminent. Yet Vietnam, a country of 50 million people, chose not to move
its mainline army units out of Cambodia, where they were mopping up the rem-
nants of Pol Pot's shattered army, even to protect itself from attack by a
country of over 950 million. Although a movement would have been time-con-
suming, Vietnam had adequate warning to shift the units, had it so desired.
Once attacked, it could have been too late. Hanoi elected not to shift the
forces, seemingly risking its survival. Vietnam's treaty with the Soviet
Union was not much to count on, given Moscow's record of limited support in
wars for North Korea and India, previous treaty allies. Nevertheless, Hanoi
seemed to have confidence that Beijing's attack would be limited and brief.
Was this confidence based on foreknowledge, and if so what was its source?
The actions of the Soviet Union appear equally strange. Once the Chinese
attacked Vietnam, Moscow did not take the basic precautions of reinforcing
its border units and deploying its Pacific fleet. Having just signed a
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defense treaty with the overt purpose of deterring such an attack, and being
by nature a suspicious and conservative military power, Russia could have been
expected to prepare for the worst as Vietnam and China started over the brink
into the unknown. Or was it unknown? Was Moscow the source of knowledge which
account for Hanoi's apparent confidence?
The pattern of Soviet and Vietnamese activity bespeaks a clear understand-
ing of future Chinese activities. Beijing did not announce that it was launch-
ing a limited war until the day of the attack; the specific limitations of its
actions (depth and duration of penetration, not entering Red River valley, etc .)
were not announced for days later. Yet Hanoi and Moscow acted even before the
attack as though they possessed this key information and were confident in its
accuracy. It is highly unlikely that Beijing could have approached Moscow
to probe the threshold of its reaction to possible Chinese attack scenarios,
and even if it had, there is no reason to believe that Moscow would have had
any confidence in Beijing's assurances. Both wanted to talk about the expected
hostilities in Indochina, but needed a reliable intermediary.
U.S. national interests would have supported taking this role, and there
are good reasons to believe Washington in fact did. Both Washington and Beijing
wanted to avoid an Indochina war spreading into a major Sino-Soviet war, and
both found it in their national interests to avoid a situation in Indochina
that could lead to Soviet intervention and possibly permanent presence in the
area. The interests of the U.S. and the Soviet Union also overlapped: neither
wanted a wider war. Moscow seems to have taken the unprecedented step sig-
nalling Beijing through Washington what specific limits of Chinese action




For the first time a new communications grid was apparently established
within the strategic triangle, with Washington at its center. In this specific
case it appears the United States put its own prestige on the line by supporting
the bona fides of the Chinese to the Soviet Union, and vice versa . The ploy
was successful because of the enormous stakes involved. But more importantly,
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A consistent pattern of foreign policy decision-making is emerging in
the post-Mao era. This pattern can be expected to survive Teng Hsiau-ping's
leadership tenure, unless the purged radicals and hardline Maoists regain
power, which seems unlikely.
Foreign policy objectives and programs are approved in the Politburo,
where a coalition of older party bureaucrats and younger technocrats are
committed to expanding foreign ties to speed modernization. Considerable
diplomatic experience exists at this level and is increasing, as Politburo
members start to travel abroad.
Routine foreign policy decisions are coordinated and made in the State
Council. The proliferation of these incremental day-to-day decisions in
the past two years is the result of China's rapidly expanding trade and
diplomatic interests. As Chinese national interests have shifted from
ideological to economic priorities, the State Council has become the
natural forum in which competing bureaucratic interests resolve conflicts.
Decison-making increasingly can be tied to the budget cycle and trade
balances. The shift of responsibilities from party to government organs
is promoted by functional as well as political considerations. Teng's
power base is in the government bureaucracy.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as a center of coordination and
policy development, but not as a decison-making point. Its top bureaucrats
do not occupy key party positions. The Ministry has established a tradition
of avoiding involvement in the political arena of decision-making, with all
the turbulence traditionally found there. Instead, it has gradually built
up a corps of seasoned diplomats who are expert observers and reporters,
and a managerial echelon of vicr and assistant ministers who are highly
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experienced in specialized fields. The Ministry exercises influence through
its recommendat ions and position papers, for State Council and Politburo
approval. The decision-making bodies are well served by this arrangement,
in which the Foreign Ministry serves as a buffer between them and outside
pressures.
Foreign policy decison-makers have continual access to unedited world
press reporting on current affairs, through internal translation services.
Their leaders frequently consult with visiting heads of state and influential
politicians. Their embassies and the NCNA provide additional well-focused
reporting. In general one must give the Chinese leadership high marks for
being well informed and sensitive to changing situations, even under crisis
conditions.
Decision-making during negotiations is retained in Peking, no matter
where the talks may be situated. Chinese negotiators are well-briefed,
patient, and careful probers of their adversaries' positions. Only when
every direct and peripheral pressure has been brought to bear, and the
opponent's rock-bottom position ascertained, will Peking signal its
negotiators to reach an agreement. The "response cycle" time (between
submission of a proposal to Chinese negotiators in the field and their
receipt of instructions from Peking in response) is typically 4-6 weeks.
China's crisis management behavior has been highly consistent over
the past 30 years. It is most likely to involve force when its interests
are threatened in countries along its borders. It concentrates its
hostilities towards a current "main enemy" and tends to analyze situations
in terms of resolving "the main contradiction" to Chinese interests posed
by that enemy's behavior. Peking will follow a set escalation ladder
(probing, warning, demonstration, attack, and finally detente) in its use
of force to protect its threatened interests.
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As our contacts with Chinese decision-makers increase, we need to
extract in discussions with them more details about the bureaucratic
politics that angered these highly consistent patterns of diplomatic
behavior. Only then can we put the patterns in their natural environment
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